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This thesis is an analysis of factors affecting the dis­
tribution of contract (i.e., procurement) awards for "external analysis 
and management services"— management analysis, economic analysis, 
policy analysis, social research, management support, and the design, 
operation, and evaluation of social programs. The primary interests 
are: 1) the distribution of awards between for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations, and 2) the impact upon this distribution of policies 
adopted by the Congress or the bureaucracy which have the effect of 
reducing the ability of one organizational type vis-a-vis another to 
compete effectively. The analysis will utilize data from a sample of 
contracts awarded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) that will indicate characteristics of the recipient organization, 
and to a lesser extent, utilize data from recently-instituted federal 
procurement information systems*
*A11 notes are located at the end of the respective chapters. 
Notes for Chapter I are located on page 40.
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The preliminary discussion begins with a review of theoreti­
cal questions and societal issues relating to this policy area and 
stresses the need for a quantitative, empirical study to establish a 
base for further research and social action. In order to focus atten­
tion upon the broader theoretical questions and issues involved in the 
present trend of government at all levels to rely evermore heavily 
upon nongovernmental organizations and governmental bureaus at other 
levels of government for the provision of needed services, there will 
be no attempt in the first section to limit the discussion to contract­
ual actions (vis-a-vis grants) or to any particular level of government. 
In the next four sections of Chapter I, it will be explained why the 
scope of the analysis will be limited to; a) the federal level of 
government, b) contract awards over $10,000 (primarily those awarded 
by HUD), c) contract awards for external analysis and management ser­
vices, and d) the distribution of contract awards between for-profit 
and not-for-profit organizations. In the last section of Chapter I, 
the specific research question will be stated, and possibilities for 
utilization of the research results will be identified. The hypothesis 
is that federal procurement policy favors for-profit organizations in 
the competitive process for contractual awards to provide external 
analysis and management services.
In Chapter II, the analysis will begin, utilizing quantita­
tive methods to identify factors affecting the distribution of contract 
awards. If, as expected, some of these factors include policies to 
restrict competition, it will be determined what the original intent 
of these policies were and whether the actual distribution pattern of 
contract awards achieved the expected result.
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Research Orientation 
Traditional areas of interest in both political science and 
political economy have been: 1) what the functions of government
should be, and 2) the extent to which the government should perform 
any given duty. For example, the most basic question is whether govern­
ment should be involved at all in any given activity (such as educa­
tion); but once this question is resolved either in or out of the 
public arena, it still remains to be determined just how much the 
government should intervene (e.g., in public school policies) or should 
commit its resources to accomplish desired ends (e.g., to support 
educational institutions). Another theoretical question related to 
the first two which has recently commanded much interest in the litera­
ture in public administration is the following: If it has been determined
either by the legislature or its agents what the functions of government 
will be and to what extent the powers and resources of government are 
to be exercised or committed, should bureaucracies "do the work of 
government," or is it both proper and advisable that "outside" organiza­
tions perform these duties?^
One group of authors has taken the position that only govern­
ment agencies should perform the really important tasks of government, 
and outside organizations should only be relied upon to provide support—  
i.e., goods and nonessential services.% Among their arguments are:
• Private organizations, in particular, are too susceptible 
to conflicts-of-interest to keep the social good as the 
primary goal— especially when regulatory functions are 
concerned.^
• The utilization of outside organizations leads to a 
loss of accountability to— and control by— the 
legislature and its agents.4
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# Reliance upon outside organizations leads to demorali­
zation within government agencies and to a waste of "in- 
house" skills.5
# When outside organizations are involved in direct services 
delivery, cost criteria rather than the quality of service 
too often become the primary determinants for adminis­
trative decisions regarding program development and often 
become the primary measures of program success.&
Another group of authors has defended the proposition that 
outside organizations should perform most of the functions of government 
and that the bureaucracy should serve primarily in a coordinating 
role.7 Among their arguments are:
# Outside organizations are more economical in performing 
the functions of government than the bureaucracies charged 
with the original mandate by the legislature— particularly 
when direct services to the public are involved.®
# Outside organizations (particularly those in the private 
sector) are more flexible and innovative in program develop­
ment. ̂
■ In the performance of program evaluation and other analyses, 
outside organizations can provide objectivity and different 
perspectives lacking from within the bureaucracy.^®
# Outside organizations can obtain needed expertise for 
short time-intervals without having to be concerned with 
ponderous merit system regulations and bureaucratic pro­
cesses.
The ideological climate in this country tends to favor those 
who argue for more involvement by outside organizations.12 This 
climate seems more pronounced at the federal level of government than 
at the state or local level. Donald Haider expresses the prevailing 
ideology well when describing the management initiatives begun by 
President Ford:
What government decides on supplying itself as opposed to depending 
on the private sector...has a significant impact on private sector 
jobs and overall private sector growth....Dating from, at least, 
the recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission (1953-1955), 
federal departments and agencies have given varying degrees of
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support to the government policy of maximum reliance on the private 
sector [emphasis mine] to supply the government with goods and 
services.... To revive this standing policy since the early 
1960's by 0MB Circular A-76, the president asked...department and, 
agency heads to development a plan for increasing reliance on the 
private sector....13
Another factor which has tended to increase the involvement 
of outside organizations has been the political consideration that 
increasing the programs and responsibilities of the agencies has been 
politically popular, but increasing the number of government employees 
has been perceived by legislative bodies and executive officials as 
being politically unwise. Again, this tendency seems more pronounced 
at the federal level of government.1̂  For example, federal civilian 
employment increased only 20 percent from the end of 1955 to the end 
of 1979— a rise from 2.4 to 2.9 million.15 In the same time period, 
federal expenditures increased 621 percent from $68.5 billion to $493.7 
billion.1̂  This increase in expenditures can partially be attributed 
to inflation, real wage increases given to government personnel, and 
additional capital investment. However, the most significant factors 
are the growth in intergovernmental programs and increased agency 
responsibilities mandated by the Congress or by decision-makers within 
the executive branch.
As Rosenblum and McGillis observe:
When an agency is mandated to perform certain tasks and is account­
able for the successful completion of those tasks but does not 
have the authority to hire the necessary staff, the only resource, 
short of failure, may be.to award contracts or grants.1'
The interaction between these pressures is most observable at the 
federal level of government. Whereas expenditures on personnel compen­
sation and benefits declined from approximately 15 percent of the 
federal budget in 1955 to approximately 10 percent of the federal
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budget in 1979, it is estimated that expenditures through the use of 
contracts and grants increased slightly from approximately 39.6 percent 
of the federal budget in 1955 to approximately 41.8 percent in 1979.18 
In absolute terms, 1979 expenditures were $206 billion through the 
use of contracts and grants (increasing from $27 billion in 1955) and 
$47.6 billion for civilian personnel compensation and benefits.1*
The debates over the propriety, economy, and effectiveness 
of utilizing outside organizations will undoubtedly continue, and 
different federal agencies, states, and local governments will choose 
different organizational "mixes" to accomplish one task vis-a-vis 
another; however, it is expected that due to the political perceptions 
of legislative members and prominent decision-makers within the respec­
tive executive branches, the tension between increased agency responsi­
bilities and the limitation on hiring will continue to intensify.
Further, legislative and executive decision-makers have made "successive 
limited" decisions^®— particularly at the federal level— which have 
resulted in a de facto policy of relying heavily upon outside organiza­
tions. This policy is not likely to be reversed in the near future.
Thus, it is expected that, in relative terms, expenditures for government 
agency personnel and capital requirements will decline, while expenditures 
for contracts and grants will increase. This tendency will be manifested 
at not only the federal level, but other levels of government as well.
As a result of this expected tendency, it is contended that 
the discussion in the literature should now be oriented not towards 
determining whether it is proper for outside organizations to provide 
any of the important functions of government, but rather, towards the 
following two core questions:
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1) Which fucntions can best be provided by which types of 
outside organizations with the maximum degree of efficiency, effective­
ness, and/or equity?^!
2) Assuming it is known which functions could best be provided 
by certain organizational types, what processes need to be instituted
to ensure that thé organizational types most suited to perform a given 
function would actually receive the contract or grant award associated 
with that function?
The.se two questions are central to the debate concerning 
what Sharkansky terms the "margins of government," where tasks of policy
formulation, service delivery, and evaluation are performed with consid­
erable autonomy and with the absence of conventional mechanisms of 
control,22 Unfortunately, Sharkansky also notes that there is an 
inadequate information base to address these two questions, particularly 
in regard to contracts and contractors.23
Crucial is an improvement in basic information. Most writing 
about government contracting relies on illustration selected 
according to no systematic scheme. There is no solid informa­
tion even about the magnitude of government contracting. Academics
can join policy makers in urging systematic collection of basic
information about contractors and other kinds of bodies on the 
margins of government....At the present time, the lack of systema­
tic attention to contracting...means that any crisis [emphasis 
. his] that could be described is more clearly one of information 
and analysis than of a breakdown in the activities of policy
making or administration.24
Sharkansky is correct in contending that present research efforts 
should now be directed towards understanding "who gets what and why."
The theoretical linkage between these considerations and the research 
questions discussed earlier is indicated by the typology of research 
questions on the next page. The position here is that focusing the 
research upon the behavioral considerations will aid further research
* 8" -
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in approaching the two core questions as well as providing a base for 
social action.25
The information and theory derived from determining "who 
gets what and why” could then be used in a study with a more ambitious 
scope to aid in identifying which functions are performed best by which 
types of outside organizations. For example, given that a reasonable 
degree of competition e x i s t s , 26 and that one type of outside organiza­
tion is consistently relied upon to provide a specific service, then 
this might be an indication that decision-makers within the bureauc­
racies considered that type of organization more efficient or effective 
in providing the service. If further research determines that the 
indicator is indeed valid and that it is consistent with performance 
evaluation indicators, there would be a basis for the argument that 
this type of outside organization should continue to provide these 
services to the government.
On the other hand, if it is determined that one organizational 
type receives a disproportionate share of awards for any category of 
services because other organizational types are excluded from the 
competitive process, then the actual receipt of awards would be a poor 
indicator of the efficiency or effectiveness of the respective organi­
zational types in providing that service. In that case, futher research 
would have to be performed to develop valid indicators.
During the preliminary stages of the research, this author 
was impressed not only with the poor quality of available evaluation 
criteria regarding the performance of outside organizations, but 
also with the invalid selection procedures for sampling by the Govern­
ment Accounting Office (GAO). Due to both of these considerations.
- l o ­
che focus of the research was shifted from an analysis of performance 
Indicators to attempting to explain "who gets what and why." But this 
Is not to argue that performance criteria are not Important. In fact, 
probably no significant reform will actually occur until these performance 
criteria are developed and linked together In some Integrated system 
for ready access by the Congress or Its agents. But whereas the aim 
of this research effort Is to make a contribution In suggested methods 
for developing this Integrated system, the actual development or compar­
ison of performance Indicators Is outside the scope of this thesis..
Thus, the primary research orientation Is to explain how 
much Is awarded, which organizational types receive these awards, and 
why they tend to do so. In the course of this discussion, the linkage 
between these considerations and the question of what processes are 
needed to ensure that the organizational types most suited to perform 
a given function would actually be assigned to perform that function 
will be Identified. However, this does not define the central research 
question. Before this question can be stated with a sufficient degree 
of conciseness, there needs to be some clarification of the scope of 
the thesis. This clarification Is related to the following topics:
• the level of government (I.e., federal),
• the policy area (I.e., contracts Instead of grants),
• the type of good or service (I.e., external analysis and 
management services), and
• the primary Interest regarding distribution of awards 
(I.e., to not-for-profit and for-profit organizations, 
respectively).
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Each topic forms the subject for one of the four following sections. 
Within each section, the limitations upon the scope of the thesis will 
be discussed, and it will be explained why a case study is needed. 
Finally, in the last section of this chapter, the research question 
will be stated.
The Level of Government
As discussed previously, the debate regarding the propriety, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of utilizing outside organizations is 
occuring not only at the federal level of government, but at the state 
and local levels as well. However, the trends regarding the increasing 
tension between program responsibilities, the limitations on hiring, 
and the resulting increase in expenditures through the use of contracts 
and grants are easier to identify at the federal level of government 
than at the state or local level. Also, the policies of the federal 
government regarding the maximum utilization of the private sector are 
more explicit and uniform than the various state policies. For these 
reasons alone, it appears that the first research effort should be to 
ascertain tendencies manifested at the federal level.
Experience has also indicated that the crux of the debate is 
different at the federal and state levels.27 Congressmen do not 
have much control over personnel selection procedures in the federal 
government and have not expressed much concern over salaries in outside 
organizations vis-a-vis civil servants. As a result. Congressional 
interest is likely to be directed toward the effectiveness and total 
cost of utilizing outside organizations; and when there is concern 
expressed by Congressmen over accountability and propriety, it is that
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federal agencies are losing control over public funds being paid to 
outside organizations and that outside organizations are not being 
held accountable in terms being evaluated properly regarding their 
performance.
At the state level, outside organizations are more likely to 
be offering direct services to the public, and state legislators have 
traditionally wielded considerable influence in the delivery of these 
services within their districts. State legislators appear much more 
nervous about the state losing control over the quality of service 
being offered than their federal counterparts. In addition, many 
legislators are not hesitant to "recommend" to the agency manager that 
certain individuals should be hired. There is little doubt that the 
influence of state legislatures is diminished when outside organizations 
(particularly those that are legally "private") are called upon to 
deliver direct services instead of government bureaus. Also, state 
legislators seem to be much more concerned that pay scales in outside 
organizations are likely to be higher than pay scales for comparable 
work reflected in the merit system.
As a result of these factors, there is the possibility of a 
considerable "backlash" at the state level which does not appear likely 
at the federal level. Although the trend of states to rely evermore 
heavily upon outside organizations to perform the functions of government 
seems to be becoming stronger, that trend may lose its momentum or even 
be reversed in many states. No such reaction is anticipated at the 
federal level unless there is a very fundamental change in attitude by 
Congressmen to allow an increase in government employment and to
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reduce the scope of the federal government. Neither of these changes 
are likely to occur.
Thus, in order to discern tendencies that are uniform, and 
in order to concentrate the analysis upon trends that are not expected 
to be reversed in the near future, this thesis will only be concerned 
with the involvement of the federal government (i.e., the Government) 
with outside organizations. But it should be emphasized that one of 
the more varied and interesting topics for future research is the 
relationship between state and local governments and outside organiza­
tions which serve them in a contractual capacity.
The Policy Area
Contracts and grants are actually legal instruments, not 
award categories. The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 
1977 (Pub. L. 95-224) distinguishes between "procurement" and "assis­
tance" relationships and specifies when various types of legal instru­
ments are to be used.^8 Procurement relationships are to be executed 
by contracts and are applicable whenever "...the principal purpose...is 
the acquisition, by purchase, lease or barter, of property or services 
for the direct benefit or use of the Federal Government."29 Assistance 
relationships are to be executed by grants or cooperative agreements^® 
and are applicable whenever;
...the principal purpose...is the transfer of money, property, 
services, or anything of value to the State and local government 
or other recipient to accomplish a public purpose of support or 
stimulation authorized by Federal statute, rather than [emphasis 
mine] acquisition, by purchase, lease or barter, of property or 
services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal Government...
The most important types of federal a s s i s t a n c e ^ ^  terms 
of magnitude are intergovernmental programs (i.e., "grants-in-aid).
.31
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which totaled $82.9 billion in 1979, and research and development grants, 
which totalled $28.9 billion in 1979.33 This combined total of 
$111.8 billion exceeds that spent upon federal procurements, estimated 
by the Office of Management and Budget to be $94.4 billion in 1979.34
However, due in large part to the criticisms voiced by Senator 
Pryor (D-Ark.) and Representative Harris (D-Va.), the most heated 
debates at the federal level of government are not in regard to inter­
governmental programs or research and development grants, but rather, 
with outside organizations performing analysis and support functions 
for federal agencies.35 It is these contractors who are the principal 
beneficiaries of the tension between increased agency responsibilities 
and the limitation upon hiring. Since these services have been tradition­
ally viewed as being of direct benefit or use of the federal government, 
they have primarily been acquired through the use of contracts.36 It 
is for this reason that the focus of this thesis is upon procurement 
policy. Assistance policy will only be referenced whenever some commonal­
ities between the two policy areas need to be stressed. In the main, 
however, procurement policy and assistance policy have developed independ­
ently and have their own literature.
Prior to the institution of the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FFDS), it was difficult to determine the magnitude of procure­
ment awards granted by civilian agencies.37 As will be discussed 
in the following sections, there are still problems relating to the 
design and accuracy of FPDS data, but the institution of this statistical 
reporting system in 1979 allows a capability to discern major procurement 
trends which was not previously possible. For example, the data reveals 
the geographical imbalance of federal procurement awards. Washington,
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D.C., with less than .4 percent of the population, accounted for 1.5 
percent of all awards; but Oklahoma, with 1.2 percent of the popula­
tion, accounted for only .5 percent of all a w a r d s . 38
The difficulty is that the FPDS is not designed to indicate 
why Washington, D.C., received a relative higher percent of procurement 
awards than Oklahoma. Preliminary research indicated that the FPDS 
data was similarly not adequate for explaining many other tendencies 
of primary interest in this study, e.g., why different types of outside 
organizations received disproportionate amounts of procurement awards 
(see below).
Therefore, it was decided to conduct a sample of procurement 
awards granted by HUD. The reason for choosing HUD was that permission 
was granted by HUD to examine the contract files. Because of Privacy 
Act requirements, the agencies are very hesitant in opening their 
files to outside reviewers. In fact, had this student not been a HUD 
employee working in the Office of Procurement and Contracts, it is 
doubtful that this permission would have been obtained. This poses 
a challenge for analyses of procurement policy which have a broader and 
more comparative scope.
The sample was from all procurement awards, regardless of 
the fiscal year, to provide a longitudinal perspective. A consolidated 
list of all basic procurement awards granted by HUD since its inception 
was obtained. Then, a census was taken of files actually available at 
HUD. This census revealed a disturbing practice by HUD which, according 
to GAO auditors, was common to most federal agencies and which creates 
severe problems for any evaluation study. The agencies have attempted 
to place historical data on computers and have either destroyed the
—16—
original files or sent them to storage (from which it is extremely 
time consuming and expensive to retrieve files). In the case of HUD, 
the validity of the data retained in the automated information system 
is dubious. Thus, the only source of valid longitudinal data is the 
contract files. But for basic awards granted prior to FY 79, the 
percent of files closed and sent to storage was high, probably approach­
ing thirty percent.
There is no question that the agencies need to close out 
files. One contract "file" located occupied six drawers of standard 
metal file cabinets. Although this particular contract was an exception, 
it does indicate the need for agencies to store and eventually destroy 
information. On the other hand, this poses severe difficulties for 
the evaluator. Probably, summary information, such as contained in 
the codebook used in this study (see Appendix B located at the end of 
the thesis), needs to be available for the various inspection agencies 
and to provide a base to determine the validity of the automated infor­
mation systems.
Fortunately, no such problem was encountered for contracts 
in which the basic award was granted by HUD in FY 79 and the first 
quarter of FY 80. The "closeout" process takes too long (sometimes in 
excess of two years) for current basic awards to be unavailable for 
review.
Thus, by sampling all HUD contract files not in storage, two 
sets of data were obtained. The first, for basic awards made prior to 
FY 79, has a relatively high percent of missing cases, but may be useful 
for lending perspective to recent tendencies. The second, for basic 
awards made in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80, has a negligible
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proportion of missing cases. For that reason, most of the analysis 
will be limited to the current data, not that which is applicable to 
basic awards made prior to FY 1979.
Futher, it was decided to limit the analysis to those contracts 
in which the basic award exceeded $10,000. The rules and regulations 
governing awards of $10,000 or less are different than for awards over 
$10,000; therefore, it is better methodology not to combine these two 
fundamental award categories in the same analysis. By limiting the 
study to awards over $10,000, the major tendencies of interest in this 
thesis may be adequately ascertained while at the same time achieving 
significant economy in the research. Awards of $10,000 or less in FY 79 
accounted for almost 98 percent of all procurement actions, but only 
slightly more than 10 percent of the total amount of procurement.39
There were 518 contracts over $10,000 on file at HUD.40 
This constituted the target population. The formula used to determine 
the sample size was that provided by Oliver Benson, with the following 
assumptions and conditions being established: 1) the population 
"split" was 70/30; 2) the confidence interval was established at + 5 
percent; and 3) the confidence level was established at 95 percent.41 
Based on these, the needed sample size would be 199.42 However, due 
to uncertainty over the estimate of the population split, the sample 
size was increased to 259, one half of all available HUD contract 
files. The method used to select the particular contracts for examina­
tion was random sampling. Thus, the confidence level for all current 
files is probably in excess of 95 percent, whereas the confidence 
level for the subset of basic awards prior to FY 79 is probably somewhat
less.43
-18-
Type Of Good Or Service 
Services provided to the Government through utilization of 
contractors are sometimes referred to as "outside" services, the impli­
cation being that these services could be performed "in house" if 
adequate personnel was a v a i l a b l e . ^4 As Elliot H. Kline and C.
Gregory Buntz observe, these outside services are both professional 
and nonprofessional:
Services range from the preparation of food, collection of trash, 
and maintenance of property to the more cerebral endeavors of 
management analysis, economic analysis, policy analysis, and the 
design, operation, and evaluation of social p r o g r a m s . 45
To complicate matters, even the most "cerebral endeavors" are not
procured as separate entities. That is, when a government agency
awards a contract for outside services, it does so to accomplish "tasks,"
which are combinations of goods and s e r v i c e s .46 An example of one
such task might be to evaluate the effectiveness of a certain program
in a given city. The Government in this case is not only purchasing
the professional service of an evaluator, but also a proportionate
share of the cost of physical facilities and support services (e.g.,
clerical) the evaluator needs to accomplish the primary objective.
Thus, when the Government states that it has purchased a certain amount
of outside services for, say, program evaluation, the ancillary costs
of physical facilities, other support services (both professional and
nonprofessional), and other direct and indirect costs are included.
The focus of the criticisms of Senator Pryor, Representative 
Harris, and other Congressional critics has been upon those task-oriented 
contracts which have as their primary objective the provision of manage­
ment analysis, economic analysis, policy analysis, social research.
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managerial support (Including the holding of conferences and providing 
training and automatic data processing expertise), and the design, 
operation (including providing technical assistance to confédéral 
grovemnents or groups), and evaluation of social programs.4? There 
is no term either in common usage by the Government or in the literature 
which adequately describes this cluster of services. In this thesis, 
the term "external analysis and management services" will be used.48 
The term "consultant services" is often used by members of Congress, 
the popular press, and in the theoretical literature.49 However, 
the concept of "consultant" has a technical meaning in contract adminis­
tration which is not consistent with describing any particular type 
of service.50
This thesis will be restricted to examining external analysis 
and management services. A conservative estimate of the managitude of 
these services is that approximately $6.7 billion— or 7.8 percent— of 
procurement awards over $10,000 were granted for external analysis and 
management services in 1979.51 Comparable data for awards under 
$10,000 are not available. However, if it is assumed that the same 
percentage of awards under $10,000 were granted for these types of 
services, then it may be estimated that awards for external analysis 
and management services approached $7.4 billion in 1979.52 The 
incentive for competing for these awards is thus significant.
The proportion of HUD awards over $10,000 for external 
analysis and management services is much higher than for all agencies 
as a whole. As Table 1-1 on the following page indicates, approximately 
90 percent of HUD awards over $10,000 for acquisitions other than 
construction were for external analysis and management services in
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FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80. Further, the proportions have 
remained very steady over time. The percentage of total HUD awards 
for external analysis and management services is lower, because most 
HUD awards of $10,000 or less are for goods and other services, and 
contracts for construction activities by HUD are substantial.
Table 1-1; HUD Awards Over $10,000, For Acquisitions Other Than 
Construction, By Type Of Effort
Type of Effort
Basic Award Actions
Prior to FY 79 
(%)
FY 79 And First 
Quarter of FY 80 
(%)
External Analysis And 
. Management Services
90.2 89.6





source of data: sample of HUD contracts
Primary Interest Regarding Distribution Of Awards 
The question of the propriety of utilizing outside organiza­
tions is often associated with the role of profit in acquiring needed 
goods or services; i.e., whether organizations ought to be able to 
make a profit from performing the functions of government. In order 
to be able to provide an information base for future examination of 
this question, this analysis will be oriented primarily toward deter­
mining the dynamics of the competitive relationship between for-profit 
and not-for-profit organizations. For-profit organizations are those 
which may, according to their charter, distribute any or all of the
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net Income (I.e., total revenue minus total expenses) to one or more 
individuals. Net income which may be distributed to private individuals 
is " p r o f i t . T h a t  portion of net income which is not so distributed 
is added to "retained earnings."54 A not-for-profit organization may 
accumulate retained earnings, but it may not, according to its charter, 
either accumulate for, or distribute to, individual owners a portion 
of net income. Therefore, a not-for-profit organization may not, by 
definition, have a "profit." Rather, net income of not-for-profit 
organizations is commonly referred to as the "increment above cost" 
or the "fund balance."55 This conception of for-profit and not-for- 
profit organizations appears to be consistent with the concept of 
"not-for-profit" suggested by Amitai Etzioni and Pamela Doty56 and 
is compatible with that utilized by the federal government.57 There­
fore, as Harold Orlans has indicated, there is no conceptual difficulty 
in utilizing the Internal Revenue Service’s judgements of what is (or 
is not) a for-profit or not-for-profit organization.58 Examples of 
not-for-profit organizations include educational institutions and 
nonprofit research institutes.
Not-for-profit organizations received only 4.8 percent of 
all 1979 federal procurement awards over $10,000 and 4.5 percent of 
all 1979 federal procurement awards of $10,000 or less.59 It is 
suspected, however, that the percentage of procurement awards to not- 
for-profit organizations for external analysis and management services 
is much higher. But because the Federal Procurement Data System is 
not designed to provide procurement data by organizational type and by 
product and service code, this hypothesis could not be verified.
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As Table 1.2 below indicates, the sample revealed that for 
external analysis and management services, HUD awarded approximately 
36 percent of procurement awards over $10,000 to not-for-profit 
organizations in all fiscal years. This suggests that those agencies, 
like HUD, which procure a relatively high amount of external analysis 
and management services instead of goods or other services are more 
likely to rely on not-for-profit organizations. However, the proportion 
of HUD awards for external analysis and management services received 
by not-for-profit organizations (i.e., 36-percent) is still relatively 
low considering that there appears to be no inherent reason why these 
services could not be performed equally well by either organizational 
type. In other words, the proportion of awards to for-profit and 
not-for-profit organizations for this type of service could be expected 
to be closer to 50 percent, respectively. Furthermore, Table 1.2- 
indicates that the proportion of HUD awards over $10,000 for external 
anlaysis and management services to not-for-profit organizations 
has been declining, from approximately 38 percent prior to FY 79 to 33 
percent in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80.
Table 1-2; HUD Basic Procurement Awards Over $10,000 For External 




% of Basic Awards
Prior To FY 79 FY 79 and the first 
quarter of FY 80
All Awards
For-Profit 61.6 67.4 63.9
Not-For-Profit 38.4 32.6 36.1
Total, All 
Organizations 100 100 100
N 138 95 233
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There Is no explanation in the literature that accounts for 
these tendencies (i.e., either the decline of or the relatively low 
magnitude of the proportion of HUD awards for external analysis and 
management services to not-for-profit organizations). Providing that 
explanation constitutes the primary interest of the thesis and the 
focus for the research. Since it is hypothesized that the tendencies 
are ubiquitous throughout the federal system, an analysis of HUD procure­
ment awards for external analysis and management services may provide 
the basis for a more ambitious study which includes all federal agencies 
in the analysis.
The Research Question And Utilization 
John F. Magnotti and James S. Hostetler have suggested that 
two types of factors should be considered when examining the competi­
tive relationship between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations.
The first type are behavioral and economic factors which influence an 
organization's ability to compete against other organizations when 
there is open entry into the procurement process. The second type are 
"political factors," those factors which determine whether an organ­
ization is eligible to participate at all.
Within the context of this theoretical perspective and the 
limitations on the scope as described in the previous four sections, 
the two central research questions for this thesis are as follows:
1) If the decision has indeed been made that more and more 
of the work of Government is to be performed by organizations outside 
of Government, then have for-profit organizations or not-for-profit
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organizations benefitted the most in the competition for HUD procurement 
awards for external analysis and management services— and why?
2) Have the secondary impacts of Congressional mandates or 
bureaucratic actions significantly altered the competitive relationship 
between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations; i.e., does a 
reasonable degree of competition still exist?
In order to examine these two questions, the research effort 
will include the following:
1) utilizing theory derived from political science, public 
administration, and economics to identify factors affecting the relative 
competitive advantages and disadvantages of for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations in the procurement process;
2) evaluating, with the tools of quantitative policy analysis, 
whether these competitive advantages and disadvantages explain the 
distribution of HUD procurement awards for external analysis and manage­
ment services or whether that distribution is better explained by the 
impacts of policies adopted by the Congress or the bureaucracy which 
have the effect of reducing the degree of competition (i.e., "political 
factors");
3) determining whether these political factors, if they 
exist, are intentional or unintentional;
4) assessing the extent to which these factors are common 
to other federal agencies (other than HUD); and
5) integrating the results of the research with other perspec­
tives and/or studies in political science and public administration.
Specific, testable hypotheses will be described in the separ­
ate sections of the thesis. But the primary hypothesis is that the
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Government, through the adoption of exclusionary policies, favors 
for-profit organizations in the competitive process for procurement 
awards to provide external analysis and management services. If the 
hypothesis holds, the conclusion might address the need for more research 
to devise alternatives to the present parameters upon which political 
factors are based. Thus, the research results might be of some use to 
Congressional subcommittees and/or their staffs who have expressed an 
interest in the appropriateness of present procurement policies. But 
experience has indicated that expectations of fundamental reform are 
somewhat unrealistic. Therefore, the research effort has been tailored 
to provide some direçt utilization possibilities for the members of 
the Congress and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy who are, 
together, searching for methods to report more accurately how much is 
actually being spent for external analysis and management services and 
which organizations are the primary beneficiaries of that largesse.
Beyond this, the goal of the research is modest, i.e., to provide an 
information base for future research.
A deterrent toward building a base for future research is 
the specialized terminology associated with the procurement process 
and a basic unfamiliarity by the academic community with that pro­
curement process. As the recent article by Phillip Cooper suggests, 
there is a growing awareness in public administration that before 
the important procurement policy issues can be addressed, there needs 
to be at least a rudimentary understanding of the procurement process.
Appendix A at the end of this chapter is designed to provide 
an outline of the procurement process and operating procedures which 
are, with slight deviations, ubiquitous throughout the federal system.
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For the reader familiar with the specialized terminology and process 
of procurement activities or uninterested in the interrelationship 
between the construction of the contract file and sources of information 
available for research. Appendix A may be safely ignored, because the 
analysis does not begin until Chapter II. However, for the purposes 
of economy of space, definitions and terms clarified in Appendix A 
will not be repeated thereafter.
APPENDIX A; THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
Introduction
The procurement process is indistinguishable from the over­
all budget process until after funds have been allocated to specific 
program areas. As can be discerned from Figure A-1 on the next page, 
the procurement process begins to have a separate identity after that 
point.62 Robert Lee and Ronald Johnson describe the beginning phases 
as follows:
...Expenditure decisions are divided between authorizations and 
appropriations. Authorizations for establishing programs, including 
maximum spending levels for each program, are the responsibility 
of the substantively oriented standing committees of each chamber....
Appropriations, as distinguished from authorizations, grant 
the money to spend or to incur financial obligations.... The 
Appropriation Committees consider requests for appropriations 
only after substantive legislation authorizing expenditures has 
been approved.53
The "apportionment” phase is essentially controlled by the
Office of Management and Budget (0MB):
Following congressional passage of an appropriations bill and its 
signing by the President, agencies must submit to the Office of 
Management and Budget a proposed plan for apportionment. This 




Figure A-1; Responsibility And/Or Authority In The Procurement Process
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY/AUTHORITY























OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT 
AND BUDGET
AGENCY HEAD OR HIS/HER 
DIMEDIATE SUBORDINATES
PROGRAM AND CONTRACT 
OFFICIALS
PROGRAM OFFICIALS
FINANCE, CONTRACT, AND 
PROGRAM OFFICIALS
Source: U.S. Civil Service Commission, Financial Aspects of a Federal
Grant Program (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Civil Service Commission,
1972), p. 18. Modified substantially to reflect the procurement 
process, with particular emphasis upon HUD.
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0MB can, and usually does, require that agencies revise downward their 
expenditure plans to bring planned spending Into balance with available 
revenue.
Once apportionments to the agencies are made, allotments are 
made within the agency to subunits such as bureaus and divisions. 
Allotments are delegated budget authorities, and like apportionments, 
are used to control spending during the fiscal year.G? Allotments are 
usually subdivided Into specific budget plans and then "reserved" for 
particular procurements.If procurements are extremely large, however, 
there may be no "suballotment" (I.e., allocation) to program areas.
The reserved amount does not obligate the Government to an expenditure 
of funds. Such obligations can only be Incurred by legal "commitments" 
(i.e., Instruments) such as contracts.^0 The original contract Is 
normally termed the "basic" award, and adjustments to this basic 
award are normally termed "modifications."
The primary focus of the research Is not upon the actors, 
but upon the process. The behavior of program and contract officials 
will be referred to only when that behavior Is felt to Influence the 
procurement process. Further, this thesis Is concerned only with what 
occurs after allocations are received by the bureau and before the 
recipient of the award begins work.^1 The authorization, appropriation, 
and apportionment phases and the "administration" of contracts— I.e., 
the monitoring of cost limitations, technical progress, and relmbursement- 
are too far afield. In addition, not all aspects of what occurs In 
the reservation and obligation phases are of Interest, but only those 
actions or decisions which have Identifiable Impacts upon the distribu­
tion of HUD procurement awards for external analysis and management
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services to for-profit and not-forprofit organizations. Finally, 
modifications are of interest only after the administrative 
decision is made to reserve more money within the program budget for 
that modification.
The major source of data for this thesis are HUD contract 
files. Each file is designed to reflect the procurement process 
after funds are reserved for a particular procurement. An overview 
of what is contained in any contract file and the specific actions 
needed to execute a procurement can be discerned by referring to 
Table A-1 on the next page. Some of the actions are relatively simple 
operations, whereas others— e.g., developing an RFP or price analysis—  
can be very involved and difficult. Those items which are felt to 
provide the most relevant information for the purposes of this thesis 
are indicated by an asterick after the item number.
The "Request For Services” is initiated by the .program office 
to the contracting office to begin procuring any particular good or 
service. For the purposes of this paper, the Request For Services 
contains the following relevant information:
• the nature of the service desired, including a proposed 
Statement of Work
• the program office making the request
• a recommendation whether the procurement is to be obtained 
competitively or noncompetitively
• if competitive, any restrictions upon competition (e.g., 
small-business set-asides)
• if noncompetitive, the organization recommended and whether 
the program for minority-owned firms is to be utilized
• justification for the "sole-source" (i.e., the only organi­
zation allowed to compete)
• the recommended amount for the procurement.
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Table A-1; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 











1* Request for Services and 9* IFB/RFP
2* Fund Reservation 10 IFB/RFP Correspondence
3 Synopsis or Memorandum of Non-Synopsis 11* Abstract
4* Determination and Findings 12* Technical Evaluation
a. Negotiation 13* Successful Proposal and
b. Contract Type Certifications
c. Sole Source Justification 14 Audit/Price Analysis and 
Cost Proposal
5* Source List/Sole Source
15 Other Approvals/Clearances
6 IFB/RFP Reviews a. Contract Complicance 









c. Small Business Specialist
18 Letter to Unsuccessful 




Source: Standard Form HUD-773 (5-76), abbreviated and modified.
*Those items which are felt to be most important for the purposes of this 
thesis.
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The "Fund Reservation" is a formal document containing 
the necessary intraagency approvals, relevant accounting and finan­
cial information, and the reserved amount for that particular pro­
curement. In some cases, an award is anticipated to more than one 
recipient (i.e., is a "multi-award") from one RFP; and the reserved 
amount will be for all anticipated awards. If only one award is 
anticipated, the reserved amount will only be for that one award.
In either case, the Fund Reservation should be identical to the 
amount of the procurement requested by the program office, but in 
case of conflict, the Fund Reservation has been used to establish 
the "reserved a m o u n t . "^2
After the Request For Services and the Fund Reservation are 
received, the responsibility and authority in the procurement process 
shifts to the contracting office.73 What occurs thereafter is not only 
reflected in the individual contract files, but also in the HUD 
procurement management Information system. Although part of the coding 
sheets and/or data collection methods of this system can be utilized 
in collecting data, the data in the system is too unreliable for direct 
use.
The contracting office does not have to accept the recommenda­
tion of the program office regarding the method of negotiation (i.e., 
competitive or noncompetitive), the contract type (e.g., cost reimburse­
ment or fixed price), or the selection of the sole-source (if it is to 
be a noncompetitive procurement).74 Whether or not the contracting 
office agrees to these recommendations, it must explain its rationale 
for that decision in memorandum called "Determination and Findings." 
This part of the file (item 4, Table A-1) can be of aid in identifying
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the negotiating authorizations and justifications used for noncompetitive 
awards to both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations.
Negotiating authorizations must be cited when;
• competitive methods other than formal advertising are 
to be used,
• a type of contract other than a fixed-price contract is 
anticipated, and
e the procurement is to be noncompetitive.
Negotiating authorizations reflect subsections of the appropriate U.S. 
Code allowing that particular procurement process. They are useful 
for the purposes of this thesis only to indicate the type of contract 
used and to verify the specific procurement method utilized.
In addition to citing an authorization for using a non­
competitive method, there must be a justification for using any 
particular sole-source. In general, justifications are usually based 
upon the uniqueness (i.e., contains an original concept or idea) or 
availability (i.e., the substance of the proposal is not available 
to HUD without restriction from another source). These justifica­
tions will be discussed later in the thesis when specific procurement 
methods are examined.
The "source list" contains the names and addresses of organi­
zations invited to participate in the competition. The source list 
does not contain organizational characteristics (e.g., whether an 
organization is for-profit). To gain this information, it was necessary 
to conduct a telephone survey to determine if a not-for-profit organi­
zation was included on the source list.
Organizations are invited to participate in the competition 
through the use of a "Request For Proposals" (RFP) that can be used
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to identify specific limitations upon the eligibility of organizations 
to compete.75 These limitations include small business set-asides 
and labor-surplus set-asides (i.e., restricting eligibility to organi­
zations located in high-poverty areas). The RFP will also indicate 
relative factors for award and other information which may be of use 
in the analysis.
The "Abstract" is a compilation of organizations submitting 
proposals; i.e., which have competed. The Abstract will also indicate 
how many proposals were forwarded to the technical review panel, which 
proposals (if any) were not forwarded because of tardiness in submission 
or ineligibility, and how much was originally proposed by each organiza­
tion in the competition for the award. Unfortunately, the Abstract 
does not indicate whether the respective organizations are for-profit 
or not-for-profit.
To obtain this information, the "Certifications and Represen­
tations" filed by each organization with each proposal must be e x a m i n e d . 76 
If the procurement is noncompetitive, the Certifications and Represen­
tations will be in the file. If. the procurement is competitive, however,
only the winner's Certifications and Representations are on file. The
proposals of nonsuccessful offerors may or may not be on file either 
at the contracting office or the program office.77 The following 
information is contained in the Certification and Representations:
• organizational type (i.e., for-profit or not-for-profit)78
• small business status (if a for-profit organization), 
including number of employees
• certification of status as a minority-owned organization
• certification of status as a woman-owned organization.
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If the organization is for-profit, is a small-business, and is minority- 
owned, it can be assumed— with a low probability of error— that the 
organization has "8(a)" status. The Small Business Administration's 
"8(a)" program is designed to encourage more minority participation in 
the procurement process. A list of organizations with 8(a) status is 
maintained by the Small Business Administration, but it only includes 
those organizations which have been approved— not those which have 
applied. Pending a final determination, the Small Business Admin­
istration allows those organizations which have applied to participate 
in the program.
The Technical Evaluation part of the file will indicate how 
the technical evaluation panel has evaluated the relative technical 
acceptability of competing proposals. In most cases, technical "scores" 
are assigned by use of an interval scale. Scores may change from the 
"initial" state of competition to after oral exams, in which the organi­
zations which have a tenable chance to receive the award are invited 
to clarify their scopes of effort and to submit best-and-final offers. 
The number of organizations included in the initial competition is 
either equal to or less than the number included in best-and-final 
competition. The possibilities which these stages of the competitive 
process present for the analysis will be described later in the thesis.
If information is lacking in any of the other portions of 
the file, the information may be available in the "Negotiation Memoran­
dum" which is a history of the events leading to the award and a 
summary of technical and cost criteria used in the award. In some 
cases, the Negotiation Memorandum will be preferable to the Technical 
Evaluation part for technical information. Further, the Negotiation
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Memorandum contains sufficient cost information for the purposes of 
this thesis; therefore, it was not necessary to examine the price 
information contained elsewhere in the file.
The information contained in Table A-1 constitutes only one 
section of a contract file.79 Another section contains the formal 
documents and is useful to establish the amount awarded by any one 
contract and the execution date of the document. This section will 
not only contain the original contract, but also modifications to that 
contract which may increase the contractual amount or extend the period 
of performance. These will also be of interest in this thesis, e.g., 
to assess Kline and Buntz's observation that many contractors have a 
tendency to bid for contracts at an unreasonably low cost in the hope 
that the charges for the service can be substantially increased through 
modifications.80
The prospective researcher should not be misled regarding 
the completeness and conciseness of file information. At HUD, too 
much unnecessary information is retained, and the placement of infor­
mation within the file is often unsystematic. The problem in this 
regard is that the limitations upon hiring have resulted in a noticeable 
deficiency in the quantity of clerical personnel. Faced with a choice 
of hiring professional and support personnel, federal supervisors will 
almost always hire professionals. The reason is that authorizations 
for senior grade levels depend upon the number and content of the 
grade levels supervised. Hiring more support personnel instead of 
more professionals may result in the downgrading of one's own grade 
level. Thus, professionals within the contracts and grants branches 
of the bureaucracies are faced with severe time pressures. Not only
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must they attempt to perform their own duties, but must be their own 
file clerks and (often) secretaries. And professionals do not make 
good file clerks.
Even more problematical for the potential researcher Is the 
Incompleteness of Information. This student seriously misjudged the 
completeness of the Certifications and Representations portion of the 
file, for example. To gain the needed Information, many outside organi­
zations had to be contacted by telephone (the response to written 
communication was negligible). This was an extremely expensive and 
time-consuming process. Until 0MB requires that this organizational 
data be complete, any evaluation studies based upon organizational 
data will suffer from missing data unless there are sufficient time 
and financial resources to devote to data collection.
The variable which posed the most difficult problem In the 
data collection phase of this research effort was the number of employees 
of the organization receiving the procurement award. In about half of 
the cases, this Information was available from the Certifications and 
Representations portion of the file. A cross-classlfIcatlon system 
was developed In which It was possible to gain this Information If It 
were not Indicated on the Certification and Representation form. Data 
was gained for this cross-classlflcatlon system by utilizing data from 
earlier or later awards, data from RFP's Issued In FY 79 or FY 80 In 
which the employment was Indicated, Standard and Poor's organizational 
data for for-profit organizations, or by telephoning directly those 
organizations for which data was not otherwise available. Because 
most of the Information collected was current (I.e., FY 79 or the
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flrst quarter of FY 80), reliability of the data collected in the 
cross-classification system is thought to be high.
In certain cases, the organizations either refused to divulge 
the number of employees or employment information was otherwise not 
made available. However, these organizations were required by HUD to 
indicate on the Certification and Representation sheet whether they 
were "large or small." Thus, preliminary computer runs were performed 
for those organizations reporting employment levels for previous fiscal 
years, and the average employment for all small and large for-profit 
organizations was used. Averages for educational institutions and 
other notfor-profit organizations were similarly calculated when 
employment data was unavailable for these organizations. Employment 









Total No. of 
Cases (N) 149 84
Total Missing 
Cases as % 
of N 9.4% 2.4%
Organizational characteristics of those organizations which 
were not successful in competing for the awards were generally lacking 
in the Abstract. However, telephone surveys were used to determine 
whether both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations actually
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competed for the award. Also, technical and cost Information was, to 
the extent applicable, available. In the thesis, it will be explained 
why information for certain economic variables (e.g., the initial 
offer in a competition) was not applicable for a certain type of contract 
(i.e., indefinite quantity contracts).
Some variables had to be deleted from the analysis due to 
the lack of information. Privacy Act requirements, or lack of relevancy. 
For the variables retained, there is no missing data per se. The 
variables retained for analysis are reflected in the "codebook" in 
Appendix B located at the end of this thesis. And uncertainty regarding 
the variable value is contained in the original data sheets, and like 
employment, is not reflected in the coding for computer input. The 
error caused through misinterpretation or uncertainty is felt to be 
negligible.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER I
^One author who has adressed this topic specifically Is 
Ira Sharkansky, "Policy Making And Service Delivery On The Margins 
Of Government: The Case Of Contractors," Public Administration
Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (March/April, 1980), pp. 116-123. The term 
"outside organization" Is usually reserved for a nongovernmental 
organization providing services to a government bureau or for a 
governmental bureau at one level of government (e.g., state) providing 
services to a government bureau at another level of government (e.g., 
federal). See: Subcommittee On Reports, Accounting, And Management
Of The Committee On Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Consultants 
And Contractors: A Survey Of The Government's Purchase Of Outside
Services (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977),
pp. 30 and 38.
%See, for example: Daniel Guttman and Barry Wllner, The
Shadow Government, Int. by Ralph Nader (New .York: Pantheon Books,
1976), pp. 24, 25, 40, and 41.
3lbld.
4por a discussion of this problem, see: Lloyd D. Musolf
and Harold Seldman, "The Blurred Boundaries Of Public Administration," 
Public Administration Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (March/April, 1980),
p. 126.
^Elliot H. Kline and C. Gregory Buntz, "On The Effective
Use Of Public Sector Expertise: Or Why The Use Of Outside Consul­
tants Often Leads To The Waste Of In-House Skills," Public Adminis­
tration Review, vol. 39, no. 3 (May/June, 1979), pp. 228-229.
^"Mental Health Programs Viewed As Ineffective," Public 
Administration Times, vol. 3, no. 20, (October 15, 1980), p. 11.
7por the clearest enunciation of this view from a conservative 
viewpoint, see: John F. Magnottl, Jr. and James S. Hostetler, "The
Role Of Nonprofits," (Unpublished paper), p. 110. Michael Harrington 
comes very close to advocating a similar position from a socialist 
perspective In: Michael Harrington, Socialism (New York: "Bantam
Books," Saturday Review Press, 1972 c.), p. 358.
-40—
-41-
®Don L. Bowen and Merrill J. Collet, "When and How To Use 
A Consultant: Guidelines For Public Managers," Public Administration
Review, vol. 38, no. 5 (September/October, 1978), pp. 476-477.
^Robert Rosenblum and Daniel McGillls, "Observations In The 
Role Of Consultants In The Public Sector," Public Administration Review 
vol. 39, no. 3 (May/June, 1979), p. 220. See also: Harrington, op.
cit., p. 369.
^^Bowen and Callet, op. cit., p 477. Also: Rosenblum and
McGillis, op. cit., p. 221.
llRosenblum and McGillls, op. cit., p. 221.
l^See: Sharkansky, op. cit., p. 116.
l^Donald Haider, "Presidential Management Initiatives: A
Ford Legacy To Executive Management Improvement," Public Administration 
Review, vol. 39, no. 3 (May/June, 1979), p. 253.
l^However, this tendency is being observed at the state 
level as well. For example, Oklahoma is increasing significantly 
funding to provide mental health services, but both the Governor and 
members of the legislature are making efforts to actually reduce the 
number of mental health state employees.
l^Employment data for 1955 were taken from: U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979, lOOth
edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979),
Schedule 460, p. 275. Employment data for 1979 were taken from:
Office of Management and Budget, Special Analyses Budget of the United 
States Government: Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980), p. 279.
^^Expenditure data for 1955 were taken from: Statistical
Abstract..., op. cit. , Schedule 423, p. 254. Expenditure data for 
1979 were taken from: Special Analyses Budget..., op. cit., p. 13.
^^Rosenblum and McGillis, op. cit., p. 220.
l^Salaries and benefits for 1955 totaled $10,295 million.
Source: Statistical Abstract..., op. cit.. Schedule 460, p. 275.
Total expenditures In 1955 were $68.5 billion. Source: Statistical
Abstract..., op. clt. , Schedule 423, p. 254. Salaries and benefits 
for 1979 totaled $47.620 million. Source; Special Analyses Budget..., 
op. cit., p. 285. Total expenditures in 1979 were $493.7 billion.
Source: Special Analyses Budget..., op. cit., p. 13. Total expenditures
($206.2 billion) through the use of contracts and grants in 1979 were 
estimated by adding grants-in-aid ($82,858 million), research and 
development grants ($28.9 billion) and expenditures through the use of 
contracts ($94,379 million). Source for 1979 grants-in-aid: Special
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Analyses Budget..., op. cit., p. 254. Source for 1979 research and 
development grants: Special Analyses Budget..., op. cit., p. 335.
Source for 1979 expenditures through the use of contracts: Office
of Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget, Quar­
terly Report of Federal Contract Awards: Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington,
D.C.: Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 1980), p. 2. Total expen­
ditures ($27.1 billion) through the use of contracts and grants in 
1955 were estimated by adding grants-in-aid ($3,207 million), research 
and development grants ($2.2 billion), and expenditures through the 
use of contracts ($21,733 million). Source for 1955 grants-in-aid:
Special Analyses Budget..., op. cit., p. 254. Source for 1955 research 
and development grants: Special Analyses Budget..., op. cit., p. 335.
The amount of 1955 expenditures through the use of contracts' was unavail­
able and had to be estimated. First, it was determined that military 
contracts in 1955 totaled $16,582 million. Source: U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1960, 81st.
edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961),
Schedule 307, p. 240. In 1979, of the $94,379 million awarded in 
contracts, the Department of Defense and the Veteran's Administration 
accounted for $72,052 million or 76.3%. Source: Quarterly Report of
Federal Contract Awards..., op. cit., p. 2. Assume the same relationship 
held in 1955 between contracts awarded by civilian and defense agencies. 
Then, $16,582 million = .763x, where x = the total amount of contracts 
awarded in 1955. Therefore, total contract awards in 1955 are estimated 
to have been approximately $21,733 million.
19lbid.
Z^The term "successive limited” as used here is consistent 
with the meaning of Lindblora; i.e., that there was no general reliance 
upon some comprehensive (i.e., "rationalistic") philosophy or decision­
making process which led to the policy, rather, that many policies 
were independently formulated with different and sometimes incom­
patible purposes. Lindblora uses the term "successive limited comparison" 
instead of "decision", but the difference is only that Lindblom is 
primarily concerned with the process of decision-making instead of the 
outcome. See: Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science Of 'Muddling Through,'”
Public Administration Review, vol. 19 (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88.
Contained In; Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, ed., Classics Of 
Public Administration (Oak Park, Illinois: Moore Publishing Company,
Inc., 1978), pp. 202-213.
"An efficient solution maximizes the return from a given out­
put, or, conversely, minimizes the input necessary to produce a given 
output." Source: James M. Buchanan and Mariljm R. Flowers, The Public
Finances, 4th ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975),
p. 176 f.n. "Effectiveness" is a measure of the extent to which objec­
tives are achieved and the extent to which the results are those originally 
anticipated. See: Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis (University, Alabama:
The University of Alabama Press, 1976), p. 95. As used in this thesis, 
efficiency and effectiveness are different concepts, and the presence 
of one does not necessarily imply the presence of the other. Terms 
such as "cost-effective" are viewed as being confused. Further,
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accomplishing efficiency and/or effectiveness may not be equitable. 
"Equity," as used in this thesis, is justice, i.e., granting the "equality" 
that unequals deserve. Source: Plato, The Laws, translated with an
introduction by Trevor J. Saunders (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books,
1972), p. 230.
22sharkansky, op. cit., p. 116.
23There is much confusion in the literature regarding the use 
of the term "contractor", or alternatively, "consultants." A "consultant" 
is a person who serves as an advisor to one or more agency staff and/or 
renders advice to a requesting agency office; whereas a "contractor" 
is a firm or organization with which legally binding contracts are 
written and which furnishes a service. In the normal case, those 
offering goods are not referred to as contractors, but as "suppliers" 
or "vendors." See: Consultants and Contractors...,op. cit., pp. 30 and
37. Consultant services can be acquired by contract or by hiring the 
individual on a temporary basis. If hired on a temporary basis, 
acquiring the services of that individual is a personnel action; and 
this topic is outside the scope of this study. If the services are 
procured by contract, the individual is viewed by the Government as 
a contractor; i.e., an organization of one. If the consultant bids 
for a contract to provide services to the Government, he/she does 
so as an organization— not as an individual. Therefore, as used in 
this thesis, direct beneficiaries of contract awards will be referred 
to as contractors. These contractors may, in turn, hire consultants 
(individuals) or subcontractors (organizations) to fulfill conditions 
of their contracts.
24gharkansky, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
Z^Coleman contends that policy research has as its philosophic
base a guide to action: "...the goal is not to further develop theory
about an area of activity but to provide an information basis for
social action." See: James S. Coleman, Policy Research In The Social
Sciences (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972), p. 2. This" 
thesis has been designed to provide a direct information base for 
modest reforms in the federal reporting system as well as providing 
an information base for more ambitious studies which, in turn, might 
have as their purpose more comprehensive reform in the acquisition of 
services by the federal government (see below).
2^Fully competitive conditions require the following:
• There must be a large number of both suppliers and buyers 
so that neither buyer nor seller can control the market.
e The goods or services must be identical, or nearly so (i.e., 
must be "homogeneous").
• There must be complete and accurate knowledge and awareness 
of the conditions of supply and demand.
• There must be relative ease of entry into and out of the
market.
—44—
• The pricing and buying policies of both the supplier and 
the buyer must reflect only efficiency criteria and not those of equity.
"Fully competitive" is less restrictive than the concept of "perfect 
competition" used by the economists. A "reasonable degree of competition" 
is herein used to describe a competitive situation which is less than 
fully competitive. E.g., in competing for government awards, there is 
often only one "buyer" (i.e., the Government), but there may be intense 
competition by potential contractors to provide the service.
2^The student has had experience in Washington, D.C. as a 
contract specialist for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop­
ment. Also, he is currently serving as executive director of an outside 
organization providing direct mental health services funded through 
contract by the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health.
28ln addition to specifying the Federal purposes for entering 
into procurement and assistance activities and to specifying when 
agencies are to use contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements, the 
Act also required that the Office of Management and Budget conduct a 
study of Federal assistance activities. Source: U.S. Office of Manage­
ment and Budget (0MB), "D. Evaluation of Pub. L. 95-224," Managing 
Federal Assistance In The 1980*s (Washington, D.C.: Office of Management
and Budget, 1979), pp. 1-2. For a summary of the issues addressed in 
the 0MB study see: 0MB, "Study Overview," Managing Federal Assistance
In The 1980*s, op. cit., pp. SO-7, SO-8, and SO-9.
29pederal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, Sec.
4(1), 41 use 503 (1978).
SOcrants are to be used whenever no substantial involvement 
is anticipated between the executive agency (acting for the Government) 
and the recipient, whereas cooperative agreements are to be used whenever 
substantial involvement is anticipated. See: Federal Grant and Coopera­
tive Agreement Act of 1977, Sec. 5(2), 41 USC 504 and Sec. 6(2), 41 
use 505 (1978).
31pederal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, Sec.
5(1), 41 USC 504 ̂  Sec. 6(1), 41 USC 505 (1978).
32"Assistance" in this paper does not include transfer payments
(e.g.. Social Security benefits). Only those expenditures executed by 
a grant or cooperative agreement are included.
33special Analyses Budget..., op. cit., pp. 254 and 335.
34puarterly Report Of Fedral Contract Awards..., op. cit.,
p. 2.
^^Martha M. Hamilton, "Increase In Federal Contracting 
Generates Troubling Questions," The Washington Post (Sunday, February 
24, 1980), pp. G1 and G4.
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36This view may change in the future for particular types of 
services, e.g., "technical assistance." In the future, these services 
may he acquired by cooperative agreements (assistance instruments).
^^The Federal Procurement Data System has been instituted by 
the Federal Procurement Data Center, the "executive agent" for the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget. 
Publications include: (1) FPDS Quarterly Report Of Federal Acquisition
Awards; (2) Special Analysis 1: Federal Acquisition Awards Over $10,000
— By Type Of Contractor; (3) Special Analysis 2: Federal Acquisition
Awards Over $10,000— By Product And Service; and (4) Federal Acquisition 
Awards— Minority And Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Participation. 
These reports are published quarterly. Copies may be obtained by 
writing: Federal Procurement Data Center, Office of Federal Procurement
Policy, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. Until the 
establishment of the FPDS, departments and agencies of the executive 
branch were not uniformly reporting their procurements to a central 
point which could produce data on all or any part of executive branch 
procurements. Source: Special Analysis 2..., op. cit.. Third Quarter
Fiscal Year 1979, p. iii.
SBsstimates of the population for 1980 were taken from the 
1974 population projections. Series I-E. The estimate for D.C. was 
derived by subtracting the individual state totals from the "S.A."
(i.e.. South Atlantic) total. See: Ben J. Wattenburg, ed.. The U.S.
Fact Book, the commercial edition of the Statistical Abstract Of The 
U.S.: 1975, 96th edition, (New York: Grosser and Dunlap, 1976),
Schedule 14, p. 16. The percentages of procurement awards for each 
geographical locality were taken from: Quarterly Report Of Federal
Contract Awards..., op. cit., pp. 8-9.
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Quarterly Report Of Federal Contract Awards..., op. cit.
^®The preliminary census revealed 533 files. Later research 
revealed that:
4 awarded prior to FY 79 had since been closed out and sent to. 
storage
2 FY 79 awards had been transferred to the regions
7 FY 80 awards had not been executed by March 31, 1980
2 FY 79 awards were for less than $10,000
15 total unavailable or outside the scope of the study
These 15 files were then deleted from the population list. Thus, the 
total population was considered to be 518.
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41oiiver Benson's suggested method for determining sample 
sizes, given confidence levels, confidence intervals, and selected 
dichotomized proportions in an infinite population, is as follows:
...Sample sizes are calculated by the normal approximation formula, 
n=(z/e)2pq, in which n = sample size..., z = the normal deviate..., 
e = the error tolerance or half the confidence interval, and pq = 
the product of the two proportions.... The accuracy of the 
normal approximation is good for sample sizes of 1,000 or more, 
fairly good for sizes of 100, and inadequate for samples of 50 or 
less.
Source: Oliver Benson, "Political Science Laboratory: Statis­
tical Supplement," (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1977),
p. 25. The "Supplement" is an addendum to his; Political Science 
Laboratory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company,
1969 c.).
He defines the terms n, z, e, p, and q in the following
statement:
...Size (n) varies inversely with the magnitude of the confidence 
interval [emphasis his] (+ e, for error)— the distance between 
the upper and lower confidence limits within which it is estimated 
the true population percentage lies. Size varies directly with 
confidence level [emphasis his] (z), defined as, e.g., the 99% 
level for z_ of 2.58, the 95% level for ̂  of 1.96, ^  being the 
normal deviate. It also varies directly with the magnitude of 
the product of the true population percentage split (pq with 
the decimal proportion of those having a dichotomous trait, and q = 
1 - P).
Source: Benson, op. cit., p. 23.
Benson also states that the adjusted size (n^) for finite 
population (N) is: n^ = n - (1 = n/N).
The population split was based upon a preliminary sample of 
20 HUD contract files. The "split" used was the proportion between 
the contract awards to for-profit and not-for-profit organizations,
respectively. This is the primary control variable in the analysis
(see below).
= (z/e)2 pq
n = (1.96/.05)2 (.70) (.30) 
n = (1536.64) (.21) 
n = 322.6944 = 323
and where N = 518
nl = 323 - (1 + 323/518)
- 323 - (1 + .62)
= 199.38 = 199
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43sased upon the actual split of 65/35 verified by the sample 
only 209 files needed to be examined for an overall confidence interval 
of 95 percent;
n = (z/e)2 pq
= (1.96/.05)2 (.65) (.35) 
and since 
(.65) (.35) = .2275 = .228 
and
(1.96/.05)2 = 1536.64 
then
n = 1536.64 (.228) = 350.354 
but
nl = n - (1 + n/N) 
thus
nl = 350.354 - (1 + 350.354/518)
= 350.354 - 1.676 
= 209.042 = 209
^^Kline and Buntz, op. cit., p. 229. See also: Consultants
And Contractors: A Survey Of The Government's Purchases Of Outside
Services, op. cit., pp. 30-37.
^^Kline and Buntz, op. cit., p. 227.
46por an illustration of a "task," see: Raymond C. Dosky, ed.,
POD Cost And Price Analysis, rev. ed. (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State
University Research Foundation, c. 1978), pp. 8-16.
47The majority of this list has been taken from Kline and 
Buntz, op. cit., p. 227.
48professor Ronald Peters of the University of Oklahoma 
suggested the term "external analysis" services. The term has been 
slightly modified— i.e., "external analysis and management services"— to 
reflect the operational and managerial components of the concept.
^^Rosenblum and McGillis, for example, use the term "consultant 
services" to describe a similar set of services addressed here. See: 
Rosenblum and McGillis, op. cit., p. 219.
SOgee Footnote 23.
S^The estimate was derived by adding the following Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS) categories: "Research and Development,"
categories AB, AE, AF, AK, AL, AM, and AQ; and "Other Services And 
Construction," categories G, Q, R, and U. Source; Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy, Office of Management And Budget, Special Analysis 
2: Federal Contract Awards Over $10,000 By Product And Service
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 1980),
pp. 10, 15 and 25.
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S^Derived by multiplying .078 times total procurement awards 
in 1979 of $94.4 billion. Source for total procurement awards: Quarterly 
Report Of Federal Contract Awards..., pp. cit., p. 2.
53ln economics, "profit" is identical to net income; i.e., the 
difference between total revenues and total expenses. See, for example: 
Paul Samuelson, Economics, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1970), pp. 593-594. But just because net income results from operations 
does not mean that the organization necessarily may distribute that net 
income to private owners. For example, state-owned liquor stores have 
net income which is returned to the state, not to private shareholders 
or owners. As herein understood, these are not "for-profit organizations.
^^Retained earnings are, in fact, cumulative increments of 
undistributed net income. See: Carl L. Moore and Robert K. Jaedicke,
Managerial Accounting, 2nd ed. (Dallas, Texas: South-Western Publishing
Company, 1967), p. 55. As used here, these increments may be undis­
tributed profits (in the case of for-profit organizations) or just net 
income (in the case of not-for-profit organizations).
55por example. Federal Management Circular 74-4 states: "No
provision for profit or other increment above cost [emphasis mine] is 
intended." General Accounting Office, "FMC 74-4; Cost Principles 
Applicable To Grants And Contracts With State And Local Governments" 
(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1974), Attachment A,
p . 1.
S^Amitai Etzioni and Pamela Doty, The Profit In Not-For-Profit 
Institutions (New York: Center For Policy Research, 1976).
57see: Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(3) and S.F. 990, the tax
return form for not-for-profit organizations.
58orlans refers to a nonprofit organization as one so "... 
classified by the 1RS." See: Harold OrIans, The Nonprofit Research
Institute (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), f.n. no. 1,
p. 181. The 1RS rulings are used by the other federal agencies in
restricting eligibility for certain types of awards.
S^The amount of procurement awards over $10,000 is being 
measured by the number of contract actions. Source: Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, Office Of Management And Budget, Special Analysis 1: 
Federal Contract Awards Over $10,000 By Type Of Contractor - Fiscal Year 
1979, p. 3. For the percentage of awards of $10,000 or less, the 
relative amount of procurement awards received by not-for-profit organiza­
tions is being estimated by the relative percentage of award amounts 
(the number of award actions is not available). The total amount of 
awards of $10,000 or less was found by adding the amount of awards of 
$10,000 or less to business concerns, for directed acquisitions for 
foreign governments, for tariff or regulated activities, for acquisitions 
outside the U.S. and its possessions, and to educational and nonprofit 
institutions. See: Special Analysis 1..., op. cit., pp. 6, 10, 15,
19, and 23.
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G^The following discussion corresponds closely to: Magnottl
and Hosteler, op. cit., pp. 114-116. Magnottl and Hostetler use the 
term "external factors" Instead of "political factors" (see below). They 
do not explicitly state a term corresponding to behavioral and economic 
factors (see below).
Glphllllp J. Cooper," Government Contracts In Public Admin­
istration: The Role And Environment Of The Contracting Officer,"
Public Administration Review, vol. 40, no. 5 (September/October 1980), 
pp. 459-468.
G^The budget process depicted In Figure A-1 or described 
below does not reflect the Influence of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974; e.g., the role of the budget committees 
or the Congressional Budget Office. For an explanation of the require­
ments of this Act, see: James J. Finley, "The 1974 Congressional
Initiative In Budget Making," Public Administration Review (May/June, 
1975), pp. 270-278. Since the purpose Is only to Illustrate the meaning 
of terms basic to the analysis, a discussion of the complexities of 
the budget process are outside the scope of this paper. The complex 
nature of the budget process can be discerned from Lee and Johnson's 
statement that: "In practice, some substantive legislation leaves the
Appropriation Committees with little discretion on spending matters 
and sometimes bypasses the appropriations process altogether." Source: 
Robert D. Lee Jr. and Ronald W. Johnson, Public Budgeting Systems 
(Baltimore: University Park Press, 1975), p. 204. For example, some
substantive committee legislation directly authorizes agencies to 
Incur obligations without approval of the appropriations committees.
One of the most prevalent forms of this "backdoor financing" Is to 
allow agencies to enter Into contracts In advance of appropriations.
See: Lee and Johnson, op. cit., pp. 207-210.
G^Lee and Johnson, op. cit., p. 204. 
64ibld, p. 92.
G^Ibld. Further, 0MB can "freeze" funds throughout the year 
for specific programs. Some procurement programs of HUD were frozen 
by 0MB mandate In January of 1980, for example.
66lbld, p. 93.
6?Ibld.
68u.S. Civil Service Commission, Financial Aspects Of A Federal 
Grant Program (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Civil Service Commission, 1972),
p. 9.
^^Note: Terminology differs among agencies regarding the
subdivisions of apportionments to bureaus, program areas, ^r specific 
procurements. See: U.S. Civil Service Commission, Financial Aspects
Of A Federal Grant Program, op. cit., p. 9. In this paper the "reserved 
amount" will be used to describe funds Initially set aside by an agency 
for a particular procurement before the award Is actually made.
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7041 ÇFR 1-1.208.
7lThus, those unusual cases where allocation to the bureau 
does not occur, and where reservations are forthcoming directly from 
the Office of the Secretary, are not being considered.
72ïhere are some cases when the program office recommends a 
certain amount for a procurement effort, but only has funds available 
for part of that amount. The other portion is usually anticipated to 
be made available within a short time period from other agencies.
Transfers of funds between agencies are usually executed by means of 
"interagency agreements." These agreements are not contracts, however.
For there to be an actual obligation, the agency receiving the funds 
must reserve those funds for a particular procurement or assistance 
instrument. In some cases, the interagency agreements are not executed; 
the Statement of Work is reduced (regarding scope of effort); and the 
obligation is incurred only for the original funds which were available. 
The reserved amount, therefore, is less than the original requested by 
the program office. This is an unusual occurrence, however. Thus, 
the reserved amount in the Fund Reservation can be considered as identical 
to the original requested from the program office.
73More specifically, the Contracting Officer. See: 41 CFR
1-1.402.
7^1he contracting office also has authority to determine whether 
an assistance or procurement instrument is more appropriate. This issue 
will be addressed later in the paper. Also, it should be noted that 
only the Contracting Officer can finalize negotiations regarding the 
estimated price to be charged for a service.
75ln Table A-1, there is reference to "IFB," which means 
"Invitation-For-Bid." It is a type of solicitation which is used for 
very specific goods or services. The IFB is not normally used for 
external analysis and management services.
76ihe terminology for this document may differ among agencies, 
but the information required is, with minor alternations, the same.
In addition to the information required as described below, there 
are Privacy Act requirements, statement of affirmative action plans, 
etc.
77The proposals of unsuccessful offerors are retained for 
two months after the date of award by the Office of Procurement and 
Contracts.
78xhe actual categories are: individual, partnership,
corporation, nonprofit organization or educational institution. The 
first three categories are for-profit organizations, whereas the latter 
two are not-for-profit.
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79ocher sections Include: supplemental records for contract
modifications, correspondence, progress reports, payment records 
and balance sheets, and the section containing signed copies of the 
instrument (e.g., the original contract and modifications thereto).




An analysis of the procurement process has in common with all 
other evaluative efforts the need to identify goals. Weiss contends 
that an examination of goals must address two issues: 1) the identifi­
cation of the goals that the evaluation will use as the basis for crite­
ria, and 2) the establishment of standards for choosing between compet­
ing goals.^ Program goals are the stated and unstated motivators for 
undertaking (or maintaining) a project and are to be differentiated from
"official" goals, i.e., those purposes which have been formulated by 
2policy makers. The situation of competing goals usually arises when
program goals and official goals differ. As Weiss states:
Programs not only move toward official goals. They accomplish 
other things, sometimes in addition and sometimes instead. The 
evaluator has a responsibility to take a look at these unexpected 
consequences of program activities.^
Comparing the two types of goals may be difficult. Program
goals are often "hazy," and official goals may only be a "long list of
*A11 notes are located at the end of the respective chapters. 
Notes for Chapter II are located on page 77.
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pious and partly incompatible platitudes."^ To complicate matters, even 
"hazy" program goals or official "platitudes" may not even be stated.
It becomes important, says Weiss, to search "...for the hidden agenda, 
the covert goals of the project that are unlikely to be articulated, but 
whose achievement sometimes determines success or failure no matter what 
else happens."^ In regard to procurement evaluation, both the agency 
and the receipient are likely to have covert goals; and this must be 
taken into account in any model of the evaluation process.
It is not that program officials do not wish to accomplish 
official goals. In fact, they are most anxious to achieve official 
goals of their programs. Lack of adherence by an agency to official 
goals may result in criticism from the Congress; thus, program officials 
are under considerable pressure from the assistant secretaries to 
achieve official goals. But official goals of other programs often 
become important only insofar as they "...help maintain the viability of 
the program (for which the official is responsible) in its environment."^ 
Thus, program decisions regarding the procurement method or the organiza­
tion actually supplying the service are made in view of the effects upon 
that particular office's own programs. No matter how much the program 
official may agree with the other official program goals, if he/she feels 
that incorporating these goals into the calculus for securing services 
perceived as vital to his/her program will potentially delay or harm 
that program, then that program official will use all available means to 
not incorporate those other goals— and vice-versa. This ethic of prag­
matic behavior is ubiquitous and is assumed, in the following discussion, 
to be present.
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The motivation by program officials to accomplish official and 
program goals results in administrative policy decisions which predeter­
mine, in the normal case, the basis upon which awards are to be made.
The most important decisions are thought to be: 1) the amount to be
awarded; 2) whether to procure a service competitively or noncompeti- 
tively; 3) if noncompetitive, what sole source is to be selected; and 
4) whether exclusionary or nonexclusionary procurement methods are to be 
utilized to acquire the needed services.
The hypothesis is that any disproportionate distribution of 
awards which occurs between the respective organizational types can be 
largely explained by the influence of these administrative policy deci­
sions. The following sections in this chapter will clarify the principal 
dependent variable used in the analysis and establish a framework for 
analysis which will be used to assess•the consequences of these deci­
sions.
Magnitude of Awards 
The magnitude of procurement awards may be measured either by 
the relative number of contracts or in terms of current dollars. As the 
following table indicates, the respective measures will result in some­
what different results. However, the value of phi is only .15; and a 
low value of phi indicates that the results derived by the two methods 
are much alike.^
Choice of the appropriate measure depends upon the purpose of 
the research effort. Describing awards in terms of the number of con­
tracts is more useful when longitudinal trends are being studied. The 
reason is that dollar amounts may be misleading due to the effects of
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inflation. This danger is most present when dollar amounts are not 
stated in terms of constant dollars. However, simply applying the index 
used for the effects of inflation in consumer goods to Government pur­
chases also may not be valid, because it is not known whether Government 
purchases are subject to inflationary pressures at the same rate as con­
sumer goods. Thus, lacking a valid constant price index for external 
analysis and management services, the number of awards are used in this 
thesis to describe magnitude longitudinally. For example, the number of 
awards were used earlier to describe the relative decline in the propor­
tion of HUD procurement awards over $10,000 for external analysis and 
management services to not-for-profit organizations from 38 percent prior 
to FY 79 to 33 percent in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80.
Table 2-1: HUD Basic Awards For External Analysis And Management Ser­
vices Over $10,000 To For-Profit And Not-For Profit Organi­
zations, By Type Of Measurement (FY 79 And The First Quarter 
Of FY 80)
Organizational Type Type of Measurement
Percent of Award 
Amounts








When the interest is upon current tendencies, it is more appro­
priate to use dollar amounts when describing the magnitude of procure­
ments. The dollar amount of the award can be compared with other inter­
val scales (e.g., additional amounts added to the basic contract through
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modifications) with more meaning than can the number of awards. There­
fore, unless stated otherwise, the dollar amount awarded will be used to 
describe the magnitude of procurement activity and will be the dependent 
variable in the analysis. However, in order to explain why one organi­
zational type receives more dollar amount of awards, the distributional 
pattern reflected in the number of awards may be useful to explain that 
pattern. But for most of the analysis, the dependent variable will be 
the award amount, because the major interest is to determine why for- 
profit organizations received 80 per cent of the amount awarded by HUD 
to procure external analysis and management services in FY 79 and the 
first quarter of FY 80.
Variables other than organizational type must be examined to 
explain the difference between the amount awarded by HUD to for-profit 
and not-for-profit organizations. As indicated in Table 2-2 below, the 
relationship between amount awarded by HUD to perform external analysis 
and management services and organizational type is not significant at 
the .05 level.
Table 2-2: One-Way Analysis Of Variance Table, Basic Dollar Amount By
Organizational Type




In the following sections of this chapter, a research design will be
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formulated to differentiate award amounts according to the procurement 
method utilized. By then examining the amount of awards received by the 
respective organizational types through each of the procurement methods, 
the variance in the amount awarded to the respective organizational 
types can perhaps be explained.
Relative Importance of Competition
An official goal of the Congress is to promote "efficiency"
by:*
...Establishing policies, procedures, and practices which 
will require the Government to acquire property and services 
of the requisite quality and within the time needed at the 
lowest possible cost, utilizing competitive procurement methods 
to the maximum extent practicable...9
The rationale behind this policy is that for most goods or 
services, supply costs can be estimated by both the potential recipient 
(i.e., the supplier) and the Government (as only one buyer in a larger 
market); and the most "fair and reasonable" method of securing these 
goods and services is for the Government to rely upon the competitive 
market place for their provision.Even if one of the parties (in most 
cases, the Government) cannot accurately make this determination of 
costs, it may rely upon the competitive range established in the market 
place. Given a fully competitive situation (or a close approximation 
thereto), the market price will reflect at any time the least-cost alter­
native to the Government.
But to determine a valid competitive range, the good or service 
must be able to be described in terms of the factors of production needed 
to produce those goods or services— e.g., direct labor or materials and 
indirect costs such as interest and travel. For external analysis and
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management services, the lack of clarity with which tasks are defined by
12government agencies is a very difficult problem. The quantity of ser­
vice required may be uncertain; and even if the quantity of services 
required are known, it is not often clear as to what factors of produc­
tion are needed to produce them. Since traditional economics has been 
built upon the assumptions that quantity and price are determinate, these 
models are not much aid in ascertaining whether competition actually does
result in the least-cost alternative; and it seems more advisable to
13approach the analysis from an "institutional" perspective.
The plan for establishing a framework for analysis is based 
upon the following tendencies in the decision-making structure of HUD: 
first, the need for the service is justified within the bureaucracy, and 
an amount is reserved for this service(s); then, it is decided whether 
the procurement is to be negotiated competitively or noncompetitively.
The elements of a competitive process include: 1) clearly stated objec­
tives for the service(s); 2) a procedure detailing how selections are 
made and on what basis; 3) the plan for processing and clearing offers 
(or requests-for-proposals); and 4) providing any additional information 
which may be useful to all offerors about the proposed contract, while 
at the same time dispelling any fear that one or more organizations have
information about the contract which is not available to other organi- 
14zations. A noncompetitive process lacks all or most of these essential 
elements.
Given no opposition from the program official's superiors or 
the contracts office, the program official will normally choose the 
"least-time" and/or "least-effort" alternative of awarding the contract.
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But because of the official goal to promote competition, program offi­
cers are not always given this option. The bureaucrats are afraid that 
too high a percentage of noncompetitive procurements would be interpreted 
as a challenge to the Congress regarding the official policy to promote 
efficiency through competition.
The "least-time" basis of procuring a service is that method 
which causes the fewest time delays between the date of request and the 
date of award. The "least-effort" basis of procuring a service is that 
method which causes the least expenditure of time and effort by one's 
own staff. Even though time is an element of both, the two concepts are 
distinct. For example, selecting one action over another may result in 
less total time from the conceptualization, but in far more time and 
effort spent by the supervisor and his/her own staff. This choice must 
often be made by program officials. For grants, the choice is often 
between requesting assistance from the contracting office— and thus 
expecting more time-delays— and expending much more time by program 
staff. At least within HUD, however, this option is not available for 
procurements for external analysis and management services, because 
these types of services must be procured by the contracting office.
Prior to the Request For Service, there does not appear to be a 
significant amount of difference in the effort or time needed by program 
officials to gain approval for noncompetitive and competitive procure­
ments. For noncompetitive procurements, the most time and effort is 
spent evaluating or selecting unsolicited proposals and then promoting 
the idea to decision-makers within the bureaucracy. When unsolicited 
proposals cannot be relied upon, more effort must be spent upon gaining
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needed information to be able to promote the idea. It is assumed that 
there is no significant time differential involved in these two respec­
tive processes.
After the Request For Services is forwarded to the contracting 
office, the effort required of the program office is essentially depen­
dent upon the method of procurement. For noncompetitive procurements, 
the requirements are minimal, primarily limited to coordination func­
tions. For competitive procurements, demands upon the program office are 
extensive, particularly in the period between which proposals are re­
ceived and a final selection is made. Technical review panels must be 
developed and coordinated, proposals must be evaluated, and detailed 
justifications for selecting one or more winners must be forwarded. The 
complexity and effort needed increase almost in direct proportion to the 
number of proposals received. The point here is that noncompetitive 
procurements do present the least-effort alternative for both the pro­
gram and contracting offices.
But the important factor is least-time. One-way analysis of 
variance indicates that there is a significant difference (at the .0005 
level) in the time needed to execute competitive and noncompetitive pro­
curements. Whereas the mean time needed to execute a noncompetitive 
procurement is approximately 112 days, the mean time for competitive 
procurements is approximately 164 days. Thus, the average cost of 
awarding a contract competitively for external analysis and management 
services is much higher for HUD than in awarding the contract non­
competitively.
The argument is often heard that these higher average time and
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effort costs of awarding the contract are more than offset by the savings 
received by the Government in procuring a service competitively, because 
more competitors will result in a lower offer to perform the service.
The argument serves to buttress the rationale underlying the official 
goal of the Congress to promote "efficiency" through competition and has 
been adequately defended for goods or services which are defined in terms 
of identifiable quantities.But the theory does not apply to external 
analysis and management services (because of indefinite quantity), and 
this can have an impact upon the design for ascertaining those factors 
which significantly affect the distribution of HUD procurement awards 
for external analysis and management services between for-profit and 
not-for-profit organizations. In order to devise a viable research 
design to determine whether competitive awards actually result, overall, 
in more savings to the Government, noncompetitive procurements will be 
examined first.
When noncompetitive procurements are involved, the least-cost 
alternative prior to the negotiating stage is identical to the proposed 
amount by the sole-source. The reserved amount for that procurement is 
always a discrete amount instead of a range. The contracting office, 
once it receives a request from the program office, then contacts the 
contractor and attempts to negotiate cost items to obtain a fair and 
reasonable price for the Government. Normally, there are only marginal 
adjustments from the original amount proposed by the contractor when 
actually awarding the amount of the contract.
When the proposed amount is less than the reserved amount, the 
proposed amount can be depicted as in in Figure 2-1 oh the next page.
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Figure 2-1: Hypothesized Relationship Between Reserved Amounts And









If the proposed amount were equal to the initial reserved amount (i.e., 
Xq ), the proposed amount would be Pq . Thus, even before negotiations, 
there is a potential "savings" (Pg-Pi) to the Government caused by un­
certainty. The saving occurs because the Government is usually willing 
to pay up to the reserved amount. Whenever the contracting office is not 
willing to pay this reserved amount, whenever the contractor is adamant 
in demanding it, and whenever no procurement results, much ill-will is 
created between the program office and the contracting office. This type 
of situation is usually avoided. When an award is actually made, the 
reserved amount is normally "dereserved" to that point where the re­
served amount equals the award amount (i.e., in Figure 2-1).
Savings to the Government normally occur only when the initial 
reserved amount is not known by the contractor. When the reserved amount 
is known by the contractor, the tendency is to bid closer to Pq . The 
contractor will not usually be denied the award, because the program 
official is not being confronted with a loss of needed time or effort.
And since there are no competitors, the contractor does not face the 
prospect of being underbid.
In some cases, the final proposed amount (i.e., the award 
amount) is larger than the initial reserved amount (e.g., ?2 in Figure
2-1). Before the actual award for the greater amount can be approved, 
the program office must reserve additional funds (i.e., X2). This 
occurs primarily when the program office has underestimated costs or 
when the contractor is willing to gamble that the time-and-effort re­
quired by program officials to select another contractor is less than 
the time-and-effort required by the program office to increase the
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reserved amount. Whatever the cause, "negative savings" are incurred 
(i.e., P2-P1), because the amount awarded is higher than the initial 
amount anticipated, and thus, reserved.
The model is applicable when considering competitive procure­
ments. The primary difference is that there are more proposals. After 
a winner has been selected, the negotiation phase begins; and the 
relationship depicted in Figure 2-1 applies.
When all HUD awards over $10,000 for external analysis and 
management services are considered, the results generally support the 
discussion above. The regression line is below the 45° line for awards 
of approximately $200,000 or less and is above the 45° line thereafter 
(Y' = - $60,730 + 1.30X). The relationship is significant, and the cor­
relation coefficient is quite high (r = .97).
An interesting finding in the analysis is the difference in 
overall tendencies exhibited by competitive and noncompetitive awards, 
respectively. As Figure 2-2 on the next page indicates, the regression 
lines for competitive and noncompetitive awards have substantially dif­
ferent slopes. Both relationships are significant at the .0001 level, 
and the correlation coefficients are high (r = .86 for noncompetitive 
awards and r = .997 for competitive awards). The following inferences 
may be made:
1) Competitive awards produce more savings to the Government in 
the lower award categories (i.e., below $150,000). But noncompetitive, 
awards actually produce more savings to the Government in the very large 
award categories (e.g., above $300,000).
2) Noncompetitive awards below $100,000 are likely to produce
-65-












X = Initial Reserved Amount ($K)
300
Least amount awarded noncompetitively equals $12,000. Least 
amount awarded competitively equals $31,000.
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"negative savings" to the Government; i.e., the amount aVrarded is higher 
than the initial amount anticipated, and thus, reserved. Competitive 
awards greater than approximately $250,000 are likely to produce negative 
savings for the Government. Some reasons for these tendencies occurring 
will be offered later in the analysis when the variable of procurement 
method (i.e., competitive or noncompetitive) is compared with the 
variable of organizational type (i.e., for-profit or not-for-profit).
The purpose here is only, to indicate that these two procurement methods 
are likely to exhibit different tendencies.
Although the relationships depicted in Figure 2-2 suggest that 
competitive and noncompetitive basic awards need to be examined sepa­
rately, Figure 2-2 does not suggest that competition— or the lack of 
it— explains the disproportionality in the distribution of HUD awards 
for external analysis and management services between for-profit and 
not-for-profit organizations. In order to determine whether competition 
(or the lack of it) is a factor in influencing the distribution of 
award amounts between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, modi­
fications to basic awards must also be considered, because modifications 
are noncompetitive procurements. As explained more in detail later in 
the thesis, there tend to be a larger number of modifications than basic 
awards, but the mean amounts awarded through modifications are smaller 
than basic awards. In order not to distort the comparison between the 
dollar amounts and number of awards in Table 2-1, neither modification 
amounts nor the number of modifications awarded were included in that 
table. Further, with the mean amounts differing substantially, there 
was some concern in utilizing analysis of variance as a methodological
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technique when the total amounts received by for-profit and not-for- 
profit organizations, respectively, were being considered in formulating 
Table 2-2; i.e., there was concern that the "cell means" would be biased. 
It is for the same reason that analysis of variance has not been used to 
analyze the relationship in Table 2-3 below; i.e., the total amount of 
noncompetitive awards includes the amount awarded by use of modifica­
tions.. Table 2-3 indicates that whether the procurement method is com­
petitive or noncompetitive is not significantly important in explaining 
the amount awarded by HUD to for-profit and not-for-profit organiza­
tions, respectively, to perform external analysis and management ser­
vices; and other variables must be included in the design to explain 
the distribution of award amounts between organizational types. In 
the next section, another way of classifying procurement methods will be 
examined to determine if this different perspective can aid in explain­
ing the difference in the amount awarded to for-profit and not-for- 
profit organizations, respectively.
Table 2-3: Percent Of Dollar Amounts Awarded By HUD In FY 79 And The
First Quarter Of FY 80 To Procure External Analysis And 
Management Services, By Competitive And Noncompetitive 
Procurement Methods.
Organizational Procurement Method All Procurement
Type Competitive Noncompetitive Methods
For-Profit 88.2 75.4 81.8




N($) $16.Om $15.8m $31.8m
Kendall's taub = .17 p> .05 conclusion: accept Hn
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Exclusionary And Nonexclusionary Awards
Both noncompetitive and competitive procurement methods may be 
"exclusionary" or "nonexclusionary."^^ Exclusionary methods restrict the 
eligibility to compete to certain organizational types, whereas nonex­
clusionary methods do not. It is hypothesized that differences in the 
amounts awarded to the respective organizational types through the use 
of exclusionary methods result from political factors, and differences 
in the amounts awarded through the use of nonexclusionary methods result 
from behavioral and economic factors which influence an organization's 
ability to compete. Behavioral factors include the ability of an organi­
zation to recognize and respond to procurement opportunities. Economic 
factors include the ability to propose to perform services at a reason­
able cost to the Government. As will be discussed later in the thesis, 
there is a strong interrelationship between behavioral and economic 
factors.
The presence or lack of exclusion cannot, without the aid of 
other variables, explain adequately the disproportionate distribution of 
the award amounts to for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, re­
spectively. This can be discerned by the relationships described in 
Table 2-4 on the following page. Although the distributional pattern 
between categories (i.e., exclusionary and nonexclusionary) is not 
significant, it should be noted that the total amount awarded on a non­
exclusionary basis exceeds that awarded on an exclusionary basis. Thus, 
behavioral and economic factors may be more important than political 
factors in explaining the distribution of the amount awarded to for- 
profit and not-for-profit organizations. If this is determined to be
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true later in the analysis, the hypothesis that federal policy favors 
for-profit organizations in the competitive process for contractual 
awards to provide external analysis and management services will be 
rejected; and implications of accepting the null hypothesis will be 
explored in the conclusion.
Table 2-4: Per Cent Of Dollar Amounts Awarded By HUD In FY 79 And The
First Quarter Of FY 80 To Procure External Analysis And 
Management Services, By Exclusionary And Nonexclusionary 
Procurement Methods
Organizational Type Procurement Method All Procurement
Exclusionary Nonexclusionarv Methods
For-Profit 75.4 83.3 81.8




N($) $ 6.0m 25.8m $31.8m
Kendall's taub = - .08 p ) .05 conclusion: accept Hq
As Table 2-5 on the next page suggests, political, behavioral, 
and economic factors may have substantially different impacts upon the 
distribution of awards for external analysis and management services 
between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, depending upon 
whether the procurement method is competitive or noncompetitive. For 
example, for-profit organizations received 100 per cent of all HUD ex­
clusionary noncompetitive awards for external analysis and management 
services in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY SO, but only 50 per cent 
of exclusionary competitive awards. Even more surprising is the in­
crease in the share of nonexclusionary awards to for-profit organizations 
from 70 per cent for noncompetitive procurements to 97 per cent for
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competitive procurements. Attempting to explain why not-for-profit 
organizations only receive 3.2 per cent of competitive nonexclusionary 
award amounts will be one of the primary tasks of the thesis.
Table 2-5: Per Cent Of Exclusionary And Nonexclusionary Awards Received
By For-Profit And Not-For Profit Organizations In FY 79-80 
From HUD For External Analysis And Management Services, By 
Procurement Method (measured by dollar amounts)





For-Profit Organizations 50.0 100.0
Not-For-Profit Organizations 50.0 0.0
All Organizational Types 100.0 100.0
Nonexclusionary Awards
For-Profit Organizations 96.8 69.6
Not-For-Profit Organizations 3.2 30.4
All Organizational Types 100.0 100.0
The major control variable in the model is the presence (or 
lack of it) of competition. Not only is the promotion of competition the 
official goal which has the largest impact upon the procurement process, 
but as the analysis of the relationship between the award amount and the 
reserved amount has indicated there appear to be substantial differences 
in the characteristics exhibited by competitive and noncompetitive 
awards. Noncompetitive awards will be examined in Chapter III, and 
competitive awards will be examined in Chapter IV.
Within each of these chapters, both exclusionary and nonexclu­
sionary awards will be examined. Thus, the research will focus upon four 
general categories of procurement awards: nonexclusionary noncompetitive
awards, exclusionary noncompetitive awards, nonexclusionary competitive 
awards, and exclusionary competitive awards. However, as the following
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discussion will indicate, it is necessary to address the specific sub- 
types of these four major classifications of procurement methods.
The first major subtype which must be examined separately is 
modifications, because modifications are not subject to the rules and 
regulations governing basic awards. Furthermore, modifications differ 
in that they result from basic awards; and, thus, it is expected that the 
amount of the basic awards will have some impact upon the amount awarded 
through modifications.
For basic noncompetitive awards, it will be necessary to search 
for variables other than exclusion (or the lack of it) to explain the 
difference in the amount awarded to for-profit and not-for-profit organ­
izations; i.e., specific procurement methods must be examined. Note that 
in Table 2-6 on the next page, a zero cell occurs for mean amounts of 
exclusionary noncompetitive awards to not-for-profit organizations. The 
reason the zero cell occurs will be discussed later in the thesis. For 
the present, the important consideration is that the overall relationship 
is not significant at the .05 level (the significance level is .411). 
Again, this implies that the amount awarded noncompetitively by HUD for 
external analysis and management services in FY 79 and the first quarter 
of FY 80 cannot be explained by differences between groups (of organi­
zational types or of procurement methods), but must be accounted for by 
other variables (e.g., specific procurement methods which may or may not 
be targeted for certain organizational types).
Similarly, it is necessary to concentrate the analysis within 
categories when examining competitive procurements. As the two-way 
analysis of variance table on the next page suggests, organizational
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Table 2-6: Mean Dollar Amounts And Number Of Noncompetitive Contracts
Awarded By HUD In FY 79 And The First Quarter Of FY 80, By 
Procurement Method And Organizational Type
Organizational
Type






























Statistical Method: 2-way ANOVA 
Significance Levle: .411 
Conclusion: Accept Hq , reject Hi
Table 2-7 : Mean Dollar And Number Of Competitive Awards Received From
HUD In FY 79 And The First Quarter Of FY 80 By For-Profit 
And Not-For-Profit Organizations To Perform External Analysis 
And Management Services, By Procurement Category
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type and the competitive procurement method (i.e., exclusionary versus 
nonexclusionary) do not adequately explain the difference in the amount 
awarded by HUD competitively for external analysis and management ser­
vices in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80. The reason this occurs 
is the close similarity between the mean amounts received by not-for- 
profit and for-profit organizations for exclusionary competitive awards. 
Table 2-7 indicates that unlike noncompetitive awards, exclusionary 
competitive contracts were awarded in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 
80 to both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. As will be 
explained later in the thesis, these two categories of exclusionary 
competitive contracts to for-profit and not-for-profit organizations 
must be examined separately, because they differ according to their 
degree of legality and conformance to official goals of the Congress.
Crosstabular analysis performed for the competitive and non­
competitive relationships reflected in Table 2-5 supports the conclusion 
which has been derived as a result of utilizing analysis of variance; 
i.e., variables other than the presence of exclusionary policies are 
influencing the distribution of both competitive and noncompetitive pro­
curement awards between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. The 
model is adequate to establish a framework for analysis, but the search 
for other variables must be more specific (i.e., "within groups") in 
order that these variables can be identified. Ironically, the necessity 
to examine more closely within groups supports the relevance of further 
research, for if the general model were adequate to explain the distri­
bution of the amount awarded to for-profit and not-for-profit organiza­
tions, there would be a greatly diminished need to continue this research.
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In sum, it appears that the analysis of awards should be focused 
within groups— more specifically, upon the procurement method utilized 
to award the basic contract or modification. The specific procurement 
methods will be examined in the following order:
• Noncompetitive (Chapter III)
(1) nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards as modifi­
cations to a basic contract;
(2) basic nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards;
(3) exclusionary noncompetitive awards;
• Competitive (Chapter IV)
(4) exclusionary competitive awards to not-for-profit 
organizations ;
(5) exclusionary competitive awards to for-profit 
organizations; and
(6) nonexclusionary competitive awards.
In order to determine the impact upon the distribution of pro­
curement awards between organizational types produced by utilizing one 
procurement method vis-à-vis another, a random sample of all files at 
HUD concerning external analysis and management services was obtained.
It was hoped that this would provide a longitudinal base for the research. 
However, it was ascertained that many HUD awards made prior to FY 79 
were in such a state of disarray and confusion that the procurement 
method could not be determined. Thus, for basic awards made prior to FY 
79, only organizational characteristics of the winners of the award were 
considered valid. For basic contracts awarded in FY 79 and the first 
quarter of FY 80, or for modifications, no such problem in the data base
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was encountered.
Therefore, the primary focus of the research will be upon con­
tracts awarded by HUD to perform external analysis and management ser­
vices in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80. Longitudinal perspectives 
will be reserved for the conclusion in which the distribution of awards 
resulting from the utilization of any one procurement method will not be 
of interest; rather, the interest will be to determine what the research 
implies regarding the trends which are occurring in procurement policy 
affecting the distribution of awards between for-profit and not-for- 
profit organizations.
The general research design used to analyze the contract 
amounts awarded by use of the specific procurement methods will be as 
follows :
e determine the legality and conformance to official goals 
of issuing awards by that procurement method; 
e assess whether that procurement method is relatively 
efficient;
e ascertain whether there is any statistical relationship 
between organizational type and the amount awarded through 
use of that procurement method; 
e search for other variables which might improve the statis­
tical relationship between organizational type and the 
procurement method;
• if this relationship is not significant, find the vari­
able (s) which accounts for the most variance in the amount 
awarded through use of that procurement method;
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determine the general advantages and disadvantages received 
by the Government for utilizing this procurement method; 
and
for nonexclusionary awards, determine which organizational 
types or sub-types are least able to compete effectively 
and attempt to explain, within the scope of the thesis, why 
this occurs.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER II
^Carol Weiss, Evaluation Research; Methods For Assessing 
Program Effectiveness (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,






^See: Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R.
Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern
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The Congressional concept of efficiency is the same as that 
utilized in economic theory; i.e., maximizing the return from a given 
output, or conversely, minimizing the input necessary to produce given 
output. See: Buchanan and Flowers, op. cit., p. 176 f.n.
^41 ÇFR 1-1.001 - 1 and 1 - 1.011 - 2
^^For an explanation of conditions required for a competitive 
situation, refer to f.n. 26, Ch. I.
^^The "least-cost alternative," as used in this paper, means the 
offering of an equivalent good or service at the lowest price. In the 
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(because of additional societal marginal cost associated with competitive 
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economics text may be referred to for the theoretical argument as to why 
competition will result in the lowest price. For an application of this 
logic to Government procurement, see: Raymond C. Dosky, ed., POD Cost
And Price Analysis. Revised Ed. (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State Univer­
sity Research Foundation, 1978c.), pp. 2-1 through 4-22.
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outside services, see: Rosenbltim and McGillis, op. cit., p. 22.
13An institutionalist, instead of accepting a priori techniques 
and abstractions and then attempting to explain reality with the aid of 
such techniques, generally focuses his/her attention upon economic rela­
tionships in their social context. Theory may result, but usually lacks 
the refinement and finesse of analytic economics. See: Ben B. Seligman,
Main Currents In Modern Economics (Toronto, Ontario: Collier-Macmillan
Canada, Ltd., 1962), p. 790.
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and Ann Welch, ed. Social Services By Government Contract: A Policy
Analysis (New York: "Praeger Publishers,” Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1979), pp. 1-10.
^^For example. Dr. Maggie Taylor, Contracting Officer for HUD, 
used this argument in a staff meeting in May, 1980.
^^See: Ed Lovett and Monte Norton, "Determining And Forecasting
Savings Due To Competition," National Contract Management Quarterly 
Journal, pp. 18-27.
^^The terms "exclusionary" and "nonexclusionary" are not found 
(to this student's knowledge) in the literature. The federal government 
is likely to use "restricted to," but this does not seem to capture the 




The issuance of noncompetitive awards provides a problem for 
those who would advocate a closer adherence to official goals by the 
bureaucracies, e.g., Theodore Lowi in The End to Liberalism.̂  For in 
this case, program goals and official goals are in conflict. The 
program office's goal is to accomplish its mission with the least 
expenditure of time and effort; and earlier analysis (i.e., in Chapter
II) has indicated that the least-time and least-effort alternative is, 
on the average, to award contracts noncompetitively. However, the 
Congressional mandate is to promote competition. As a result, whenever 
the decision (as in HUD) is left to the program office as to which 
procurement method is to be utilized, the official goal is likely to 
be subverted.
The Code of Federal Regulations specifies that the contracting 
office is to ensure that official procurement policy is followed.%
In the case of HUD, the responsibility has been abrogated to the 
program offices. Of the contracts examined which were awarded in FY 79 
or the first quarter of FY 80, the procurement method recommended
*A11 notes are located at the end of the respective chapters. 
Notes for Chapter III are located on page 118.
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by the program office was utilized in 98.9 percent of the subsequent 
procurements. And all "sole-source" contractors recommended by the 
program office were subsequently awarded the contract. It is doubtful, 
however, that the degree of abrogation would be as high for goods or 
services other than external analysis and management services. Further, 
it is not known just how ubiquitious this degree of abrogation is through­
out the federal system. It is suspected, however, to be quite high.
There are essentially three strategies used by the bureau­
cracies to avoid complying with the official goal of promoting competi­
tion. These are: 1) to claim that competition is impracticable (and
thus not required under the law); 2) to claim a need for continuity of 
effort by an existing contractor; and 3) to cite other official goals 
which are incompatible with that of promoting competition. Each strategy 
has its own particular set of justifications allowed by law. The 
justifications claiming the impracticability of competition can be 
utilized for all basic awards to any of the respective organizational 
types and are thus indicative of nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards. 
Justifications claiming the need for continuity of effort by an existing 
contractor are utilized for modifications. Justifications utilized 
to promote official goals other than competition are limited to basic 
awards to certain organizational types and are thus indicative of 
exclusionary noncompetitive awards. As a percentage of all HUD procure­
ments for external analysis and management services awarded noncompeti­
tively in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80, modifications account 
for 61.3 percent; nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards account for 
19.6 percent; and exclusionary noncompetitive awards account for 19.1 
percent.
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Since modifications account for the largest proportion of 
noncompetitive awards, they will be discussed first in the following 
section. Then nonexclusionary awards will be examined. Finally, 
exclusionary awards will be discussed. The hypothesis is that the 
disproportionate share of noncompetitive awards to for-profit organiza­
tions is due primarily to exclusionary factors. Stated another way, 
there will be no significant difference in the distribution of HUD 
procurement awards for external analysis and management services between 
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations when modifications and 
nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards are examined, but there will be 
when exclusionary noncompetitive awards are examined. Relative advan­
tages and disadvantages of the respective procurement methods will be 
summarized in the last section of this chapter.
Modifications
Modifications to existing contracts are allowed "...if the 
proposed contractor has a substantial investment of some nature which 
would have to be duplicated at excessive Government expense by another 
source entering the f i e l d. T h i s is interpreted somewhat loosely 
by the bureaucracies to include duplication of effort. Thus, if all 
tasks are not completed, or if the agency increases the number of 
tasks related to any one topic area, another contractor would have to 
incur "start-up" costs and delays which the present contractor supposedly 
would not have to incur. In many cases, this is a valid concern.
However, in most procurements for external analysis and 
management services, this justification is not usually applicable.
First of all, experience has indicated that tasks often specified for
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modifications have little to do with the original contract. That is, 
the present contractor has as much start-up costs as a new contractor 
would. Secondly, many training, management, and social research projects 
have few start-up costs. A professional working in one organization 
can continue on with a project begun by another professional in another 
organization, particularly since the core information needed to do so 
is the property of the Government. There is normally no more inter­
ruption of the flow of work than if there were a change of professional 
talent within the organization.
The motivation for the bureaucracies to award modifications 
is not to save the Government start-up costs, but time. Whereas the 
mean time needed to award a noncompetitive basic award by HUD for 
external analysis and management services is 112 days (compared with 
164 days for a competitive award), the average time needed to award a 
modification to an existing contract is only 55 days. Thus, the motiva­
tion for a program official to maximize program objectives on a least-time 
and least-effort basis through the use of modifications is substantial. 
This motivation results in approximately 1.3 modifications for every 
basic contract issued by HUD for external analysis and management
services.4
The average number of modifications would be much higher if 
the possibility of incurring Congressional wrath were not so prevalent.
Of all the noncompetitive procurement methods, the use of modifications 
is criticized the most by outside reviewers such as GAO. The GAO will 
criticize the agency for substantially misjudging the original cost, 
or, if the agency increases the number of tasks, criticize the agency 
for subverting the official goal of competition. Both charges imply
—83“
an uncooperative attitude toward the will of the Congress— an impression 
the agencies seek to avoid or at least minimize.
Whether or not this limited reliance upon modifications 
results in higher costs to the Government is difficult to ascertain.
One measure would be a comparison of amounts awarded through mod­
ifications with amounts requested for modifications, similar to 
that conducted in Chapter II for basic awards. However, for mod­
ifications, it is expected and proper that the contractor and the 
program office will negotiate amounts; thus, the request amount and 
the modification amount are almost always the same. Therefore, the 
Government does not incur savings or negative savings by utilizing 
modifications.
Another criterion of efficiency is the amount of "fee" 
charged for performing the service. A fee is not the same concept 
as "profit." A fee may include costs (e.g., interest) not normally 
reimbursed by the Government as well as profit. For that reason, 
both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations can charge a fee.
For both types of organizations, the fee indicates that portion of 
the total costs to the Government not related to performing the 
tasks of the contract. Thus, given two equivalent offers to perform 
a given service, a lower fee will imply more service being offered 
for the same cost. Thus, a lower fee would be more "efficient." 
Similarly, that procurement method which, on the average, awarded 
lower fee amounts would be more efficient. However, as discussed 
below, the fee cannot be used as a valid criterion of efficiency 
when comparing procurement raethods-at least in this thesis.
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It was originally Intended to use the amount of fee as one 
criterion of efficiency throughout the thesis. But the amount of fee 
can only be determined for cost-reimbursement contracts, in which the 
direct costs (e.g., labor), indirect costs (e.g., overhead), and the 
amount of fee are specified in the contract document. In contrast, 
fixed-price contracts only specify the total amount which is to be 
charged to the Government by the contractor to perform any given ser­
vice; and indefinite quantity contracts specify the total amount which 
may be charged. Both fixed-price and indefinite quantity contractual- 
instruments were originally designed for goods instead of services; 
and they are not normally appropriate to procure external analysis 
and management services, even though certain contract specialists at 
HUD continue to issue fixed-price and indefinite quantity contracts to 
procure these types of services. Overall, 23 percent of the number of 
contracts awarded by HUD in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80 to 
procure external analysis and management services were either fixed- 
price or indefinite quantify contracts. The issuance of fixed-price 
contracts has the consequence of only making the amount of fee indeter­
minate, but the practice of utilizing indefinite quantity contracts 
has consequences for other criteria of efficiency which will be discus­
sed later in the thesis.
The issuance of fixed-price or indefinite quantity contracts 
normally has the effect of making the fee indeterminate for modifi­
cations to those contracts as well as the basic award, because mod­
ifications to fixed-price and indefinite quantity contracts will only 
increase or decrease the total amount of the contract. Thus, the 
amount of fee is an unreliable criterion of efficiency for modifications
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as well as for basic awards. As a result, this thesis will utilize 
the two criteria discussed earlier to compare the relative efficiency 
of noncompetitive procurement methods; i.e., the time required to 
execute the instrument and the amount of savings to the Government 
caused by the contractor's uncertainty as to how much the Government 
has reserved as being a reasonable cost for that procurement. When 
competitive awards are examined, other criteria of efficiency will be 
developed.
In the past, for-profit organizations have received a 
substantially higher percent of the number of modifications awarded 
for external analysis and management services, but as the data in 
Table 3-1 below implies, a new trend may be occurring. Not-for- 
profit organizations were awarded more modifications in the first 
quarter of FY 80 than for-profit organizations. A statistically 
significant relationship is present between the number of modifications 
awarded to the respective organizational types and the time period 
involved. While working at HUD during FY 79 and FY 80, it seemed
Table 3-1: Number Of Modifications Awarded By HUD For External
Analysis And Management Services, By Organizational 
Type And Time Period
Organizational Time Period








% N % N % N % N
For-Profit . 69 101 79 38 38 10 67 149
Not-For-Profit 31 46 21 10 62 16 33 72
All Organizational 
Types 100 147 100 48 100 26 100 221




that not-for-profit organizations were becomeing as aware of the possibil­
ities of obtaining modifications as for-profit organizations and that 
both organizational types were equally as aggressive in pursuing those 
possibilities.
Even though the ability of for-profit organizations to secure, 
on the average, a larger number of modification awards is becoming 
questionable, descriptive information indicates that the average amount 
received by for-profit organizations is greater than that received by 
not-for-profit organizations. The mean amount awarded by HUD through 
modifications for external analysis and management services in FY 79 
and the first quarter of FY 80 was $98,344 for for-profit organizations 
and $35,912 for not-for-profit organizations. However, one-way analysis 
of variance indicates that there is a high probability that this rela­
tionship occurred by chance; i.e., the relationship is not statis­
tically significant at the .05 level. Unless this probability can be 
improved through the introduction of other independent variables, it 
must be concluded that there is currently no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount awarded by HUD through modifications 
to procure external anlaysis and management services and organizational 
type.
The following indicates the results of the initial search to 
determine those other variables which might be of use in improving the 
statistical relationship between the amount awarded through modifications 
and organizational type;
• organizational size
H]̂ : There will be a statistically significant relationship
between the mean modification amounts awarded to 
small organizations (i.e., less than 200 employees) 
and large organizations (i.e., more than or equal to 
200 employees).
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df: 1 (between groups),
120 (within groups)
sig.: F = 2.342, sig. = .1285
conclusion: accept Hq , reject H^
contract type
H^: There will be a statistically significant relation­
ship between the type of contract and the modifica­
tion amount. Specifically, higher amounts are more 
likely to be awarded for modifications to fixed-price 
and indefinite quantity contracts than modifications 
to cost-reimbursement contracts.
df: 1 (between groups),
119 (within groups)
sig.: F = .202, sig. = .8177
conclusion: accept Hq , reject H^
minority ownership
H^: There will be a statistically significant relation­
ship between minority-ownership and the modification 
amount. Specifically, minority-owned organizations 
are discriminated against in the awarding of modifi­
cations.
df: 1 (between groups),
120 (within groups)
sig: F = .696, sig. = .4058
conclusion: accept Hq, reject Hi
description code
Hi: There will be a statistically signficant relation­
ship between the type of external analysis and 
management service procured (e.g., automatic 
data processing services) and the modification 
amount.
df: 5 (between groups),
116 (within groups)
sig.: F = .109, sig. = .9902
conclusion: accept H q , reject Hi
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• office
Hi : There will be a statistically significant relation­
ship between the program office (e.g., the Assistant 
Secretary for Community Development) and the modifi­
cation amount; i.e., some program offices tend to 
award greater amounts of dollars through modifications, 
on the average, than others.
df: 7 (between groups),
114 (within groups)
sig.: F = .268, sig. = .9652
conclusion: accept Hq , reject
Of the variables examined, organizational size comes closest 
to meeting the statistical significance criterion, but even it fails 
to do so; but because it does seem more important than the other 
variables, the next step is to add organizational size as an independent 
variable to determine whether organizational size and organizational 
type together account for most of the variance in the modification 
amount. As Table 3-2 on the next page indicates, the descriptive 
information supports such a conclusion. However, neither the overall 
relationship nor the interaction effects are significant at the .05 
level.
In order to determine whether organizational type might be 
important in helping to explain the variance in the modification 
amounts awarded within groups, one-way analysis of variance was con­
ducted for large and small organizations, respectively, with the modifi­
cation amount as the criterion variable and organizational type as the 
independent variable. As expected, for small organizations, there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the modification 
amount and organizational type.5 More surprisingly, a similar result 
is obtained for large organizations.& Thus, it must be concluded
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Table 3-2; Mean Modification Amounts Awarded By HUD In Fy 79 And The
First Quarter Of FY 80 For External Analysis And Management 
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that there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
effects of organizational type and organizational size in explaining 
the variance in the modification amount.
The variance in the amount received through modifications is 
hypothesized to be due to the same political, behavioral, and economic 
factors which explain the distribution of the basic awards. The reason 
is that modification amounts are only adjustments in the basic amount. 
This is not to imply that the amount awarded through modifications for 
any given procurement can be predicted by the basic amount awarded. 
Regression analysis indicates that for all HUD awards in FY 79 and the 
first quarter of FY 80 to procure external analysis and management 
services, the relationship between the modification amount (as the 
dependent variable) and the award amount (as the independent variable) 
is not significant at the .05 level. But the total shares of the 
amount awarded through modifications and basic award are very
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similar for the respective organizational types. This is indicated 
in Table 3-3 below. Note that there is a high probability that any 
differences in the percentages of amounts received by the respective 
organizational types through modifications and basic awards have 
occurred by chance. Thus, it can be expected that the percentages 
of the total amount awarded through modifications received by for- 
profit and not-for-profit organizations tends to approximate the 
relative shares received of the total basic amount awarded.
Table 3-3: Percent Of Modification And Award Amounts Received By
For-Profit And Not-For-Profit Organizations In FY 79 









P ̂  .05 ; accept Ho
Again, it is hypothesized that the behavioral, economic, and 
political factors which affect the distribution of basic award amounts 
between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations affect the distri­
bution of amounts awarded through modifications to these organizational 
types. Some of these factors are not difficult to identify, but in 
some cases, qualitative judgements must be relied upon to assess why 
one organizational type tends to receive a disproportionate share of 
the awards. This is particularly applicable to nonexclusionary noncom­
petitive awards (limited hereafter in this thesis to refer only to 
basic awards) by which organizations receive substantial amounts
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to perform external analysis and management services and by which 
those awards are made virtually outside of the public arena. This 
type of procurement method is the topic of the next section.
Nonexclusionary Noncompetitive Awards
Nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards for external analysis 
and management services are allowed by the following justifications 
contained in the Code of Federal Regulations^ (which has the status 
of law):
• time (if time is of the essence and if the proposed con­
tractor can complete the required task within the time 
frame while all others would fail);
• duplication cost (if the proposed contractor has a sub­
stantial investment of some nature which would have to 
be duplicated at excessive Government expense by another 
source entering the field); and
• uniqueness (the unique capability, highly specialized 
experience, or facilities possessed by the proposed 
contractor).
Paradoxically, although time is a primary motivating factor 
for agencies to award contracts noncompetitively, time cannot normally 
be cited as justification for procurements in excess of $10,000 for 
external analysis and management services. The reason is that if the 
agency justifies a noncompetitive procurement on the basis of time 
exigency, it is subject to considerable criticism if the services are 
not delivered as scheduled. A recent GAO investigation criticized the 
Department of Commerce on just these grounds.® For most external 
analysis and management services, both the tasks and the time required 
to perform those tasks are often vague and indefinite.
Likewise, duplication costs are not often cited for external 
analysis and management services. As stated earlier, this is often a
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consldçratlon In awarding modifications, but is rarely applicable for 
basic awards to procure external analysis and management services.
The contracting market for external analysis and management services 
just Is not characterized by such monopolies of Information.
The justification cited most often Is uniqueness; I.e., that 
the contractor Is the only organization with the needed expertise to 
perform the service. As the GAO has noted, this Is rarely true.9 
Just as the contracting market for external analysis and management 
services Is not characterized by a monopoly of Information, It Is not 
characterized by a monopoly of talent. The one characteristic of 
contractors— particularly those engaged In providing external analysis 
and management services— Is that they either have or can obtain quite 
readily almost any disciplinary or professional expertise. Whenever 
this justification Is used, It serves only to lend a spurious legality 
to a decision to award noncompetitively (I.e., on a least-tlme and least- 
effort basis).
Why agencies utilize this justification Is somewhat per­
plexing. The law specifically states that noncompetitive nonexclusion­
ary awards may, with the concurrence of the contracting officer, be 
justified on other grounds.^0 For example, unsolicited proposals 
considered to have superior merit are often used within the bureau­
cracy to justify a noncompetitive procurement. It would seem equitable 
and forthright to outside reviewers (e.g, from the GAO) If the agencies 
would simply state this as the reason for making the award In the 
first place. But at least at HUD, this Is not done. It could not be 
determined from the contract files which noncompetitive awards resulted 
from unsolicited proposals and which did not.
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In sum, the legal justifications used for nonexclusionary 
noncompetitive awards are not thought to be any more of a factor In 
explaining the distribution of those awards between for-profit and 
not-for-profit organizations than for modifications. Again, the primary 
consideration In choosing this particular procurement method Is a 
desire by program officials to award a contract on a least-tlme basis. 
Nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards by HUD for external analysis and 
management services are not as efficient In terms of least-tlme as 
modifications— I.e., 95 average days compared with 55 average days— but 
are more efficient than competitive awards (which take an average of 
164 days to be executed).
As Figure 3-1 on the next page suggests, nonexclusionary 
noncompetitive awards are also relatively efficient judged by the 
criterion of the deviation from the request amount.H This type of 
procurement method does not result in the negative savings to the 
Government normally associated with noncompetitive basic awards for 
external analysis and management services, for there Is a small 
difference between the regression line for nonexclusionary awards and 
the 45° line. On the other hand, there are no savings to the Government 
caused by uncertainty either over task definition or Indefinite quantity. 
It Is hypothesized that there Is a higher degree of collusion between 
program officials and contractors for nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
awards than for any other procurement method except modifications.
_0A_
?lffure 3.1 Relationship Between The Award Amount And
Requested Amount ?or HUD Contracts For External 
Analysis And Management Services, FY 79-80 
(Selected Procurement Methods)
Award Amount  
(3000)









/ f  -




Not-for-profit organizations awarded nonexclusionary non­
competitive contracts by HUD for analysis and management services in 
FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80 received a mean amount of $183,271, 
while for-profit organizations awarded contracts procured by this 
method only received, on the average, $67,446. However, one-way analysis 
of variance indicates that this relationship is not significant at the 
.05 level.12 Unless the significance level can be improved with the 
introduction of other independent variables, it must be concluded that 
there is no significant relationship between organizational type and 
the distribution of current nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards by 
HUD for external analysis and management services.
The following indicates the results of the initial search to 
determine through one-way analysis of variance those other variables 
which might be of use in improving the statistical relationship between 
the amount awarded through nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards and 
organizational type:
• organizational size
H^: There will be a statistically significant relation­
ship between the mean amounts awarded through use 
of nonexclusionary noncompetitive contracts to small 
and large organizations, respectively.
df: 1 (between groups),
20 (within groups)
sig.: F = .031, sig. = .8625
conclusion: accept Hq , reject H^
• minority ownership
H^: Nonminority-owned firms will, on the average,
receive more of these types of awards than minority- 
owned firms. The difference between the mean amounts 
awarded to minority-owned firms and nonminority-owned 
• firms will be significant.
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results of analysis: Analysis of variance is not appli­
cable. All organizations receiving nonexclusionary 
noncompetitive awards were nonminority firms.
• contract type
Hi : There will be a statistically significant relation­
ship between the type of contract awarded (i.e., 
cost-reimbursement, fixed-price, or indefinite 
quantity) and the amount awarded through the use of 
nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards.
df: 2 (between groups),
19 (within groups)
sig.: F = .534, sig. = .5946
conclusion: accept Hg, reject Hi
• description code
Hi : It is hypothesized that the "class" of external
analysis services (e.g., ADP services or special 
studies and analyses) might account for the amount 
awarded through nonexclusionary noncompetitive con­
tracts. That is, nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
contracts may tend to be awarded in higher amounts 
for ADP services than other classes of external 
analysis and management services.
df: 1 (between groups),
20 (within groups)
sig.: F = .277, sig. = .6042
conclusion: accept Hq , reject Hi
• requesting office
Hi : Some program offices will tend to rely much more
heavily upon noncompetitive nonexclusionary awards 
than others, and the relationship between the amounts 
awarded by this procurement method and the requesting 
office will be significant.
df: 4 (between groups),
17 (within groups)
sig.: F = 3.059, sig. = .0454
eta squared: .4186
conclusion: accept Hi, reject Hq
—97—
• woman-ownershlp
Hi : Women-owned firms will experience some discrimina­
tion in the awarding of nonexclusionary noncompeti­
tive awards. Specifically, the relationship between 
woman-ownership (as a variable) and the amount awarded 
through nonexclusionary noncompetitive contracts 
will be significant.
df: 1 (between groups),
20 (within groups)
sig.: F = .195, sig. = .6631
conclusion: accept Hq , reject H^
• fund type
Hi: It is hypothesized that the fund type might have a
significant impact in explaining the awarding of 
noncompetitive awards. Specifically, it is hypothe­
sized that when the program office has funds which 
will be lost in the current fiscal year (if not 
awarded), the program office will tend to award 
higher amounts of nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
awards,and vice-versa.
df: 1 (between groups),
20 (within groups)
sig.: F = .441, sig. = .3140
conclusion: accept Hq , reject Hi
• request quarter
Hi : It is hypothesized that the quarter in which the
program office makes the request for the contract­
ing office to procure a service might have a sig­
nificant impact in explaining the distribution of 
nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards. Specifi­
cally, the time pressures involved in awarding con­
tracts before the end of the fiscal year will result 
in a significantly higher amount of nonexclusionary 
noncompetitive awards for external analysis and 
management services when the procurement is requested 
in the fourth quarter.
df: 5 (between groups),
16 (within groups)
sig.: F = .735, sig. = .6078
conclusion: accept H q , reject Hi
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From the results of the preliminary analysis, it can be 
concluded that the following variables are not important in explaining 
the variance in the amount awarded by HUD in FY 79 and the first quarter 
of FY 80 for external anlaysis and management services through the use 
of nonexclusionary noncompetitive contracts: organizational size,
contract type, woman-ownership, fund type, request quarter, and type 
of external analysis and management service. The primary variables 
explaining this variance are: 1) whether or not the organization is
minority-owned, and 2) the particular office making the request. Each 
will be discussed in turn, and their impact upon the distribution of 
nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards to for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations will be assessed.
None of the organizations receiving HUD awards for external 
analysis and management services procured on a nonexclusionary non- • 
competitive basis are minority-owned. This suggests strongly that 
some discrimination occurs against minority-owned firms in the com­
petition for nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards. However, the 
phenomenon is more likely due to a policy that all noncompetitive contracts 
to minority-owned firms are to be awarded on an exclusionary basis.
This will be discussed in the next section. But it should be noted 
that not all minority-owned firms are eligible for exclusionary awards; 
and for those not so eligible, some discrimination may be occurring.
This would have little impact, however, on the distribution of nonex­
clusionary noncompetitive awards between for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations, respectively. It cannot be said with any degree of 
certainty that a greater amount awarded on a nonexclusionary noncompe­
titive basis to for-profit, minority-owned organizations would necessarily
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result in a lesser amount to not-for-profit organizations; i.e., 
nonminority-owned, for-profit organizations might receive less.
The variable explaining the most variance in the amount 
awarded on a nonexclusionary noncompetitive basis is the requesting 
office. To determine whether the introduction of the requesting 
office might aid in explaining the difference between the amounts 
awarded to for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, respectively, 
two-way analysis of variance has been utilized. The criterion variable 
is the amount awarded by HUD on a nonexclusionary noncompetitive basis 
for external analysis and management services in FY 79 and the first 
quarter of FY 80. The two independent variables are organizational 
type (i.e., for-profit or not-for-profit) and the requesting office. 
Neither the overall relationship nor the interaction effects are signif­
icant at the .05 level.13
Since it is hypothesized (based upon the results of the 
one-way analysis of variance tests described earlier) that there are 
no other variables which (by being introduced as independent variables) 
would improve the statistical relationship between organizational type 
and amounts awarded on a nonexclusionary noncompetitive basis, it must 
be concluded that organizational type is relatively unimportant in 
explaining the distribution of HUD awards for external analysis and 
management services procured on a nonexclusionary noncompetitive basis 
in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80.
The variable explaining most of the variance in the amount 
awarded upon a nonexclusionary noncompetitive basis is the requesting 
office. In order to lend some perspective, the HUD program offices 
and the number and mean amounts awarded in various award categories
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are reflected in Table 3-4 below. Because the award category is based 
upon the same variable as the criterion variable (i.e., the award 
amount), no inferences regarding the presence or strength of the rela­
tionship can be made, and the data can only serve a descriptive function.
Table 3-4: Number And Mean Amounts Of Contracts Awarded By HUD On
A Nonexclusionary Noncompetitve Basis For External 
Analysis And Management Services In FY 79 And The First 
Quarter Of FY 80, By Requesting Office And Award 
Category
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The respective program offices differ markedly in their 
reliance upon nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards. Within HUD, the 
most conservative are those program offices with high visibility (e.g., 
the Office of the Secretary), with little need for external analysis 
and management services (e.g, the Government National Morgage Association),
-101-
or which are in a state of declining influence and responsibility 
(i.e., the New Community Development Corporation). Unsolicited pro­
posals are not likely to be successful when submitted to these types 
of program offices. Likewise, too much effort spent in cultivating 
informal commitments from program officials from these offices would 
probably be unwise.
Another grouping of program offices can be discerned which, 
by tradition (e.g., Housing or Policy Development and Research), or 
because they are not powerful enough within the bureaucracy (e.g.. 
Administration or Neighborhoods and Voluntary Associations) to receive 
unlimited authority to igsue noncompetitive contracts, rely only moder­
ately upon nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards to procure external 
analysis and management services. These are likely to issue noncompe­
titive contracts only in the lower award categories. For awards over 
$100,000, they are normally more cautious. Thus, organizations wishing 
to maximize the chances to secure nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
awards from these program offices would be advised to limit the scope 
of effort to that which can be performed for less than $100,000. This 
does not always hold true, however, as the one large award ($1.2 million) 
made by Housing suggests.
The office most likely to procure external analysis and 
management services through the use of nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
contracts is Community Planning and Development (CPD). It is not 
clear whether this program office relies more heavily upon unsolicited 
proposals than the other program offices, but this is felt to be the 
case. Further, it is suspected that informal relationships between 
CPD program officials and contractors are extremely important in
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explalnlng the distribution of CPD awards procured on a nonexclusionary 
noncompetitive basis. The GAO notes that contractors often enter 
into "long and friendly" relationships with agencies.14 But if this 
analysis is correct, it suggests that the GAO was in error in focusing 
its audit at the agency level instead of the program office level.
The ability to develop close relationships with members of 
the bureaucracy is a behavioral factor which is thought to affect the 
distribution of nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards between organiza­
tions. More specifically, these relationships are most important when 
they involve the top management of the organization and the most influ­
ential program officials within the bureaucracy. This does not, in 
the normal case, imply improper behavior. Rather, it is hypothesized 
that professional relationships are usually the result of a historical 
satisfaction within the bureaucracy of a contractor's performance and 
credibility. This has important implications for the value of evalua­
tion studies, for if the hypothesis is correct, the results of evalua­
tion studies could determine which organizations actually perform the 
best, and nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards could be reserved for 
these organizations. At present, it can only be hypothesized that 
such a linkage exists on an informal basis. Also, the value of such a 
system (whether formal or informal) depends upon whether this pro­
curement method offers advantages to the Government in terms of time 
and cost efficiency; and this may not be found to be true when other 
procurement methods are examined.
For the present, it is sufficient to note that although 
informal relationships are shared with program officials and representa­
tives of for-profit and not-for-profit organizations alike, not-for-profit
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organlzatlons definitly compete as well as— and perhaps better than—  
for-profit organizations for awards secured by this procurement method. 
Analysis of variance and crosstabular analysis suggest that there are 
other variables other than organizational type which affect the distri­
bution of award amounts; further, there is no indication that these 
other variables (primarily, the ability to develop informal relationships 
with members of the bureaucracy) are associated with either organizational 
type. However, the percentages of nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
awards received by not-for-profit organizations and for-profit organi­
zations differ substantially from the relative percentages received 
from all other procurement methods (excluding modifications). Not-for- 
profit organizations received 83 percent of the total amount awarded 
on a nonexclusionary noncompetitive basis by HUD in FY 79 and the 
first quarter of FY 80 to provide external analysis and management 
services, but only 10 percent of the total amount awarded through all 
other procurement methods (excluding modifications). The problem for 
not-for-profit organizations is that contracts awarded on a nonexclu­
sionary noncompetitive basis constituted only 14 percent of the total 
amount procured by HUD in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80. And 
as discussed in the conclusion, this total share of award amounts 
accounted for by nonexclusionary noncompetitive contracts may decline 
in the near future.
One of the factors which may contribute to this decline is 
the official goal to promote participation in the procurement process 
by minority-owned firms. This official goal will be discussed in the 
next section. Prior to this examination, it can only be noted that 
minority-owned firms either do not enjoy the "friendly" relationships
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with program officials or, if they do enjoy such relationships, receive 
noncompetitive awards through utilization of a different procurement 
method.
Exclusionary Noncompetitive Awards 
The official goal of promoting competition is in direct 
conflict with the official goals of promoting opportunity for certain 
groups through the issuance of exclusionary noncompetitive contracts. 
These types of awards are not only reserved for specific racial or 
cultural groups, but also to certain organizational types; and this 
has an identifiable impact upon the distribution of awards for external 
analysis and management services between for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations.
The only direct authorization for exclusionary noncompetitive
awards is that which is contained in the 1978 amendments to the Small
Business Act of 1958 (hereafter referred to as "the Act"):
...the Congress finds...that the power to let sole source 
Federal contracts pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small 
Business Act can be an effective procurement assistance tool 
for development of business ownership among groups that own 
and control little productive capital....^^
The purpose of Section 8(a) of the Act is not to aid all those who own 
and control little productive capital, but only those "socially and 
economically disadvantaged persons" by virtue of "...their identification 
as members of certain groups that have suffered the effects of discrimin­
atory practices or similar invidious circumstances over which they 
have no control.. That is, social disadvantage is more important 
as a criterion of eligibility than economic status. However, both 
criteria are to be considered in determining the eligibility of specific
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organizations, which is the responsibility of the Small Business Admin­
istration (SBA).
Because the primary authorization for giving preference to 
socially and disadvantaged groups in procurements is Section 8(a) 
of the Small Business Act, organizations owned by individuals who have 
been determined by the SBA to be eligible for such preference are 
commonly referred to as "8(a) firms." To receive 8(a) status, an 
organization must be: 1) at least 51 percent owned and operated by
individuals determined by the SBA to be socially and economically 
disadvantaged, and 2) a "small business" as defined by the SBA.
The Act specifically targets as socially disadvantaged groups 
"Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, and other minorities."1? It 
has been left up to the discretion of the SBA to identify these "other 
minorities." Other minorities which have been designated by the SBA 
include ifative Americans, Americans of Asian descent, and those from 
the Pacific Islands. For other groups, the SBA is probably being more • 
conservative than the Congress intended. The final conference report 
for the amendments cites an example which is indicative of how flexible 
the Congress wished the intent of the Act to be interpreted:
...the Conferees realize that other Americans may also suffer 
from social disadvantage because of cultural bias. For 
example, a poor Appalachian white person who has never had 
the opportunity for a quality education or the ability to 
expand his or her cultural horizons, may similarly be found 
socially disadvantaged....18
The SBA has not included people from the Appalachians or Ozarks as
socially deprived groups and has been resisting granting 8(a) eligibility
to other groups claiming social deprivation and eligibility under the
auspices of Section 8(a)— e.g., women and Hasidic Jews.
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In the past, the guidelines used by the SBA to determine a 
"small business” were based upon a combination of capital assets and 
number of employees. More recently, the SBA has been attempting to 
institute standards based only upon the "industry" and number of em­
ployees.19 This will be discussed more in the next chapter. For the 
purposes of this thesis, a small organization primarily offering external 
analysis and management services is considered "small" if it employs 
less than 200 employees.
The most important consideration for the purposes of this 
thesis is that only for-profit organizations are eligible to participate 
in the 8(a) program. This is a result of the Act's requirement that 
8(a) eligibility is dependent upon, in part, being classified a "small 
business concern." The SBA has correctly interpreted Congressional 
intent that only a for-profit organization be considered a "concern."
It is hypothesized that this factor has identifiable impact throughout 
the federal government upon the distribution of awards for external 
analysis and management services between for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations, because as 8(a) awards increase as a percent of total 
amounts awarded for external analysis and management services, the 
proportion of award amounts which not-for-profit organizations are 
eligible to receive declines. Further, it is hypothesized that the 
agencies are increasing markedly both the number and amounts of 8(a) 
contracts. This is due to increased pressure from the SBA for the 
agencies to increase such procurements and from a perception by program 
officials that 8(a) procurements offer a defensible method for awarding 
contracts noncompetitively (thus avoiding-the time delays inherent in 
competitive procurements).
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Because of the scope of the thesis, these hypotheses can not 
be proven. However, in regard to the proposition that the federal 
agencies are increasing their reliance upon 8(a) procurements, HUD's 
performance is probably typical. Although HUD has actually awarded 
only 19.1 percent of its noncompetitive procurements on an exclusionary 
basis, this accounts for almost 50 percent of all noncompetitive basic 
awards for external analysis and management services. The projected 
goal for HUD for FY 80 is that 8(a) contracts account for 59 percent 
of all noncompetitive basic awards.^0
It should be noted that this is a planned policy instead 
of a haphazard pattern. As previously discussed, minority firms 
do not receive nonexclusionary noncompetitive HUD awards for external 
anlaysis and management services, although they are just as eligible 
as other organizations to do so. Rather, when a program official 
is given authority to issue a contract noncompetitively, and a minority- 
owned firm is available as a sole-source, the program official will 
recommend that the noncompetitive procurement be secured through the 
8(a) program because such a procedure is not only more defensible, but 
also it appears to actively support the official goal of promoting 
participation by minorities. Further, when given the authority to 
issue a contract noncompetitively, and given that there are two organi­
zations equally capable of performing the service— one an 8(a) firm 
and the other a small not-for-profit organization— the program official 
will recommend that the 8(a) firm be chosen as the sole-source and 
that the contract be issued under the 8(a) program. Again, this is not 
due to a concern for equity, but a pragmatic ethic to achieve program 
goals with the least expenditure of time and effort.
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In contrast with other noncompetitive procurement methods, 
the primary motivation for the program official is to save effort, and 
only secondarily, time. The average time for HUD to execute an exclu­
sionary noncompetitive basic award for external analysis and management 
services is 122 days, compared with 55 days for modifications and 95 
days for nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards. Exclusionary noncompe­
titive awards are only efficient in terms of least-time when compared 
with competitive awards, which take an average of 164 days to execute. 
However, program officials must be substantially involved in the process 
to award contracts competitively, but they have to expend relatively 
little effort on noncompetitive awards. For 8(a) awards, the primary 
effort must be expended by the contracts office. One of the most 
byzantine processes in the federal government involves the approval of 
an 8(a) contract. First, the agency making the award constructs a 
contract for the amount of the service with the SBA. In fact, this is 
only a clearance, but it is extremely burdensome in terms of effort by 
the contract specialist— at least as much as issuing a nonexclusionary 
noncompetitive contract. Then, the agency must formulate another 
contract for the contractor, and this process takes as much effort as 
awarding a nonexclusionary contract.
The time spent would, on the average, be double the time 
spent on a nonexclusionary noncompetitive contract except that contract 
specialists are under pressure from the program offices to get the 
final contract executed; for, legally, the contractor is not supposed 
to be able to begin work until the final contract is executed. But 
program officials do not normally understand the process to award an 
8(a) contract. In their perception, once the initial contract is
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slgned with the SBA, the contractor should be able to begin work.
Thus, they are likely to give informal authorization for the contractor 
to begin work. But the contractor is normally unwilling to incur too 
much cost without a formal contract. They begin to pressure the program 
office, which in turn complains to the contracting office.
Exclusionary noncompetitive awards are also extremely ineffi­
cient for HUD procurements for external analysis and management services 
in which the total amount of the award is less than $100,000. An 
important factor is that the Act implies that one of the purposes of 
letting contracts on a sole-source basis to 8(a) firms is to aid in 
capital formation. Capital formation cannot normally occur unless 
there is an excess of revenue compared to expenditures; i.e., there 
must be an increase in retained earnings. As a result, agencies are 
never criticized for over-compensation of 8(a) firms; and program 
officials can quite easily obtain clearance from within the bureau­
cracy to increase the reserved amount for an anticipated 8(a) pro­
curement as long as that increase is relatively small (e.g., $10-$30 
thousand).
Most 8(a) contractors understand this process. A favorite 
tactic is to wait until the initial contract has been cleared through 
the SBA and then refuse to do the work (which has often been begun 
without the knowledge of the contracting office) unless the contract 
amount is increased. The contract office is then faced with cancelling 
the procurement and beginning anew or with authorizing the higher 
amount. At HUD, the latter course is almost always chosen to avoid 
conflict with the program office. Thus, for procurements under $100,000 
for external analysis services, the amount actually awarded almost
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always exceeds that originally estimated. This is indicated in Figure 
3-2 on the next page.
If issuing awards of under $100,000 on an exclusionary non­
competitive basis is extremely expensive for the Government, the use 
of this procurement method produces savings for awards in excess of 
$100,000. It is hypothesized that this is due to the program official 
wishing to avoid criticism by underestimating costs for a major pro­
curement; i.e., the program official will normally "withdraw" the 
request rather than lobby for an increase. Most contractors are aware 
that they may lose an award altogether by exceeding the reserved amount 
for large procurements. Further, the slopes of the regression lines 
comparing the amount reserved and the amount awarded suggest that 
there is less collusion between program officials and contractors for 
8(a) noncompetitive awards than for nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
awards. In the absence of collusion, as the level of effort increases, 
and as tasks become more numerous and interrelated, costs become more 
difficult to estimate. And if the contractor is likely to err for a 
large 8(a) noncompetitive procurement, it is more likely to be on the 
side of caution.
HUD only awards exclusionary noncompetitive contracts as 
allowed by law. This is indicated in the sample results in that no 
such contracts for external analysis and management service in FY 79 
and the first quarter of FY 80 were awarded to not-for-profit organi­
zations and that all exclusionary noncompetitive contracts were awarded 
to 8(a) firms. Thus, analysis of variance is inappropriate in deter­
mining the significance of the distribution of exclusionary noncompeti­
tive awards between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. But
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Pigure •3 9 Relationship Between The Amount Awarded And 
The Initial Amount Reserved Por Exclusionary 
Noncompetitive Contracts Awarded By HUD Por 
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It can be stated that exclusionary noncompetitive awards account 
for almost 38 percent of the overall difference between the total 
amounts awarded noncompetitively to for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations, respectively, for current (i.e., FY 79 and the first 
quarter of FY 80) external analysis and management services.
In order to determine what variables (other than the primary 
ones of organizational type and 8(a) status) affect the distribution of 
HUD awards for external analysis and management services procured on 
an exclusionary noncompetitive basis, one-way analysis of variance has 
been performed. The criterion variable is the amount awarded on a 
exclusionary noncompetitive basis. The independent variables correspond 
closely to those utilized for nonexclusionary awards, so that some 
comparisons can be made. The results of the analysis may be of use 
when, in the conclusion, both the equity and effectiveness (of achieving 
official goals) of exclusionary awards are examined.
It does not appear that organizational size is an important 
variable in explaining the distribution of exclusionary noncompetitive 
awards for external analysis and management services. Although the 
descriptive statistics suggest that organizations with less than 200 
employees receive a higher mean amount of such awards than organizations 
with more than 200 employees, the relationship is not significant at 
the .05 level.22 This indicates that the program may not be achieving 
its goal to direct such procurements to those representatives of those 
groups that "own and control little productive capital," because it 
is hypothesized that there is an extremely high correlation between 
organizational size and existing capital; i.e., organizations that
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have more than 200 employees are likely to own and control significant 
amounts of capital.
The program does, however, appear to be effective in direct­
ing its primary effort to minority groups. Out of 23 contracts for 
external analysis and management services awarded to 8(a) organizations, 
HUD awarded 22 to minority-owned organizations. Further, there is no 
indication of any favoritism shown by race or culture after 8(a) eligi­
bility has been determined. Not only is there no significant difference 
between the mean amounts awarded minority-owned and nonminority-owned 
f i r m s , 23 but there is no significant difference between the amounts 
awarded to the respective racial categories (e.g., black or hispanic).^^
Unexpectedly, the analysis indicates that some favoritism 
may be shown to women-owned 8(a) firms. The mean amount awarded by 
HUD to women-owned, 8(a) organizations for external analysis and manage­
ment services in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80 is $296,919, 
compared to $115,825 for 8(a) organizations not owned by women. The 
relationship is signficant at the .05 level.25 One factor may be 
that there are so few women-owned firms that the owners of these organi­
zations may be more "visable" within the bureaucracy, particularly to 
senior program officials who are women and who (at least within HUD) 
tend to be advocates for women's rights. But the scope of the data 
base prevents testing this proposition.
Similar to nonexclusionary awards, HUD exclusionary non­
competitive awards for external analysis and management services do 
not seem to be highly associated with the type of contractual instru­
ment used (e.g., cost-reimbursement or fixed-price), the type of external 
analysis and management service being procured (i.e., ADP vis-à-vis
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other external analysis and management services), or the fund type 
(i.e., whether or not the program office would lose funds if the pro­
curement were not awarded in the same fiscal year as the program 
office made the request for the procurement). None of these relation­
ships was found to be significant at the .05 level.
In contrast to nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards, there 
is no significant difference in the program offices regarding their 
willingness to award exclusionary noncompetitive contracts to 8(a) 
organizations.27 It is assumed that all the assistant secretaries 
of the major program offices strive to maximize the amount awarded to 
8(a) organizations. They are constrained only in that they are also 
expected to limit total noncompetitive procurements to avoid criticism 
by the GAO or other reviewing agencies. The confusion caused by attempt­
ing to conform to two conflicting goals is substantial.
It is hypothesized that the ability of various 8(a) organ­
izations to receive exclusionary noncompetitive awards is due to the 
behavioral factor of developing informal relationships with members of 
the bureaucracy. But unlike nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards, 
these relationships do not seem to be as concentrated within certain 
program offices and may not be as close (if the relationship between 
the award amount and reserved amount is any guide). Experience gained 
as a contract specialist at HUD has indicated that organizations seeking 
8(a) contracts must be very aggressive in seeking out opportunity from 
within the bureaucracy. But again, without being able to assess the 
degree of reliance by HUD upon unsolicited proposals, it is not clear 
whether this aggressiveness is usually channeled into submitting
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unsollclted proposals or in developing informal relationships with 
members of the bureaucracy.
Summary
All noncompetitive awards have the identifying characteristic 
that the amounts received by the respective organizations are due, in 
large part, to informal relationships established between representa­
tives of the organizations and program officials. It is hypothesized 
that these relationships develop because of the bureacracy's satisfaction 
with past performance and perceptions of the credibility of contractors. 
However, given the scope of the thesis, this hypothesis can not be tested. 
Further, it is not clear as to the impact of other variables which may 
influence the awarding of noncompetitive contracts (e.g., the submission 
of unsolicited proposals).
Overall, the research indicates that the proportion of modifi­
cation amounts which received by the respective organizational types 
corresponds closely to the proportion of basic amounts. In contrast, 
the total amount received by 8(a) organizations on an exclusionary 
noncompetitive basis is likely to be a set figure, established in 
advance of the fiscal year by HUD and the Small Business Administration. 
The total amount awarded by HUD on a nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
basis may be dependent upon the total amount awarded through utilization 
of other procurement methods. This proposition will be discussed in 
the conclusion. For now, it need only be noted that not-for-profit 
organizations tend to compete very well for nonexclusionary noncompeti­
tive awards.
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Exclusionary noncompetitive awards cannot be defended on 
grounds of efficiency. As Table 3-5 below indicates, exclusionary 
noncompetitive awards are the least efficient judged by the efficiency, 
criterion of the time needed to execute the contract (or modification).
The result is more mixed when judged by the criterion of savings to 
the Government. For awards of less than $100,000, exclusionary noncom­
petitive awards are the least efficient if it is assumed realistically 
that the slope of the regression line for modifications is 1.0. For 
awards over $100,000, exclusionary noncompetitive awards probably 
produce more savings to the Government than the other two noncompetitive 
procurement methods. But the overall judgement is that awarding contracts 
on an exclusionary basis is probably the least efficient method of 
procuring a service noncompetitively— particularly if the hidden cost 
of double effort (caused by SBA procedures) is considered.
Table 3-5: Ranking Of Noncompetitive Procurement Methods Used By
HUD For Awarding Contracts For External Analysis And 
Management Services In FY 79 And The First Quarter Of 
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However, the method of issuing sole-source contracts to 8(a) 
firms does seem to be contributing toward the official goal of aiding 
capital formation for firms owned by members of socially and economically 
disadvantaged groups. No tendencies could be discerned which would 
imply discrimination against any racial group, yet most of the 8(a) 
program is being reserved for members of racial minorities— just as 
the Congress intended. However, the low participation rate of women- 
owned firms is probably indicative of an overly-conservative interpre­
tation of enabling legislation by the SBA. The opposite is probably 
true of the SBA allowing firms with more than 200 employees to participate 
in the program. A person who owns a firm with more than 200 employees 
is not economically disadvantaged-regardless of racial or cultural 
origin.
In sum, exclusionary noncompetitive awards can be defended 
in terms of equity. But critical to the argument justifying preference 
to 8(a) firms is the presupposition that organizations owned by members 
of socially and economically disadvantaged groups are, in fact, less 
able to compete effectively for federal contracts. As the next chapter 
will indicate, there is some question regarding the validity of this 
presupposition. That is, promoting participation by minorities may 
not be incompatible with competition. If this is indeed the case, 
exclusionary noncompetitive awards may not be justifiable, and the con­
fusion caused by competing official goals could be removed. Then it 
can legitimately be asked whether the same Congressional goals could 
be accomplished with nonexclusionary means.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER III
^Lowl states: "Juridlclal democracy tends to reduce the 
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4por basic contracts awarded by HUD prior to FY 79, the 
mean number of modifications were 1.07 prior to FY 79, .23 in FY 79, 
and .02 in the first three months of FY 80. For contracts awarded in 
FY 79 and the first three months of FY 80, the mean number of modifica­
tions were .18 in FY 79 and .24 in FY 80. Since awards prior to FY 79 
have had a much longer performance period (some as long as 8 years) 
the two sets of data are not directly comparable. It is hypothesized 
that, over time, the mean number of modifications awarded per contract 
will be approximately the same for contracts awarded in FY 79 as prior 
to FY 79. No initiative was observed while this student was a contract 
specialist at HUD to decrease the reliance upon modifications. On the 
other hand, there seemed to be no abnormal increase in the number of 
modifications being awarded. Thus, it is expected that for every 
basic HUD award for external analysis and management services in FY 
79, there will eventually be between 1.3 and 1.4 modifications.
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freedom, F = .142 and the significance level is .7069.
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^Primarily 41 CFR 24-3.101-50. An additional justification 
exists for procuring certain goods and ADP systems noncompetitively, 
i.e., if "...the proposed contractor is the only one which can fulfill 
a requirement that the desired item be compatible with existing equip­
ment or systems." Source: 41 CFR 24-3.101-50 (c)(l)(iii). Further,
there are certain "exclusions:" 1) architect-engineering services, 2) 
for utilities, 3) purchases from the mandatory Federal Supply Schedule 
(for goods) whenever only one source is listed, and 4) 8(a) procurements 
with the Small Business Administration. Source: 41 CFR 24-3.101-50(b). 
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2lAmount awarded noncompetitively $11,924,975
to for-profit organizations
less: amount awarded noncompetitively 3,894,535
to not-for-profit organizations __________
difference $ 8,030,440
amount awarded on a $3,026,173
exclusionary basis =__________ = .3768
difference
$8,030,440
^^With 1 (between groups) and 21 (within groups) degrees 
of freedom, F = .703, and the significance level is .4111,
Z^With 1 (between groups) and 21 (within groups) degrees 
of freedom, F = .084, and the significance level is .7749.
2^With 4 (between groups) and 18 (within groups), F = 1.742 
and the significance level is .1848.
25with 1 (between groups) and 21 (within groups), F = 4.573 
and the significance level is .0444.
Z^For the relationship between the amount awarded on an 
exclusionary noncompetitive basis and:
1) Contract type
df: 2(between groups), 20 (within groups)
F: 2.007
sig.: .1606
2) Description code (i.e., type of external analysis and
management service)




df: 1 (between groups), 21 (within groups)
F: 1.035
sig.: .3205
27with 4 (between groups) and 18 (within groups) degrees 




Similar to noncompetitive awards, competitive procurement 
methods may be exclusionary or nonexclusionary.^ Exclusionary competi­
tive awards restrict the eligibility to compete to certain organizational 
types, whereas nonexclusionary competitive awards do not. Also similar 
to noncompetitive awards, differences in the amounts awarded to the re­
spective organizational types through the use of exclusionary competi­
tive methods result from political factors, and differences in the 
amounts awarded through the use of nonexclusionary competitive methods 
result from behavioral and economic factors which influence an organi­
zation's ability to compete.
Concentrating the analysis upon awards procured by specific 
procurement methods not only affords the opportunity to examine the com­
petitive advantages and disadvantages of for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations, respectively, but also the competitive advantages and 
disadvantages of certain organizational sub-types (e.g., minority-owned 
firms). Thus, the presupposition that exclusionary policies are required
*Notes are contained at the end of the respective chapters. 
Notes for Chapter IV are located on page 183.
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If these firms are to participate in the largesse distributed through 
contracts can be tested.
The analysis of competitive awards is more difficult than for 
noncompetitive awards. The process of making a competitive award is 
more dynamic, there are more variables to consider, and there are more 
standards by which to judge the relative ability of any organizational 
type to compete. The analysis is also complicated in that most competi­
tive processes involve two competitions; i.e., "initial competition" and 
"best-and-final competition." Initial competition is that stage of the 
competitive process in which all of the proposals received from prospec­
tive offerors are evaluated according to criteria stated in the RFP. 
Best-and-final competition is that stage of the competitive process in 
which oral reviews are conducted with those organizations which have a 
reasonable chance of receiving the award and in which those organizations 
may submit revised proposals.
Nevertheless, the general research design used to analyze within 
groups for noncompetitive awards can be adapted to analyzing within 
groups for competitive awards. Exclusionary competitive awards will be 
examined first. This will help to introduce some concepts (e.g., "quasi­
competition") which are essential to understanding the process of nonex­
clusionary competitive awards and will identify the political factors 
which influence the distribution of competitive awards. Then nonexclu­
sionary competitive awards will be examined to identify behavioral and 
economic factors which influence the distribution of award amounts when 
all organizational types are allowed to compete. The conclusion will 
then compare both competitive and noncompetitive methods and suggest
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whether exclusionary criteria for eligibility are necessary for accom­
plishing the purposes for which they were intended.
Exclusionary Competitive Awards to 
Not-For-Profit Organizations 
Exclusionary competitive contracts to not-for-profit organiza­
tions are not specifically allowed by the Code of Federal Procurement
2Regulations and are thus illegal. If not so allowed, nonexclusionary 
competitive procurement methods must be used; noncompetitive awards must 
be made, citing the appropriate justifications; or the services must be 
acquired through assistance instruments (i.e., grants or cooperative
3agreements). However, some federal agencies are still awarding con­
tracts on an exclusionary competitive basis to not-for-profit organiza­
tions. HUD has recently instituted a policy to discontinue this prac- 
4tice, and it is thought that the discontinuance of the practice will 
become ubiquitous throughout the federal system before long.
Prior to the institution of this policy by HUD, the contracting 
office did issue from one RFP 20 multi-awards on an exclusionary competi­
tive basis to not-for-profit organizations in FY 79. Thirteen of these 
awards were selected in the sample. Even though inappropriately (and 
probably illegally) awarded, this set of contracts does provide a unique 
opportunity to examine some of the factors which influence the distribu­
tion of HUD procurement awards for external analysis and management ser­
vices when only not-for-profit organizations are allowed to compete 
against each other. To this student's knowledge, HUD did not issue any 
other exclusionary competitive awards to not-for-profit organizations in 
FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80.
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The awards were made by HUD to provide technical assistance to 
community organizations and neighborhood housing associations. Eligibil­
ity was restricted in the competition for these awards to not-for-profit 
organizations engaged primarily in providing low-cost housing. Most of 
these organizations were small, averaging 85 employees. Only 2 of the 
13 contractors in the sample employed 200 or more employees. No educa­
tional institutions or units of state and local government were allowed 
to participate.
Although awards to these organizations all resulted from one 
RFP, they provide an opportunity to develop some "tools" of analysis 
which might be useful when examining other competitive procurement meth­
ods. Further, it is hypothesized that these awards will indicate that 
there are no particular advantages (in terms of efficiency) received by 
the Government in restricting eligibility to not-for-profit organiza­
tions.
One measure of efficiency (i.e., obtaining the same service 
with the least cost) for competitive procurements is the "cost class.
The theory is that all competitors may be ranked according to costs pro­
posed. These ranks may then be collapsed into three classes— first 
third, second third, and third third. For cost, the first class (i.e., 
first third) would contain the least expensive alternatives and the 
third class (i.e., third third) would contain the most expensive alter­
natives. The most efficient procurements would be those in which ser­
vices were obtained from those offerors falling within the first class.
Judged by this criterion. Table 4-1 on the next page indicates 
that this is an inefficient procurement. First of all, those offering
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to perform the service at the least cost were the least likely to obtain 
this award. Even more important is the relative disregard of cost effi­
ciency in making the awards. There is no significant relationship be­
tween the amount awarded and the cost class as determined in either the 
initial or the best-and-final competition. If cost-efficiency were being 
considered, either or both of these relationships would be in the direc­
tion favoring the first third and would be significant.
Table 4-1: Relationship Between The Mean Amounts Awarded By HUD Through 
Exclusionary Competitive Contracts To Not-For-Profit Organi­
zations In FY 79 And The First Quarter Of FY 80
Initial Competition Best And Final Competition



















Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
DF F Sig. DF F Sig.
2 1,526 .2639 2 .437 .6580
Conclusion: Accept Hq Conclusion: Accept Hq
Normally, what occurs in the initial competition is less impor­
tant in regard to the actual amount awarded than what occurs in the best- 
and-final competition. However, often technical reviewers begin 
"cluing" potential contractors to lower (or oftentimes, raise) offers. 
This is what probably occurred for this particular procurement obtained 
through exclusionary competition to not-for-profit organizations. Re­
gression analysis was utilized to compare the best-and-final offer (as 
the dependent variable) and the initial offer (as the independent
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variable) . The regression line is above the 45° line when the amount 
initially proposed is approximately $125,000 or less and is below the 
45° line after that point.^ This suggests that reviewers might have 
"clued" potential contractors initially bidding low to increase offers 
to reflect approximately $125 thousand worth of effort; and organizations 
initially proposing an amount in excess of $125 thousand were encouraged 
to decrease offers. Since such cluing is illegal and can lead to a 
"protest" (which might tie up the award for a year), the clues are 
normally vague; and some contractors are more adept than others in inter­
preting them. Otherwise, the slope of the regression line would be hor- 
izonal. The important point here is that contract specialists are aware 
when excessive cluing occurs and in those instances most begin negotia­
tions with the contractor based upon the amount initially proposed— not 
that proposed in best-and-final competition. For example, the relation­
ship for this set of awards between the initial amount proposed and the 
award amount is significant at the .03 level, and is moderately strong 
(r2 = .29), but the relationship between the amount proposed in best-and- 
final competition and the award amount is not significant at the .05 
level.^
Judged by another criterion of efficiency— the amount awarded 
compared with the amount initially reserved— this procurement method (for 
this RFP) produced savings to the Government. There were two reserved 
amounts, $125,000 and $150,000. Why the program office reserved one 
amount for ten of the anticipated procurements and one amount for three 
of the others is a mystery. This almost never happens for procurements. 
Normally, the program office receives an allocation, estimates the cost
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of the service, divides that amount by the desired number of awards, and 
then reserves that average amount for each anticipated award. In this 
case, it was necessary to compute a weighted average of the amount re-
g
served and utilize this as the reserved amount. Note that the regres­
sion line in Figure 4-1 on the next page is below this average reserved
 ̂9 amount.
Overall, utilization of exclusionary competition for this set 
of multi-awards probably saved the Government money because of uncer­
tainty. But savings were not as great as they could have been if more 
reliance had been placed on those offerors in the first (or even second) 
cost class. Further, cluing was probably excessive, and the awards took 
too long to execute (an average of 155 days). Taking into account the 
extra time and effort required for all competitive contracts by contract 
personnel and program officials, even the savings occurring because of 
uncertainty were probably negligible. That is, the services could prob­
ably have been procured at least as efficiently on a nonexclusionary 
noncompetitive basis.
There are no factors other than the initial amount proposed 
which are thought to explain the difference in the amount awarded to the 
respective not-for-profit organizations included in this set of awards. 
Again, the difficulty is that all awards resulted from one RFP. Thus, 
not only are most of the "organizational variables" (e.g., whether or not 
minority-owned) inapplicable, but the values of the "process variables" 
(e.g., requesting office or requesting quarter) are constants.
One applicable organizational variable is organizational size, 
as measured by the number of employees. But the amount awarded has no
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Figure 4-1: Relationship Between The Amount Awarded And The Initial
Amount Offered For HUD Exclusionary Competitive Awards To 
Not-For-Profit Organizations In FY 79 And The First Quarter 
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slgnificant relationship with the number of employees (the significance 
level is .23).^^ That is, as organizational size increases, the amount 
of the award does not necessarily increase. Furthermore, organizational 
size does not have any influence in those organizations making relatively 
higher or lower offers, because the relationship between the number of 
employees and the initial amount offered is not significant at the .05 
level.H
The amount awarded is also not significantly related to the
technical score, which is the agency reviewers' assessment as to the
potential effectiveness (i.e., "technical proficiency") of the contractor
12in performing the service. But if a high score does not cause a higher 
amount to be received, it is the most important variable in receiving the 
award in the first place. This can be shown by ranking the interval 
scores and then consolidating these ranks into ordinal "technical 
classes" similar to cost classes. The first technical class indicates 
those contractors judged most technically proficient, i.e., those falling 
into the first third. The third class (i.e., third third) denotes those 
judged least technically proficient. For this set of awards, all organ­
izations finally receiving an award were included in the first technical 
class, indicating that technical proficiency was the overriding concern.
With most organizational variables and process variables either 
being inapplicable or constants, it is difficult to determine why cer­
tain organizations tend to receive higher scores. Therefore, the task 
of identifying these factors will be deferred until multiple competitions 
can be examined in the following sections. It is evident, however, that 
the ability to receive higher technical scores is not significantly
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related to organizational size for this set of awards. Regression anal­
ysis indicates that the relationship between technical score and number
13of employees is only significant at the .34 level. It is hypothesized 
that the lack of a statistical relationship between organizational size 
and technical proficiency will be determined for all competitive methods. 
If this hypothesis holds, it may cast some doubt on whether exclusionary 
policies need to be implemented to protect small organizations.
Equally as important to this thesis as ascertaining whether 
some organizational types or subtypes require special preference if they 
are to participate in the procurement process is to determine the nega­
tive consequences of establishing those exclusionary policies. In addi­
tion to the efficiency criteria developed for making judgements regard­
ing the respective utility of noncompetitive procuremental methods, com­
petitive methods can be evaluated in terms of efficiency and potential 
effectiveness (i.e., technical proficiency). It is proposed that the 
overall criterion of utility be a comparison of cost and technical 
classes.
A maximally efficient and effective procurement method would 
ensure that the contractors receiving the awards would be in the first 
technical class and the first cost class. If this is not possible, the 
next best choice would be for a contractor to fall within the first 
class of technical proficiency and the second class of cost or within 
the first class of cost and the second class of technical proficiency.
It may be that awards should rarely, if ever, be made to those falling 
within the third class of either technical proficiency or cost. This 
decision-making matrix is reflected in Table 4-2 on the next page.
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Table 4-2: Proposed Priority Ranking Of Cells To Select Contractors To
Perform External Analysis And Management Services
Cost Class Technical Class1 2 3
1 1 2 No Award
2 2 3 No Award
3 No Award No Award No Award
The decision-making model can be utilized to determine the rel­
ative efficiency and effectiveness of both initial and best-and-final 
competition. The procurement methods with the highest utility would be 
those in which there was a significant positive relationship between the 
cost class and the technical class. The model and the criteria have 
been applied in Table 4-3 on the next page to the best-and-final compe­
tition for exclusionary competitive awards to not-for-profit organiza­
tions. Since all awards resulted from one RFP, the correlation coeffi­
cient is indicative of the overall utility of this one competition as 
well as for the competitive method as a whole. But normally, the co­
efficients would differ. Only the coefficients for the method will be 
of interest later in the thesis.
The decision-making model cannot be applied to the initial com­
petition for this set of awards, because all of the award winners were 
judged to be in the first technical class; and correlation coefficients 
cannot be calculated when there are cases applicable to only one category 
of either of the two variables. When this occurs, however, reliance may 
be placed upon the original cost rankings compared to the technical rank­
ings. In the case of these awards, there is less of a negative associa-
1tion present in the initial competition than with best-and-final
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Table 4-3: Per Cent Of Award Winners In Best-And-Final Cost Classes And
Best-And-Flnal Technical Classes For Contracts Awarded On An 
Exclusionary Competitive Basis By HUD In FY 79 And The First 
Quarter Of FY 80 To Not-For-Profit Organizations To Perform 
External Analysis And Management Services*
Cost Class Technical Class All Technical Classes1 2 3
1 14.3 50.0 0.0 30.8
2 0.0 33.3 0.0 15.4
3 85.7 16.7 0.0 53.8
Column Total 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
N 7 6 0 13
*Totals do not add due to rounding, 
significance: .0164
strength of relationship: Kendall's taub = - .59
competition (tauc = - .333), and the relationship between the cost rank­
ings and the technical rankings does not quite meet the .05 criterion of
14significance (i.e., the significance level equals .0563). In this 
thesis, it is assumed that significance has precedence over the strength 
of the relationship until the .05 significance level is reached. After 
that point, the strength of the relationship is of more importance.
Using this guide, it can be said that the overall utility in using an 
exclusionary competitive procurement method for not-for-profit organiza­
tions should be ascertained primarily from the perspective of best-and- 
final competition. The correlation coefficient is negative; hence, 
technical proficiency and cost efficiency were not maximized. Applica­
tion of the decision-making model in Table 4-2 would have resulted in 
over half of the contractors which were actually selected for awards not 
being so selected.
It is hypothesized that this same pattern (i.e., a negative
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association between cost-efficiency and technical proficiency) will be 
found when other competitive procurement methods are examined. This 
would suggest the need for reform in the emphasis placed on the respec­
tive criteria utilized in the procurement process.
The argument here is that no such conflict between cost-effi­
ciency and technical proficiency needs to be inherent in the competition 
for awards, just as no such conflict is present in the actual performance 
of external analysis and management services. The competitive process 
should reflect how outside organizations intend to perform. And if those 
outside organizations do not intend to— or cannot— perform both effi­
ciently and effectively, then they should not be granted the award in the 
first place.
It is not clear whether the implementation of this decision­
making model would be in conflict with the official goals of the Con­
gress to promote participation in the procurement process by socially 
disadvantaged groups or small organizations and to promote competition. 
This cannot be ascertained until those procurements are examined in 
which all organizational types (and sub-types) are allowed to compete.
But it might be helpful to first determine what occurs when only for- 
profit organizations are allowed to compete against each other. For, as 
stated in the conclusion, this may become the dominant procurement mode 
in the future.
Exclusionary Competitive Awards To For-Profit Organizations
Except for a few exceptions which are not of interest in this
16thesis, competitive exclusionary awards to for-profit organizations 
are allowed by the Code of Federal Procurement Regulations only for
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those organizations certified by the Small Business Administration
(SBA) to be "small business concerns." As noted earlier, only for-profit
17organizations are eligible to be classified as a "concern."
The SBA determines whether an organization is "small" on the 
basis of a formula for each industry which considers annual receipts, 
capital assets, and number of employees. Normally, for external analy­
sis and management services, the SBA is quite liberal in interpreting 
"small;" i.e., if the firm's average annual gross receipts for the pre­
ceding three fiscal years do not exceed $8 million and if the number of
18employees is less than 500.
The formulas used by the SBA have come under criticism from 
19private organizations. Critics charge that the formulas are too com­
plex and are not sufficiently restrictive in their application. As an 
alternative, the delegates attending the White House Conference On Small 
Business passed a resolution that the only criterion to be used by the
SBA should be the number of employees and that organizations should be
20classed according to the number of employees as follows:
Class Number of Employees
A 0 - 9
B 10-49
C 50 - 249
D 250 - 499
The conferees recommended that preference be given in procurement awards
for organizations in the lower classes (e.g., A or B).
The Office of Advocacy of the SBA has recommended a more re-




Family size 1 - 4
Micro 5 - 1 9
Mid-sized 20 - 99
Macro 100 - 499
Like the conferees to the Conference On Small Business, the Office of 
Advocacy recommended that more consideration be reflected for organiza­
tions qualifying in the lower categories.
The SBA finally decided to recommend that small business eligi-
22bility be determined by industry and by employee size. Probably, the 
Office of Advocacy's classification schema was utilized for the employee 
component. Although less complex than the current standards, the indus­
try classifications are confusing, and the size standards are unrealis- 
tically low for some external analysis and management services. For 
example, those organizations engaged primarily in "Management, Consul­
ting, or Public Relations Services" can employ no more than 25 people to
23be considered small. More realistic is the recommended ceiling of 100 
employees for those organizations engaged in "Date Processing Ser­
vices.
The new proposed size standards have not yet been accepted by 
25the Congress and it is expected that significant revisions will be 
made in the SBA proposal. The argument here is that this standard 
should be dichotomous; i.e., either an organization is small or it is 
large. More classes would only result in more confusion and bureaucrat­
ic paperwork. Also, one standard should be formulated for all indus-
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tries. Again, either an organization should be classified as small or 
large. It seems indefensible to argue that because one organization is 
engaged in providing outpatient care, it is "small" if it employs 100 
people, yet an organization performing policy analysis is "large" 
because it employs 26 people.
The standard utilized in this thesis is a compromise between 
the maximum mid-sized small firm suggested by the Conference On Small 
Business and that suggested by the Office of Advocacy. That is, organ­
izations with less than 200 employees are considered small organizations. 
This is based partially on an empirical analysis of organizations rep­
resenting themselves as small or large and partially on the observation 
that employees seem to identify more strongly with organizations em­
ploying fewer than this number of employees. This standard will be used 
to determine whether exclusionary competitive awards are indeed bene­
fiting small for-profit organizations.
There are two exclusionary competitive methods utilized to pro­
cure needed services from small business concerns. The first is what is 
referred to as "small business set-asides." Under this program, all or­
ganizations are eligible to compete which have been certified by the SBA 
to be small business concerns. The second method is more restrictive, 
because eligible organizations must not only be small business concerns, 
but have 8(a) status as well.
Analysis of awards regarding these two procurement methods must 
be kept distinct. The reason is that small business set-asides are more 
similar to nonexclusionary competitive procurements, but 8(a) competition 
has as many characteristics of a noncompetitive procurement as a
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competltlve one. However, some comparisons between the two methods can 
be made. The comparison will be particularly useful to determine 
whether 8(a) contractors are unable to compete effectively against 
other small business concerns.
Both 8(a) competitive awards and small-business set-asides for 
external analysis and management services are accomplishing the objec­
tive of the official goal to involve small for-profit organizations in 
the procurement process. Over 83 per cent of the awards procured by HUB 
through small business set-asides and 100 per cent of the awards pro­
cured by HUD through 8(a) competitions for external analysis and manage­
ment services in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80 were to small for- 
profit organizations (i.e., having less than 200 employees). The aver­
age employment for those organizations competing through 8(a) competi­
tions was 50, compared with 99 for organizations granted awards as a 
result of small business set-asides. But this does not imply that these 
two procurement methods are necessarily unique in encouraging the par­
ticipation of small organizations in the procurement process. For 
example, 85 per cent of the awards to not-for-profit organizations dis­
cussed in the previous section were to small organizations, and the 
number of employees of these organizations averaged 85.
As expected, 8(a) competitive procurements are more effective 
in encouraging minority participation in the procurement process than 
small business set-asides. Minority-owned firms received 100 per cent 
of all 8(a) competitive awards and 33 per cent of contracts awarded 
through small-business set-asides. But even 33 per cent is quite high, 
considering that minority-owned and "disadvantaged" firms received only
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1.5 per cent of total federal procurements in FY 79 and only 7.5 per cent
26of all FY 79 contracts awarded by HUD. It illustrates that minority- 
owned firms are able to compete against nonminority-owned firms for 
small business set-aside programs which have as their purpose the provi­
sion of external analysis and management services. And they need no 
preferential treatment in doing so; rather, minority-owned firms are
likely to be "over-represented" in small business set-asides to procure
27external analysis and management services— at least at HUD. But since 
all of the firms included in the sample for both 8(a) competition and 
small business set-asides were black-owned firms, it must be concluded 
that only black-owned firms are over-represented, while all other minor­
ity types are "under-represented." Furthermore, women-owned firms are 
under-represented in both procurement methods, receiving 20 per cent of 
all HUD 8(a) competitive awards and approximately 17 per cent of all HUD 
small business set-asides for external analysis and management services 
in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80.
Unlike exclusionary noncompetitive awards to 8(a) firms, there 
is little motivation for the agency to utilize competitive 8(a) proce­
dures. Not only is the agency required to follow the ponderous competi­
tive procedures required by the Code of Federal Procurement Regulations, 
but the agency must then follow the procedure of the SBA to execute the 
contract. As a result, 8(a) competitions are the most inefficient in 
terms of time and effort of any procurement method utilized by HUD. For 
HUD awards to acquire external analysis and management services in FY 79 
and FY 80, 8(a) competitions required an average of 204 days to execute. 
This compares to 189 days for small business set-asides.
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The burden of obtaining the SBA clearance for 8(a) awards is 
evident when comparing the relationship of the time required to execute 
the contract and the time required by the competitive process (i.e., 
time allowed to submit proposals plus the time required by technical 
review panel members to evaluate proposals). The relationship for small 
business set-asides between these two time variables is significant (at 
the .002 level) and quite strong (r̂  = .90), but the same relationship 
for 8(a) competitive awards is not significant at the .05 level and the
relationship is much weaker (r̂  = .57).^^ The reason the relationship
is not significant is because of the time required to gain SBA clearance.
The difference in total average time spent in executing the 
contracts would have been even greater between the two procurement
methods if there had been more time to respond to the RFP by 8(a) organ­
izations. The average time allowed for 8(a) organizations to respond to 
the RFP was 19 days, which is inadequate in most cases to develop a 
viable proposal. This is in contrast to the 42 average days allowed to 
respond for small business set-asides. Overall, time allowed to present 
proposals and time for the technical review panel members to judge the 
technical proficiency of the proposals consumed an average of 44 days for 
8(a) competitive awards and an average of 58 days for small business set- 
aides.
Regression analysis indicates that the time spent in evaluating
proposals for small business set-asides is due primarily to the larger
29number of organizations competing for small business set-asides. On 
the average, only 3.6 8(a) firms were asked to submit proposals, and 2.6 
actually did so. This compares to an average of 140 organizations asked
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to compete for small business set-asides, even though only 16, on the 
average, actually submitted proposals. The important consideration, how­
ever, is the number of sources (i.e., the number of organizations invited 
to participate). One official goal of the Congress is that competition 
should be promoted whenever possible, and small business set-asides are 
much more effective in doing so than 8(a) competitive awards. This is 
probably due to the longer time allowed to submit proposals. Simple 
regression analysis indicates that there is a positive correlation be­
tween the number of offers and the amount of time allowed for an RFP for
30small business set-asides. No such significant relationship was dis-
31covered for 8(a) competitive awards.
But effectiveness in promoting competition does not necessarily 
promote cost efficiency. In fact, for awards less than $125,000, 8(a) 
competitive awards are much more efficient in terms of providing poten­
tial savings to the Government than small business set-asides. After
this point is reached, small business set-asides become more efficient.
32These relationships are depicted in Figure 4-2 on the next page.
Overall, both of these competitive methods produce more savings 
to the Government than nonexclusionary methods. However, considering 
the time and effort spent in executing the contracts, the true utility 
of these methods for producing savings to the Government are diminished 
even more. And as the following discussion will indicates, the magnitude 
of savings produced by utilizing both procurement methods were not as 
great as they could have been.
As discussed when analyzing competitive awards to not-for- 
profit organizations, another criterion of relative efficiency which can
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Figure 4-2: Relationship Between The Award Amount And Requested Amount
For HUD Contracts For External Analysis And Management Ser­
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be utilized for competitive awards is the cost class. However, this
criterion is not applicable for 8(a) competitive awards because most of
33these awards are "quasi-competitive." Quasi-competition occurs when 
a procurement process lacks either cost competition or technical com­
petition but not both. For HUD awards for external analysis and manage­
ment services, it is cost competition which is always lacking (but theo­
retically, the reverse could happen). The lack of cost competition is 
normally only encountered either when the competitive process involves 
8(a) firms exclusively o£ when the RFP specifically states that an in­
definite quantity contract is to result from the competitive process. 
Each of these anomalies will be discussed in turn.
When 8(a) organizations are asked to submit proposals, they are 
usually required to submit technical proposals, but not cost proposals. 
The SBA has advised that if an agency requires 8(a) organizations to 
submit cost proposals, then the agency is, in effect, creating a small 
business set-aside for 8(a) firms. But doing so is not allowed in the 
federal procurement regulations and, hence, may be illegal. But if the 
agency only asks for technical proposals, the proposals can be evaluated 
similarly to unsolicited proposals, and no conflict with the regulations 
supposedly occurs.
However, the SBA can only advise vis-à-vis dictate procurement 
policy. Most contracting officers at HUD have accepted the SBA's advice 
in this regard, but one did not as late as June of 1980. Thus, some 
8(a) competitive awards will not be quasi-competitive. One 8(a) compet­
itive award was identified in the sample in which cost competition was 
present. It might also be noted that the agencies differ considerably .
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in their practices regarding 8(a) firms. The Department of Human Ser­
vices makes no competitive awards to 8(a) firms, whereas the Department
of Commerce not only utilizes this procurement method relatively fre-
34quently, but also always requires cost competition. The only common­
ality is the agencies' motivation for issuing 8(a) competitive awards,
even though they realize the time delays inherent in the process. The
35motivation is to appear to support Congressional official goals. Since 
8(a) competitive procurements are reported as competitive procurements 
as we-11 as awards to minority-owned firms, the agency totals reflect 
acceptance— and active support— of two official goals, i.e., to promote 
competition and to promote minority participation in the procurement 
process. In those cases where cost competition is present, this is a 
valid claim. Where cost competition is not present, the validity is 
somewhat more questionable. •
Quasi-competition can also occur because of the type of con­
tractual instrument used. More specifically, indefinite quantity con­
tracts have no minimum, even though they must contain a maximum dollar 
amount. In other words, the Government is not obligated by the contract 
to purchase anything, but if it does so, it can only do so up to a cer­
tain dollar amount (i.e., the maximum). Since the maximum is also the 
award amount, the relationship between the award amount and the request 
amount can be ascertained. But in most cases, the agencies do not re­
quest cost data from the contractor until after the award is made.
Prices are then negotiated through "task orders" or "task specifica­
tions." The rationale is that since the Government is not obligated to 
expend funds, it does not have to issue these subsidiary contractual
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instruments if the price is too high.
The only problem with this logic is that the Government (more 
specifically, contract specialists) have very poor knowledge of fair and 
reasonable prices charged for comparable services in different locales. 
Thus, the use of indefinite quantity contracts usually leads to the 
Government paying a higher price for the service. Some contract special­
ists have attempted to establish a hypothetical level of service (e.g.,
500 programmer hours or 200 senior social scientist hours) in the RET 
which, in their estimation, will approximate the reserved-amount and then 
require that offerors base their estimate accordingly. When this occurs, 
relative cost rankings can be determined. But as stated previously, the 
normal case is that no such cost estimates are called for in the RFP and, 
hence, provided by the respective offerors.
The position here is that indefinite quantity contracts for ex­
ternal analysis and management services should not be allowed. They 
were originally designed for supply items, not services. If the Govern­
ment has no idea as to the level of effort required for services, then 
it should probably not be attempting to procure that service in the first 
place. There is sufficient flexibility in cost reimbursement contracts 
to allow for indefinite quantity and uncertainty.
In the rest of this thesis, the reader will be alerted as to 
the degree of quasi-competition present either because of 8(a) competi­
tions or indefinite quantity contracts in which cost competition was not 
present. For example, in the sample set for small business set-asides, 
two of the contracts were indefinite quantity contracts. Cost competi­
tion was present for one of these awards, but not for the other. Missing
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cost data due to quasi-competition equals 16.7 per cent. This does not 
significantly distort the analysis. At the other extreme are 8(a) pro­
curement awards in which missing cost competition data due to quasi­
competition is 80 per cent. Thus, 8(a) competition must be largely ex­
cluded from any further discussion regarding cost-efficiency.
There appears to be no more consideration to cost criteria in 
granting awards through small business set-asides than for granting 
awards to not-for-profit organizations on an exclusionary competitive 
basis. For small business set-asides, the relationship between the 
amount awarded and the cost class is not significant at the .05 level.
In determining what does affect the amount awarded or which variable(s) 
explains best the basis upon which the amount awarded is actually made, 
there is a shift from noncompetitive awards in which the variables most 
important in explaining the amount actually awarded either reflected 
organizational characteristics or process characteristics (e.g., the 
requesting office). Furthermore, the relationships are as indicative of 
why the organizations have been awarded the contract as to why either 
larger or smaller amounts were actually received. For competitive 
awards, the variables best explaining how much is actually awarded may 
or may not be important in determining why the respective organizations 
received the award originally.
For reasons to be discussed later in this section, the primary 
emphasis here is to develop a methodology for determining what affects 
the amount awarded. Then, in the next section where nonexclusionary com­
petitive awards are discussed, the attention will be primarily upon de­
veloping "tools" to determine why one organizational type vis-à-vis
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another tends to receive a disproportionate share of the awards. Table 
4-4 below summarizes for all exclusionary competitive methods the rela­
tive degrees of significance for relationships between the award amount 
and selected variables which were hypothesized to have some effect on the 
amount awarded.
Table 4-4: Significance Levels Between The Amount Awarded And Selected
Variables For All Exclusionary Competitive Contracts Awarded 
By HUD In FY 79 And The First Quarter Of FY 80 For External 









employment .36107 .16467 .23149
request amount .00448* .01965* .18637
initial offer N.A. .00201* .02945*
best-and-final offer N.A. .00017* .22122
technical score .25982 .04542* .14261
best-and-final score N.A. .05531 .26139
2Nominal or Ordinal Variables
organizational size N.A. .7082 .3778
minority ownership N.A. .8129 N.A.
8(a) status N.A. .8129 N.A.
minority type N.A. .8129 N.A.
woman ownership .93 .9423 N.A.
contract type N.A. .9232 N.A.
description code .0455* .1344 N.A.
requesting office .1848 .6383 N.A.
request quarter .0807 .8514 N.A.
basic award quarter N.A. .5225 N.A.
cost class N.A. .7650 .2639
best-and-final cost class N.A. .9168 .6580
technical class N.A. .1474 N.A.
best-and-final techni­ N.A. .1189 .3105
cal class
gSignificance levels determined through simple regression analysis
Significance levels determined through one-way ANOVA 
*Denotes those that meet the .05 significance level criterion
As mentioned previously the primary factor affecting the amount
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awarded to not-for-profit organizations is the initial amount offered.
But it is not clear whether contractors would be held to their initial 
offers so closely if more awards had been made by utilizing that pro­
curement method. In contrast, most 8(a) competitions have no cost com­
petitions. The contract specialist, having little else upon which to 
base his/her negotiations, will rely upon the requesting office's orig­
inal estimates and will attempt to actually award just less than this 
original amount requested. This is indicated by the regression formula 
(Ÿ = - 66,232 + 1.4 X) and by the strength of the relationship 
(r̂  = .92). The effort to award less than the requested amount is nor­
mally made because after spending so .much time and effort in the competi­
tive process and in gaining SBA clearance, neither program officers nor 
contract specialists are enthusiastic about attempting to have the re­
serve amount increased. As Table 4-5 below indicates, the amount re­
ceived by 8(a) organizations is also related to whether the award was 
made to secure data processing expertise or other types of external an­
alysis services. Not only is the relationship significant, but the re­
lationship is fairly strong.
Table 4-5; Mean Amounts Of HUD Awards Issued As A Result Of 8(a) Compe­
titions In FY 79 And The First Quarter Of FY 80, By Category 
Of External Analysis And Management Services
Category of External 
Analysis and Management 
Services
Mean Amount F Sig. 2eta^
Data processing services






As a contract specialist, this student had observed that awards 
for data processing services seemed, on the average, to be larger than 
for any other category of external analysis and management services.
For noncompetitive awards, however, no significant relationship was dis­
covered between the amount awarded and the category of external analysis 
and management services. The 8(a) firms are actively involved in the 
competition for these awards; and although the awards for data proces­
sing services are relatively few, they are lucrative when obtained. And 
it is hypothesized that it will be discovered in the next section that 
not-for-profit organizations are least likely to compete for data proces­
sing awards, even though they are eligible to do so. For now, it should 
be observed only that the relationship between the mean amounts awarded 
for data processing services and other external analysis services, 
respectively, through small business set-asides is not significant at the 
.05 level. Thus, it may also be discovered that the category of external 
analysis and management services may only be an important factor for 8(a) 
competitive awards.
For small business set-asides. Table 4-4 indicates that several 
variables may be influencing the amount actually awarded for external
analysis and management services. These variables are as follows:
2 2 1) the request amount (r = .69); 2) the initial offer (r = .96);
3) the best-and-final offer (r̂  = .99); 4) the technical score 
(r2 = .55); and 5) the best-and-final technical score (r̂  = .63). These 
variables were included in a multiple regression equation with the depen­
dent variable being the amount actually awarded'. The overall relation-
■ 36ship was found to be significant at the .05 level. However, only
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three of the variables were determined to be important in explaining the 
variation in the amount awarded. These variables, the standardized beta 
coefficient, the F ratios, and the signficance levels, are reflected in 
the table below. Only the best-and-final offer is significant at the 
.05 level.
Table 4-6: Summary Table Of Important Variables In Explaining The Vari­
ation In The Basic Amount Awarded Through Contracts Issued 
In FY 79 And The First Quarter Of FY 80 To Purchase External 




Beta Coefficients F DF Sig. Level
Best-And-Final Offer .99623 4696 3,1 P < .05
Request Amount .12097 115 3,1 P > .05
Best-And-Final Score .09804 45 3,1 P > .05
Generally, the amount actually awarded is only slightly less 
(i.e., 4 per cent) than that proposed by the contractor when submitting 
the revised proposal for best-and-final offers. The need to rely upon 
the contractor's proposal is necessitated by HUD's policy to award most 
contracts for external analysis and management services through the cen­
tral office in Washington, D. C. Contract specialists working there 
have little conception of fair and reasonable costs which should be in­
curred by HUD for external analysis and management services. There is 
no time for the contract specialist to make an independent price analy­
sis. When this is done, or if (such as with the Department of Energy) 
cost analysts are hired to provide price analysis, the resulting time- 
delays and effort required to get a contract executed become prohibitive.
The only price guide other than that established in the
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competitlve process that the contract specialist has is the original 
reserve amount in which program officers have estimated the cost of the 
service. When no other cost determination is available (i.e., when 
quasi-competition occurs), the contract specialist will use the request 
amount as a guideline in the negotiations. But when cost competition is 
available, the contract specialist is likely to rely upon the contrac­
tor's proposal. If there is best-and-final competition, the best-and- 
final offer will be used. If there is but one competition, the initial 
offer will be utilized. As indicated earlier in the discussion regarding 
the little consideration given to cost criteria, the offers (whether 
initial or best-and-final) are poor guides to determine the most reason­
able prices to be charged to the Government. Contract specialists could 
save the Government a considerable amount by utilizing average prices 
for direct labor and overhead of all offerors participating in any one 
competitive process instead of the winner's proposal to use as a guide­
line in the negotiations. But as stated earlier, time pressures are too 
great to allow this practice. It is for that reason that the "next-best"
solution of cost classes is being proposed in this thesis.
Cost-efficiency is no more of a factor in determining why organ­
izations originally receive the contract than it is in influencing the
amount actually awarded once an award winner is chosen. For all exclu­
sionary competitive awards for external analysis and management services, 
technical proficiency is the primary factor in originally receiving the 
award. This can be ascertained by comparing the technical classes appli­
cable to the award winners. Less reliance is placed upon those offerors 
included in the first technical class for small business set-asides than
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for 8(a) competitions, but technical proficiency is the primary consid­
eration in receiving an award through both of these competitive modes.
Whereas 100 per cent of the award winners for 8(a) competi­
tions and for exclusionary competitive awards to not-for-profit organi­
zations were judged to be in the first technical class, 83.3 per cent of 
the award winners of small business set-asides were judged to be in the 
first technical class and 16.7 per cent in the second class. A similar 
pattern is reflected in those competitive processes which had best-and- 
final competitions. However, only 33.3 per cent of those receiving the 
awards resulting from small business set-asides received the highest 
score in the initial competition and only 40 per cent received the high­
est score in best-and-final competition. Obviously, factors other than 
technical proficiency are considered to a degree not found in the other 
exclusionary competitive methods. Since proposed cost-efficiency is 
thought to be one of these factors, this implies that proposed cost- 
efficiency could be incorporated into the criteria for selecting award 
winners for all competitive procurements.
Through a detailed look at the data, it was found that in one 
of the small business set-aside awards, the primary criterion for issuing 
the contract was cost-efficiency, i.e., the organization receiving the 
award proposed to perform the service at the least cost. Further, in­
vestigation of the original survey sheets indicated this criterion was 
explicitly stated in the RFP. Further, cost might have been considered 
co-equally with technical proficiency in making two other awards, be­
cause one award was judged to be in the first cost class, and the other 
was judged to be in the second technical class and the first cost class.
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The conclusion is that cost-efficiency is more of a factor in issuing 
the award for small business set-asides than for either of the other two 
exclusionary competitive methods. But as stated earlier, cost-effi­
ciency is not, overall, a significant factor in explaining why contracts 
were originally awarded through small business set-asides (or any other 
exclusionary competitive method). Technical proficiency is still the 
overriding concern.
Because all competitive processes have initial competition, but 
some do not have best-and-final competitions, the technical score will 
be the variable used to reflect relative technical proficiency for the 
rest of this thesis vis-a-vis best-and-final technical scores. As Table 
4-7 on the next page suggests, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the two technical proficiency criteria which is 
quite strong (r̂  = .82), but they are different processes.
Table 4-7 also summarizes the initial search to determine which 
variables have a significant effect upon, help explain, or have associ­
ation with the technical score. It should be noted that for small busi­
ness set-asides, there is no discernible tendency for minority-owned, 
women-owned, and/or disadvantaged firms to receive higher or lower aver­
age scores. This implies that organizational sub-type is not a consid­
eration in determining why these awards were originally made. It does 
not imply, however, that goals of equity in the procurement process are 
necessarily being achieved. As discussed earlier, for example, HUD 
small business set-aside awards for external analysis and management ser­
vices are not being received by firms owned by racial minorities other 
than blacks, and the percentage of these awards received by women-owned
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firms is relatively low (i.e., 16.7 per cent). .
Table 4-7: Significance Levels Of Relationships Between The Technical
Score And Selected Variables For All Exclusionary Competi­
tive Contracts Awarded By HUD In FY 79 And The First Quarter 
Of FY 80 For External Analysis And Management Services 









best-and-final technical N.A. .01737* .00001*
score
employment .05114 .06554 .34216
initial offer N.A. .05316 .11298
number of offers .46024 .20584 N.A.
2Nominal or Ordinal Variables
organizational size N.A. .6336 .8501
minority ownership N.A. .8128 N.A.
8(a) status N.A. .8128 N.A.
minority type N.A. .8128 N.A.
woman ownership .0520 .8643 N.A.
^Significance levels determined through use of regression 
Significance levels determined through one-way ANOVA
analysis
Since organizational type (or sub-type) is relatively unimpor­
tant in explaining the variance in the technical score, discussion of 
the factors affecting the technical score will be deferred until the 
next section, in which nonexclusionary competitive awards are discussed. 
It need only be said at this point that small business competitions are 
characterized by a high "state-of-the-art" in proposal writing and mar­
keting. And as such, small business set-aside competitions can serve as 
a guide to the state-of-the-art characteristic of proposals submitted in 
nonexclusionary competitions. It should not be inferred, however, that 
a high state-of-the-art in proposal writing and marketing is indicative 
of overall benefits received by the Government in utilizing any given
-154-
procurement method.
Determining the overall utility of the respective exclusionary 
competitive methods is problematical. For 8(a) procurements, neither 
cost classes not cost ranks can be determined because of the influence 
of quasi-competition. For small business set-asides, comparison of the 
cost class and the technical class indicates that presence of a negative 
relationship (tauy = - .408) between the cost class and technical class; 
i.e., the higher the technical class, the lower the cost class and vice- 
versa. A similar relationship can be determined when cost ranks are 
compared with technical ranks (tauc = - .32). However, neither relation­
ship is significant at the .05 level. Thus, the negative association 
between technical proficiency and cost-efficiency must remain a proposi­
tion, and although suspected, cannot with any certainty be said to 
exist.
In the next section, nonexclusionary competitive awards will be 
examined. Hopefully, all of the "tools" developed for noncompetitive 
awards or for exclusionary competitive awards to determine relative de­
grees of efficiency, maximization of proposed effectiveness, and overall 
utility to the Government will be applicable. In addition, it is hoped 
to determine with more clarity why some organizational types are better 
able to compete than others.
Nonexclusionary Competitive Awards 
Who Get What
Behavioral and economic factors have been defined as those 
factors which influence an organization's ability to compete against 
other organizations when there is open entry into the procurement
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process. Behavioral factors to be considered are the recognition of 
procurement opportunities and a willingness to respond to those oppor­
tunities. The primary economic factor of the most interest in this 
thesis is whether the organization can propose to provide the service 
at the least cost, i.e., whether potentially, at least, that organiza­
tion is cost-efficient. The general hypothesis stated earlier was that 
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations were about equally aware of 
procurement opportunities to provide external analysis and management 
services and that there was little difference in either the ability or 
willingness of the two organizational types to respond to those oppor­
tunities. The hypothesis was based upon the view by authors such as
Guttman and Willner that there was little practical distinction between
37the two organizational types.
Although awareness, ability, and willingness are separate
variables, Orlans suggests that these variables affect each other simul- 
38taneously. For example, the larger the organization, the more re­
sources that it can afford to muster for proposals. And yet, the more 
aware the organization is of opportunities, the more likely it will be 
to be able to grow and, thus, have the ability to submit proposals, 
which can be a very expensive undertaking (particularly for large pro­
curements). Thus, the correct model is similar to that suggested by
Benjamin Page and Calvin Jones in their study of receiprocal effects of
39policy preferences.
As Page and Jones suggest, to estimate the path coefficients, 
additional variables would have to be introduced which are exogenous to 
the process described above, which can be assumed to be unaffected by
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the endogenous variables, and, yet, which have direct effects on some—
40but not all— of the endogenous variables. For example, one such exog­
enous variable affecting ability might be one of the ratios used by 
students of finance to measure corporate health (e.g., the "acid test 
ratio"). Another example would be the exogenous variable of security, 
which affects willingness to compete. As Orlans states:
A special value of applied and project institutes is precisely 
their responsiveness to the research market place; were they 
more secure, they would presumably become less responsive.
For each one of the endogenous variables, there are probably multiple 
exogenous variables affecting them. The problem is not that statistical 
measures of these exogenous and endogenous variables could not be con­
structed; and Page and Jones' technique, though difficult, could probably 
be applied. Rather, the difficulty is one of scope. This information 
would have to rely upon original organizational data, not agency data.
And this would be far too ambitious for the purposes of this thesis.
Figure 4-3: Non-recursive Relationship Of Awareness, Ability, And Will­
ingness
AWARElŒSSjf--------------------- —  ABILITY
WILLINGNESS 'iMEASURABLE OUTCOME Y
The other strategy is to focus the attention upon the "measur­
able outcome." In Page and Jones' study, the measurable outcome is 
votes. In this thesis, the measurable outcome is the amount awarded by 
HUD to respective organizational types or sub-types for the procurement 
of external analysis and management services in FY 79 and the first
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quarter of FY 80. The presence (or lack) of a statistical relationship 
between organizational type (or sub-types) and the cumulative outcome of 
awareness, ability, and willingness can thus be determined. If no sig­
nificant relationship could be determined, it still could not be said 
that there was no difference in awareness, ability, and willingness; 
but it could be stated that either there was no difference, on the 
whole, in relative awareness, ability, and willingness, of the respec­
tive organizational types or that even if there might be relative dif­
ferences in the effects of these endogenous variables, there are offset­
ting tendencies which produce, overall, similar outcomes.
This tactic has been used by Orlans. In Orlans' judgement, 
"nonprofit research institutes" and "educational institutions" have off­
setting inherent tendencies which make them about equal, on the whole, 
in the entire process of submitting proposals. Orlans argues, for exam­
ple, that nonprofit research institutes have a higher degree of staff 
insecurity than universities, thus tending to make the non-profit insti­
tutes more aggressive in seeking out procurement opportunities. On the 
other hand, this insecurity also leads to instability; and the univer­
sities— because of tenure— are often more able to attract higher-quality 
staff, have more financial stability, and experience less intellectual 
"isolation.
A similar conclusion may be reached regarding the distribution 
of HUD procurement awards for external analysis and management services 
between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations in FY 79 and the 
first quarter of FY 80. Although the total amounts reflected in Table 
4-8 on the next page indicate that for-profit organizations received a
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substantially higher amount of these awards in FY 79 and FY 80, the 
difference in the mean amounts awarded is not statistically significant.
Table 4-8: Amounts Awarded On A Nonexclusionary Competitive Basis By
HUD In FY 79 And The First Quarter Of FY 80 For External 





Of Awards Mean N DF F Sig.
for-profit $12.6 M $574,705 22
1,24 .54 .47
not-for-profit $ .4M $102,948 4
Conclusion: Accept Hq
Thus, once it is decided to award the contract, it makes little differ­
ence whether or not an organization is for-profit or not-for-profit. 
Rather, the problem for not-for-profit organizations is that they are not 
as likely to receive the award in the first place. Two-way analysis of 
variance operations reflected in Table 4-9 generally support this con­
clusion. No other variables other than those reflected in Table 4-9 are 
thought to significantly improve the relationship between the amount 
awarded and organizational type. The only variable which, in conjunction 
with the type of organization, has a possible effect on the amount actu­
ally awarded is the category of external analysis and management ser­
vices.
There is little doubt that the category of external analysis 
and management services has a significant impact upon the amount actu­
ally awarded through nonexclusionary competitive methods, for one-way 
analysis of variance indicates the presence of a statistically signifi­
cant relationship between these two variables at the .02 level. The
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average amount of HUD awards for data processing services is signifi­
cantly higher than the average amount for other categories of external 
analysis and management services. Further, although two-way analysis of 
variance does not offer a high degree of assurance that the relationship 
is not occuring by chance (the significance level is .065), the relation­
ship depicted in Table 4-10 indicates that not-for-profit organizations 
are not likely to receive awards by HUD to perform data processing ser­
vices.
Table 4-9: Relationships Between Amounts Awarded On A Nonexclusionary
Competitive Basis By HUD For External Analysis And Management 
Services To For-Profit Organizations And Not-For-Profit Or­
ganizations, By Selected Variables (* = .05 Sig. Level)






services .065 N.A. .46
cost class .229 N.A. .23
best-and-final cost
class .139 N.A. .38
technical class .699 N.A. .03
best-and-final tech­
nical class .663 .806 .14
Category Of External
Analysis And Mgmt. Ser­
vices And:
cost class .114 .361 .35
technical class .146 .802 .21
best-and-final cost
class .001* .001* .60
Why not-for-profit organizations tend to receive fewer (or no) 
awards for data processing services will be discussed later in this 
section when the variables of willingness, awareness, and ability are
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examined. For the present, the purpose is to identify what affects the 
measurable outcome, i.e., the amount of HUD awards for external analysis 
and management services.
Table 4-10: Mean Amounts Awarded By HUD In FY 79 And The First Quarter
Of FY 80 Through Nonexclusionary Competitive Contracts, By 
Category Of External Analysis And Management Services 
(In $000)
Organizational
Mean Amount Awarded By 
Category of Service ($000)
Type Data Processing 
Services




df = 2,23 
F = 3.078 
sig. level = .065 
eta.2 = .211
As Table 4-9 also indicates, the only other variables discerned 
by two-way analysis of variance which affected strongly the amount 
awarded were the combined effect of the category of external analysis 
and management service and the best-and-final cost class. The relation­
ship is significant at the .001 level and moderately strong (eta.2 =
.60) 43
For contracts for data processing services, those organizations 
in the first cost class (i.e., least-cost) are granted higher award 
amounts. For other external analysis and management services, those in 
the first cost class are likely to receive the smallest awards. This is 
the first indication found in this thesis that cost-efficiency is actu­
ally a determinant in the amount awarded. The hypothesis is that if a 
contractor wishes to secure an award for providing data processing
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services, that organization would do well to propose minimal (but real­
istic) prices in best-and-final competition. In contrast, the contractor 
wishing to secure an award for other external analysis and management 
services would do well, on the average, to offer a relatively high cost 
in best-and-final competition, hoping the bureaucracy will interpret 
this as a higher commitment to quality. It should be noted that this is 
not being recommended as policy, but only in recognition of a situation 
that exists.
For all categories of external analysis and management services 
procured by HUD, the amount proposed in best-and-final competition thus 
appears to be the primary determinant in how much will be actually 
awarded once the decision is made to make the award to that organization. 
This hypothesis can be tested by utilizing the multiple regression solu­
tion developed for small business set-asides. Through simple regression 
analysis, those variables with a statistically significant relationship 
to the amount awarded were located. These variables, their relative 
significance levels, and correlation coefficients are reflected in 
Table 4-11 on the next page. These variables were then included in a 
multiple regression equation to determine which of these variables was 
most important in explaining the variance in the amount awarded for 
external analysis and management services. Table 4-11 reflects the 
standardized beta coefficients obtained through multiple regression for 
those variables reflecting the greatest influence within the model. The 
F-test was then conducted to determine whether these beta coefficients 
were significant. The overall relationship is significant at less than 
the .01 level.
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Table 4-11: Relationship Between Selected Variables And The Amount
Awarded By HUD Through Nonexclusionary Competitive Con­
tracts For External Analysis And Management Services To 
Organizations Participating In Best-And-Final Competition






























p < .01 
P <.01 








Only the best-and-final offer was important in explaining the 
amount awarded when best-and-final competition was conducted through 
small business set-asides. In contrast, the analysis indicates that 
three variables— the best-and-final offer, the request amount, and the 
initial offer— are important in explaining the actual amount' awarded by 
HUD on a nonexclusionary competitive basis for external analysis and 
management services. It appears that the request amount is the beginning 
parameter in that program officials have a more substantial investment in 
time and effort in securing that amount than for any other type of pro­
curement. Initial bids are offered which often exceed this amount. Pro­
gram officials (who are usually the technical review panel members) then 
clue those offerors who do so and who have high initial technical scores 
to decrease cost offers during best-and-final oral discussions. These 
offerors reduce bids somewhat unrealistically far below the request 
amount. Then, in the process of negotiating the award, the contract 
specialist will be sympathetic to a small increase over the best-and- 
final offer in actually making the award (simple regression indicates 
that the amount of increase is likely to be less than .3 per cent).
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This explanation would account for the direction and magnitude of the 
simple betas in Table 4-11 as well as their relative importance indi­
cated by the standardized beta coefficients (i.e.. Beta). But without 
examining the pattern of offers more closely, this must remain a quali­
tative assessment of what occurs. And this examination is outside the 
scope of this thesis.
For approximately 19 per cent of the awards, there was an 
initial competition, but no best-and-final competition. However, when 
only one competitive process occurs, the amount proposed is at once the 
initial offer and the best-and-final offer; and from the model, it can 
be assumed that the initial offer would thus take precedence over the 
request amount. This is consistent with experiential knowledge of the 
process. For those 30 per cent of awards with no cost competition (i.e., 
which are quasi-competitive), the contract specialist has little choice 
but to begin negotiations on the basis of the reserved amount.
As the discussion of other procurement methods has indicated, 
the analysis of noncompetitive awards differs fundamentally from com­
petitive awards in that variables affecting the amount awarded through 
noncompetitive contracts are indicative of why the award is originally 
granted. For competitive contracts, technical scores received in either 
initial or best-and-final competition are likely to explain why awards 
are originally granted, although emphasis may occasionally be placed on 
other selection criteria (e.g., cost competition).
As this preliminary discussion has indicated, the measurable 
outcome is, to some degree, affected by the category of external analy­
sis and management services. Other variables, however, are hypothesized
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to be even more important in explaining the relative awareness, willing­
ness, and ability of not-for-profit organizations, and these variables 
will be discussed below. The one consideration that can be disregarded 
is the sub-type of not-for-profit organizations; e.g., whether the not- 
for-profit organization is an educational institution or private non­
profit research institute. The number of awards received by educational 
institutions and private non-profit research institutes through nonex- 
clusionary competitive contracts for external analysis and management 
services are the same, and crosstabular analysis does not indicate any 
significant differences between the two. This tends to support Orlan's 
assessment referred to earlier.
In contrast, sub-types of for-profit organizations are not 
likely to manifest the same competitive characteristics. It was earlier 
hypothesized that minority-owned and women-owned firms would be ade­
quately represented in awards made through a nonexclusionary competitive 
procurement method; hence, exclusionary policies were not required. The 
data does not support this proposition. Not one nonexclusionary compet­
itive contract was issued by HUD in FY 79 or the first quarter of FY 80 
for external analysis and management services to minority-owned firms, 
other "disadvantaged" firms, or to women-owned firms.
This finding will be discussed more at length in the conclusion. 
The search will be to determine that procurement method which is the 
most efficient, maximizes potential effectiveness, and promote official 
goals for equity in the procurement process. This section will serve to 
identify what some of the elements should be in implementing such a 
system. The argument here is that those elements should be based upon
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empirical observations of relative degrees of awareness, willingness, 
and ability as well as relative standards of efficiency. Organizational 
differences in being able to obtain awards will be discussed prior to 
efficiency.
Awareness And Willingness 
Lack of awareness can only partially explain the difference in 
the amount of awards received by for-profit and not-for-profit organiza­
tions, respectively, for external analysis and management services pro­
cured through nonexclusionary competitive methods. For lack of a better 
indicator, inclusion on the source list is being used to determine 
whether any one organizational type was aware of the procurement oppor­
tunity. As Table 4-12 below suggests, awareness is a factor. Not one 
competitive procurement process in which excluded not-for-profit organ­
izations on the source list for the RFP received proposals from not-for- 
profit organizations. Not-for-profit organizations were, on the average, 
excluded 15 per cent of the time from knowing about the opportunity 
(i.e., 4 4 26 = .15).
Table 4-12: Per Cent Of The Number Of Nonexclusionary Competitive Pro­
curements In Which Not-For-Profit Organizations Partici­
pated, By Inclusion On Source List
Participated Included On Source List TotalNo Yes
No 100.0 50.0 57.7
Yes 0.0 50.0 42.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 4 22 26
Kendall's taub = .37; sig. = .034
In an attempt to discern why not-for-profit organizations were
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not equally as aware of HUD opportunities to compete for procurement
awards for external analysis and management services, crosstabulations
were performed between the source code (i.e., whether not-for-profit
organizations were sent the request-for-proposals), the description
code (i.e., the category of external analysis and management service),
and the requesting program office code. It was hypothesized that there
would be a statistically significant relationship between: 1) the source
code and the description code, and 2) the source code and the requesting
office code. Neither of these relationships were significant at the .05 
44level. Therefore, it may be assumed that not-for-profit organizations 
are given about the same degree of opportunity by the HUD program of­
fices to compete for the different categories of external analysis and 
management services. If these variables are unimportant, any differ­
ences in awareness may be due to ignorance in how to be included on the 
source list.
The source list is a crucial determinant of who receives 
awards. Government agencies are supposed to advertise the availability 
of RFP's in the Commerce Business Daily, but this is often not done for 
external analysis and management services because of time constraints.
At least at HUD, what normally occurs is that a source list is devised, 
the RFP is sent out, and then the RFP is advertised in the Commerce Busi­
ness Daily. Except for contractors living in Washington, D.C., there is 
little time to respond to an RFP after it appears in that publication, 
after a request for the RFP is made to the agency in writing, and after 
the organization receives the RFP. Thus, being on the source list is 
important. But how this is done varies widely among agencies. At HUD,
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this is a relatively simple process, but relatively few organizations 
are aware of it.
It is infeasible to expect that any publication could be any 
more effective on a national scope than the Commerce Business Daily.
There are too many organizations involved, and the federal government is 
not known for time-efficiency regarding publications. Direct contacts 
with provider organizations is much more efficient. Further, there will 
never be any reform in this regard until contracts are issued regionally 
instead of nationally. The reason is that federal personnel in Washing­
ton, B.C., are not as aware as regional personnel as to the reputations 
and availability of outside organizations to perform external analysis 
and management services.
There is some interaction of awareness of opportunity and will­
ingness to compete. For-profit organizations seem much more aggressive 
in ensuring that they are included on agency source lists and in obtain­
ing RFP's. Further, not-for-profit organizations seem less willing to 
compete once an opportunity is identified. Forty-two per cent of the 
times not-for-profit organizations were invited to participate in HUD 
nonexclusionary competitions, but they did not do so due to a combina­
tion of awareness and willingness. In contrast, for-profit organizations 
participated in all HUD nonexclusionary competitions for external analy­
sis and management services. Of the 58 per cent of all nonexclusionary 
competitive awards for which not-for-profit organizations didn't compete, 
awareness accounts for 27 per cent of the nonresponses and willingness 
accounts for 73 per cent of the nonresponses.
Probably the greatest "opportunity costs" incurred by not-for-
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profit organizations is in not competing to provide data processing 
expertise. Not one offer was received by not-for-profit organizations 
in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80 to provide data processing ex­
pertise, even though not-for-profit organizations were invited to par­
ticipate in 86 per cent of these awards. Given the amount of quanti­
tative expertise in the universities, this lack of participation is 
surprising.
Nonetheless, awareness and willingness do not account ade­
quately for the difference in the amount awarded to not-for-profit and 
for-profit organizations. Not-for-profit organizations responded to 
58 per cent of all RFP’s to purchase external analysis and management 
serivces other than data processing, but only received 13.5 per cent of 
the contract amounts resulting from these awards. Ability to compete 
appears to be a significant factor in explaining this difference in the 
amount awarded.
Ability to Compete
Throughout this thesis, it has become clear that all exclu­
sionary criteria are based upon either organizational type (or sub-type) 
or organizational size. Thus, in order to determine whether exclusionary 
criteria need to be instituted, it becomes important to determine whether 
small organizations and/or certain organizational types are unable to 
compete effectively for nonexclusionary competitive awards.
Measured in terms of amount, small organizations actually re­
ceived more through HUD nonexclusionary competitions for contracts to 
perform external analysis and management services than large organiza­
tions. However, one-way analysis of variance indicates that there is no
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statlstical difference in the mean amounts awarded to organizations of
one size vis-a-vis another and that variables other than organizational
45size must be examined to explain the amount awarded. Further, mea­
sured by the number of awards, large organizations received 69 per cent 
of all HUD awards, through nonexclusionary competitions, and small organ­
izations received only 31 per cent. It is hypothesized, however, that 
this relatively low percentage of the number of awards received by small 
organizations is due, overall, to a combination of awareness and willing­
ness to compete instead of ability. But before this hypothesis can be 
tested, a valid indicator of ability must be developed.
Throughout the discussion regarding competitive awards, it has 
been illustrated that the proposals submitted in best-and-final competi­
tion will determine which organization will actually receive the award—  
and for how much. Cost proposals are only important in determining how 
much is to be awarded, but are not normally a factor in determining 
which organization is to receive the award. It is the best-and-final 
technical proposal— and the resulting best-and-final technical score—  
which determines which organization will receive the award for external 
analysis and management services.
However, the score received in best-and-final competition is 
usually only a marginal adjustment of the score received in the initial 
competition, and relative rankings do not change substantially. This is 
indicated in that the relationship between the technical rank and the 
best-and-final rank is significant at less than the .01 level, and the 
relationship is strong (tauc = .45) and positive. Further, utilizing 
the initial technical score (for rank and class) instead of the best-
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and-final score has the advantage that all organizations are scored in 
the initial competition; but some competitive processes do not include 
best-and-final competition, and even when best-and-final competition 
occurs, only the scores of organizations allowed to participate (on the 
basis of technical ranks established in the initial competition) are . 
examined. Thus, technical proficiency as judged in the initial com­
petition will be used here to judge relative abilities to compete. 
Further, since the number of offerors differs considerably from one com­
petition to another, and since some review panels grade proposals rela­
tively high or low, the technical class will be a better indicator than 
either technical scores or technical ranks.
Table 4-13 below indicates how all organizations competing for 
the nonexclusionary competitive awards being discussed in this chapter 
were judged in terms of technical proficiency. The number of RFP's 
represented (25) is one less than the number of nonexclusionary competi­
tive awards, because one of the RFP's resulted in two of the awards 
drawn in the sample. There is no statistical relationship reflected 
between organizational size and technical proficiency as measured by the 
technical class; i.e., when they compete, small organizations, overall, 
are as able to do so as large organizations. This conclusion is sup­
ported by the fact that small organizations represent 27.6 per cent of 
the offerors, but 31 per cent of the winners of the awards.
Thus, the primary factors affecting the relative low percentage 
of awards to small organizations is awareness or willingness to compete. 
Outside of the Washington, D.C., Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
it is hypothesized that awareness is the greatest factor. For
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organizatlons within that area, willingness seems to be more important. 
The president of Prospect Associates, a successful small firm engaged in 
providing external analysis and management services within the Washing­
ton, D.C., area, has stated that her firm rarely competed in nonexclu­
sionary competitions, believing that chances of obtaining the award were
46prohibitive when having to compete against large organizations. At 
least regarding HUD competitions for external analysis and management 
services, this reluctance is ill-founded. But this kind of unwillingness 
by small organizations to compete against large organizations may be 
widespread.
Table 4-13: Per Cent Of Organizations Judged Most Technically Proficient
In Nonexclusionary Competitions For HUD Awards To Perform 
External Analysis And Management Services In FY 79 And 
FY 80, By Organizational Size
Technical Organizational Size • All
Class Small Large Organizations
1 (most proficient) 30.2% 35.8% 34.2%
2 34.9% 32.7% 33.3%
3 (least proficient) 34.9% 31.5% 32.5%
All Classes 100% 100% 100%
N 63 165 228
significance level: .5892
Kendall's tauc = - .048 
conclusion: accept Hg
It was hypothesized that minority-owned and women-owned firms 
would be the small organizations less likely to compete effectively. In 
the sample, not one award was obtained by minority-owned or women-owned 
firms. But analysis of the competitions for these awards indicates no 
statistical relationship between status as a minority-owned or woman- 
owned firm and ability, judged by technical proficiency. Although the
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measure of association (tauc = - .10) indicates a weak relationship in 
this regard, the significance level is only .28. However, one of the 
minority/women-owned firms judged to be the first class was also judged 
to be the most technically proficient in that particular competition, 
yet did not receive the award; and it was not clear from the contract 
file why this occurred. This is the only case discovered in this thesis 
where discrimination may have occurred, although this is not felt to be 
a widespread problem— either in the assigning of scores or the actual 
awarding of contracts.
There is also no discernible statistical relationship between
the ability to be judged technically proficient and being a small not-
for-profit organization. It was expected that this particular sub-type
would find it difficult to compete against both large organizations and
small for-profit organizations. This was not found to be true. There
was no statistically significant difference in the ability of small not-
for-profit organizations to compete against other organizational types 
47or sub-types. The small number of awards to small not-for-profit or­
ganizations can more likely be attributed to a lack of awareness of 
opportunity or an unwillingness to compete; and the high percentage 
(67 per cent) of small not-for-profit organizations being judged to be 
in the least-proficient class can be attributed to chance.
For small not-for-profits, there are institutional barriers to 
entering the competition for*contract awards. If the organizations are 
primarily funded through federal grants or state appropriations, regu­
lations may bar the use of these funds for proposal development. Even 
more restrictive are the attitudes of governing boards. In many cases.
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they will not approve expenditures for proposal development, particu­
larly if these expenditures are large. In contrast small for-profit 
organizations consider proposal development an essential and legitimate 
expenditure if those organizations are to compete to perform external 
analysis and management services. Even more detrimental for small not- 
for-profit organizations is awareness. They are rarely included on pro­
curement source lists and may lack the information as to how they could 
be so included.
Overall, however, not-for-profit organizations tend to fare as 
well as for-profit organizations in the competition for technical pro­
ficiency. As Table 4-14 on the next page indicates, a weak tendency by 
small not-for-profit organizations to be judged the least technically 
proficient is more than offset by an equally weak tendency for large not- 
for-profit organizations to be judged in the most technically proficient 
class. Note that Table 4-14 only reflects those RFP's through which both 
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations competed. The data in 
Table 4-14 indicates that, measured by the technical class, for-profit 
and not-for-profit organizations have a comparable general ability to 
compete effectively; however, this general ability to compete is of 
little use if an organization is continuously ranked "second-best," for 
most awards are only granted to the best technical score. If best-and- 
final competition is held, the highest best-and-final score is the pri­
mary consideration. If not, the highest technical score received in the 
initial competition will determine which organization will receive the 
award.
The point here is that not-for-profit organizations lack an
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"edge" in the competitive process which often prevents their obtaining 
the highest score. Of those awards in which there was best-and-final 
competition, 65 per cent of the winners had the highest score in best- 
and-final competition, and of this 65 per cent, 92.3 per cent were for- 
profit organizations and 7.7 per cent not-for-profit organizations. A 
similar pattern was found in the highest scores assigned to the initial 
competition.
Table 4-14: Technical Proficiency As Judged By Technical Class Of All
Organizations Competing On A Nonexclusionary Basis For HUD 






N % N % N % N %
For-Profit
Small 10 (29.4) 13 (38.2) 11 (32.4) 34 (100)
Large 22 (31.0) 25 (35.2) 24 (33.8) 71 (100)
All, for-profit 32 (30.5) 38 (36.2) 35 (33.3) 105 (100)
Not-For-Profit
Small 1 (16.7) 1 (16.7) 4 (66.7) 6 (100)
Large 13 (43.3) 10 (33.3) 7 (23.3) 30 (100)
All, Not-For- 14 (38.9) 11 (30.6) 11 (30.6) 36 (100)
Profit
All Organizations 46 (32.6) 49 (34.8) 46 (32.6) 141 (100)
The "edge" normally lacking is thought to be proposal packaging 
and marketing. Proposals from for-profit organizations just appear more 
professional. For-profit organizations hire editors who police for gram­
matical errors. The typing (on quality bond paper) is of high quality 
and uniform in design. Resumes are tailored for each proposal. Finally, 
all proposals have jackets with company logos and are in the format 
requested by the bureaucracy. In contrast, the proposals received from
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certain types of not-for-profit organizations (particularly universities 
and small not-for-profit organizations) are likely to appear quite 
amateurish by comparison. Not-for-profit organizations are also not as 
likely to rehearse for oral examinations in best-and-final competition. 
The large nonprofit research institutes, however, place as much stress 
on packaging and marketing as the for-profit organizations, and it is 
due to their influence that the relationship between organizational 
type and the highest best-and-final score is only significant at the 
.1121 level.
The overall assessment is that the preliminary hypothesis was 
in error. That is, the differences in the amounts awarded to not-for- 
profit organizations and for-profit organizations, respectively, can 
primarily be explained by behavioral factors which, overall affect the 
awareness, willingness, or ability to compete. Ramifications of this 
assessment will be discussed in the conclusion. But unless the Congress 
expresses a desire to grant not-for-profit organizations special exclu­
sionary status, this organizational type will probably continue to 
suffer competitive disadvantages. The quandry is that by granting not- 
for-profit organizations exclusionary status, the Congress would be 
weakening its own official goal to promote open competition. It is to 
that official goal which the focus of the thesis now returns.
Other Official Goals
It has been determined that nonexclusionary competitive procure­
ment methods as instituted by HUD are not effective in furthering the
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official goal to promote minority participation in the awarding of 
contracts for external analysis and management services. The purposes 
of this section will be to briefly ascertain how effective nonexclu­
sionary competitions are in furthering other official goals. Then, in 
the conclusion, the relationship between conformance to official goals 
and the distribution of awards between for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations will be examined.
As discussed earlier in this thesis, one official goal of the 
Congress is to promote more competition in the procurement process. This 
goal is related to, but yet separate from, the official goal to promote 
efficiency. Rather, the primary motivation behind the goal of promoting 
competition is "fairness." That is, open competition supposedly allows 
more organizations to compete and diminishes the possibility of undue 
influence in awarding the contract. Certain indicators have been devel­
oped in relation to small business set-asides to provide a comparative 
base for ascertaining the effectiveness of nonexclusionary competitions 
to promote competition. These are: 1) the amount of time allowed for 
the offerors to develop viable proposals, 2) the number of sources 
sought in the RFP to provide the service, and 3) the number of offers 
received.
As Table 4-15 indicates, nonexclusionary awards promote less 
competition than small business set-asides, but considerably more than 
8(a) competitions. Again, there is a direct association between the 
amount of time allowed for RFP's and the number of offerors; and non­
exclusionary awards allow for less time to respond to the RFP than small 
business set-asides, and hence, receive fewer offers. On the average.
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the number of sources sought is slightly more through nonexclusionary 
awards than small business set-asides. But the most important criterion 
is the number of offers received.
The overall assessment is that no competitive procurement 
method utilized by HUD to secure external analysis and management ser­
vices is particularly effective in promoting competition. Even 16 
offerors is quite low. And competitive methods are effective in pro­
moting competition only when compared with noncompetitive procurements. 
Further, the relatively more offers submitted in response to small 
business set-asides indicates that there is no necessary relation 
between exclusivity and the promotion of competition.
Table 4-15 Selected Criteria Of Conformance To The Official Goal Of 








RFP time 19 days 42 days 31 days
(mean)
Number of Sources 3.6 140 149
(mean)
Number of Offers 2.6 .16 10
(mean)
The other official goal is to promote efficiency. In the past, 
it has been assumed that open competition is more efficient than 
noncompetitive procurement methods. "Tools" or indicators of efficiency 
which have been developed in this thesis include: 1) time to execute the 
contract, 2) savings to the Government through uncertainty, and 3) the 
cost class. Each will be discussed in turn, and comparisons will be 
made with other procurement methods when applicable. No comparison will
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be made with exclusionary awards to not-for-profit organizations, 
because this method has since been discontinued.
It should now be clear that no competitive procurement methods 
utilized by the federal government can be truly efficient. The Code of 
Federal Procurement Regulations prevents such efficiency by mandating an 
incredible morass of procedures; e.g., pre-award audits and multiple 
clearances. For nonexclusionary awards, the average length of time at 
HUD to execute a contract for external analysis and management services 
is 157 days. This is more efficient than for small business set-asides 
(189 days) or for 8(a) competitions (204 days), but does not compare 
favorably with modifications (55 days), nonexclusionary noncompetitive 
awards (95 days), or even exclusionary noncompetitive awards to 8(a) 
organizations (122 days).
Because of the extra time and effort by personnel to execute 
competitive contracts, the average costs for competitive contracts is 
much higher than for nonexclusionary noncompetitive contracts and modifi­
cations. It is hypothesized that the marginal cost of any one contract 
is in direct proportion to the amount of time needed to execute it.
Data is lacking to prove this hypothesis, however.
Lacking this criterion of cost efficiency, the criterion appli­
cable to all procurement methods is the potential savings to the Govern­
ment through uncertainty. For example, the regression line depicting the 
relationship between the amount awarded and the amount initially re­
served for HUD nonexclusionary competitive contracts for external analy­
sis and management services is: Y' = - 106,823 + 1.44 X. The relation­
ship is significant at the .0001 level and quite strong (r^ = .995). As
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Figure 4-4 on the next page suggests, this implies that the Government 
obtains significant savings for awards less than $250,000, but begins 
to incur negative savings thereafter. It is hypothesized in the thesis 
that organizations incur significantly more costs in the competitive 
process for larger awards (e.g., more research for statistics to be used 
in the proposal) and attempt to have the Government absorb this cost.
Comparison with all other procurement methods could be accom­
plished by plotting all other regression lines in Figure 4-4, but six 
regression lines might be somewhat confusing. Therefore, the regression 
equations will be used to determine the estimated award amount when 
$100,000 and $300,000 is requested. These two "critical points" appear 
to be the best guides as to relative efficiency for small and large 
awards, respectively. The equations for each procurement method, the 
estimated award amounts at each of the critical points, and the resulting 
ranks are reflected in Table 4-16 on a following page. Note that non­
exclusionary competitive awards are the most efficient procurement method 
for small awards, but one of the least efficient for larger awards.
Another criterion of cost-efficiency developed earlier in this 
thesis is the cost class, but it is only applicable for small business 
set-asides and nonexclusionary competitive awards. This is the cost 
class. For nonexclusionary competitive awards, there is a higher degree 
of quasi-competition present (23 per cent vis-à-vis 17 per cent) than 
for small business set-asides. When organizations could be classified 
into cost classes, nonexclusionary competitive methods resulted in 26.9 
per cent of the awards going to the most cost-efficient, 38.5 per cent 
of the awards being received by organizations in the second cost class.
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Figure 4-4: Relationship Between The Award Amount And Request Amount
For Nonexclusionary Competitive Awards For External Analy­
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and 11.5 per cent in the third cost class. This does not appear to by 
any improvement over small business set-asides, in which 50 per cent of 
the awards were received by organizations in the first class, zero in 
the second class, and 33.3 per cent in the third class. It would 
probably not be too much of a distortion to add the percentages of con­
tracts awarded through quasi-competition to the third class of both.
Table 4-16: Values Of The Estimated Award Amount At Critical Points In
The Request Amount, By Procurement Method (Note: Rank 1 = 
Most Efficient)








X = $300,000 
($)
Rank
Modifications^ 100,000 4 300,000 3
Nonexclusionary
Noncompetitive^
102,290 5 300,290 4
8(a) Noncompetitive^ 106,203 6 176,203 1
8(a) Competitive^ 74,768 2 356,768 6
Small Business 
Set-Asides^
94,381 3 238,381 2
Nonexclusionary
Competitive^
37,177 1 325,177 5
^Regression Line same as 45° line 
= 3,290 + .99 X 
Ŷ' = 71,203 + .35 X 
Ŷ' = - 66,232 + 1.41 X 
Ŷ' = 22,381 + .72 X 
Y' = - 106,823 + 1.44 X
As has been discussed earlier, cost-efficiency is almost always 
disregarded in making the award through small business set-asides, but 
at least cost-efficiency does not seem to be a detriment in receiving 
the award. For nonexclusionary competitive awards, there is a negative 
association (taufa = - .47) between the best-and-final cost class and the
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best-and-final. technical class. The relationship is significant at the 
.03 level. The relationship implies that for nonexclusionary competi­
tive contracts, the most cost inefficient are most likely to receive the 
award, because earlier analysis has indicated that those in the first 
best-and-final technical class are the most likely to receive the award.
Thus, it can be stated that open competition in Government pro­
curement for external analysis and management services normally encour­
ages inefficiency. The disturbing tendency discerned here is that with 
all of its inefficiency, the nonexclusionary competitive method is prob­
ably the most efficient for all awards less than $250,000. Its advan­
tage is that it probably does much to maximize potential effectiveness. 
But with expending so much time and effort to execute the contract, the 
bureaucracy has few resources to commit to effective program evaluation. 
Thus, technical proficiency measures the amount of promises to perform, 
not performance. And often, promises are unfulfilled. In the next chap­
ter, it will be explained why reforming the procurement system to place 
more effort on evaluation (vis-à-vis process) would have a significant 
impact upon the distribution of procurement awards to organizational 
types and sub-types.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV
^There are two primary means by which competitive procedures 
may be implemented. The first is through formal advertising and the 
issuance of an "Invitation for Bid." This procedure is only appli­
cable when the good or service can be defined very specifically and 
is not appropriate for the procurement of external analysis and 
management services. The second procedure is through the issuance 
of a "Request For Proposals" (RFP). An RFP does not have to contain 
the level of specificity of an Invitation For Bid and does not have 
to utilize formal advertising. Since RFP's are almost always used to 
secure external analysis and management services, the scope of this 
thesis will be restricted to that competitive process.
2The only exception is for public agencies which employ 
handicapped individuals "...for not less than 75 per centum of the 
man-hours required for the production or provision of the commodities 
or services." Source: 41 CFR 1-1.706-9. This exception is so re­
strictive that it can be safely disregarded in this thesis.
For the illegality of issuing contracts by methods other 
than that allowed in the Code of Federal Procurement Regulations, 
see: 41 CFR 1-1.403.
3
If the involvement of the agency is not to be "substan­
tial," and if the Government is to receive no direct benefit from the 
service, the Federal Grant And Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 man­
dates that the services must be acquired through assistance instru­
ments. See: Government Affairs Committee, United States Senate, 
Senate Report No. 95-449 (September 22, 1977), pp. 1-8.
^This decision was made by Dr. Taylor, contracting officer, 
while this student was employed at HUD.
^The student is indebted to Professor Ted Hebert of the 
University of Oklahoma for suggesting the concept of the cost class, 
technical class (see below), and their comparative possibilities 
(see below).
^The regression line is: Ÿ = 48,034 + .62884 X. The sig­
nificance level is .01023, and r^ = .3996.
^The regression line between the award amount and the ini­
tial amount offered is Ÿ = 86,309 + .18143 X; the significance level 
is .02925; and r^ = .28828. The regression line between the award 
amount and the best-and-final offer is: Ÿ = 101,761 + .07934 X; the




The weighted average is $144,231.
9
The overall relationship is significant at the .02925 level;
and r^ = . 71187.
^^The regression line is Ÿ = 114,406 - 17.96592 X; the sig­
nificance level is .23149; and r^ = ,04995.
^^The regression line is Ÿ = 151,449 - .59.363 X; the sig­
nificance level is .20549; and r2 = .06226.
12The scatter plot indicates that the relationship is not 
linear, thus, regression analysis is not appropriate.
^^The regression line is Ÿ = 81.28351 - .00786 X; the sig­
nificance level is .34216; and r^ = .01560.
^^According to Kirkpatrick, Kendall's tauc is most appro­
priate as a measure of association wi-th ties on ranks and when the 
number of columns and rows differ. For a discussion of tauy and 
tauc and their comparability, see: Samuel Kirkpatrick, Quantitative
Analysis of Political Data (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Pub­
lishing Company, 1974c.), p. 47.
^^In deciding how much to award non-profit providers of 
mental health services, the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health con­
siders criteria of both effectiveness and efficiency. This serves 
to indicate that the concept of considering both criteria in the pro­
curement process is not unrealistic.
^^Exclusionary competitive awards are also allowed for 
"labor surplus areas" as identified by the Department of Labor.
These are areas of concentrated unemployment, underemployment, or 
labor surplus. Source: 41 CFR 1-1.801. Preference in these awards
is to be made for small businesses, but if an insufficient number of 
bids or offers from small businesses are forthcoming, large business­
es may be utilized. Source: 41 CFR l-1.802-2(e). This reliance
upon large businesses for labor-surplus awards is rare, however.
Labor-surplus "set-asides" are not important for the pur­
poses of this thesis. HUD issued no labor-surplus set-asides in FY 
79. Source: Office Of Management And Budget, Special Analysis 5:
Federal Labor Surplus Preference Over $10,000 By Executive Department 
And Agency, By State By Product/Service, Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Office Of Management And
Budget, 1980), p. 81. In addition, none were identified in the 
sample for the first quarter of FY 80.
^^41 CFR 1-3.1202(3)(e).
18The figure for the annual gross receipts is taken from an
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attachment to RFP's issued by the Department of Human Services 
(formerly HEW). Source: Department of Human Services, "RFP No. NIA
80-007, Mimeographed. The figure for the number of employees has 
been taken from: Minority Contracting Reports, vol. 2, no. 2
(January 25, 1980), p. 5.
19For acknowledgement of this criticism by the SBA, see: 
Federal Register,vol. 45, no. 48 (Monday, March 10, 1980), p. 15443.
20Minority Business Reports, vol. 2, no. 2 (January 25,
1980), p. 5
21%bid.
^^"Revision To Method Of Establishing Size Standards...," 
op. cit., p. 15442.
^^Ibid, p. 15450.
^^Ibid.
25Conversation with Ms. Louise Thompson, Small Business 
Administration (Oklahoma City Office) on February 18, 1981.
26Source: Office Of Management And Budget, Special Anal­
ysis 3: Federal Contract Awards Over/Under $10,000, Minority And
Small Disadvantaged Business, By Executive Department And Agency And 
By State, Fiscal Year 1979 (Office Of Federal Procurement Policy, 
Office Of Management And Budget, 1980), p. 2.
27The student wishes to thank Professor Ted Robinson of the 
University of Oklahoma for suggesting the term "over-represenation."
28For small business set-asides, the regression line is 
Ÿ = 86.6 + i.8 X; the significance level is .00187; and r2 = .90185. 
For 8(a) competitive awards, Ÿ = 181.5 + 51 X; the significance level 
is .07013; and r^ = .57.
29The relationship between competitive time and the number 
of offerors for small business set-asides is significant at the 
.04367 level; r^ = .56; and the regression equation is Y = -25.9 +
5.22 X. The relationship between competitive time and the number of 
offerors for 8(a) competition is not significant (i.e., the signifi­
cance level is .37).
^^The regression line is Ÿ = -4.19 + .49 X; the significance 
level is less than .03; and r^ = .69.
^^The regression line is Ÿ = 3.98 - .07 X; the significance 
level is .12; and r^ = .41.
32 -For 8(a) competitive procurements Y = - 66,232 +
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1.40596 X; = .925; and the significance level is less than .005.
For small business set-asides Y = 22,381 + .7157 X; = .69; and 
the significance level is less than .02.
33The term "quasi-competitive" is my own. No term in the 
literature seems to be adequate for a situation in which cost compet­
ition is not present, for example.
34Conversation with Mr. Kenneth Dosier, who is a contract­
ing officer at HUD, in early 1980.
^̂ Ibid.




DF (Greater Mean Square): 3
DF (Lesser Mean Square): 1
F: 4998.17069
Critical value of F for a significance level of .05: 21$
Critical value of F for a significance level of .01: 5,403
37Guttman and Willner's book is primarily concerned with 
whether outside services should be procured at all. The authors 
attack for-profit organizations and not-for-profit organizations with 
equal zeal and see little difference between the two organizational 
types. For example, they state:
...the legal distinction (between the two types of organi­
zations) is often far sharper than the practical one. Non­
profits are no less private than profit-making corporations 
...If profit-making firms seek profits, nonprofits are no 
less interested in survival and growth.
Source: Guttman and Willner, op. cit., p. 19. Guttman and Willner's
position will be examined in the conclusion.
38Orlans is primarily interested in the competitive rela­
tionship between the universities and "nonprofit research institutes," 
but the thrust of his argument is applicable to the competitive re­
lationship between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. In 
particular, see: Orlans, op. cit., pp. 123-126, 141-144, and 149-152.
39Benjamin I. Page and Calvin C. Jones, "Reciprocal Effects 
of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and The Vote," American Polit­
ical Science Review, vol. 73, no. 4 (December, 1979), p. 1079.
40Ibid, pp. 1079-1080.




Orlans, op. cit., pp. 141-159.
The relationship is summarized in the following table:
Source of Variation F Sig. of F
Interactions 15.6 .001
Between Classes 18.2 .001
For the relationship between the source code (2 cate­
gories) and the description code (2 categories), taufe = - .01849 
and the significance level is .4632. For the relationship between 
the source code (2 categories) and the requesting office (8 cate­
gories), = .6563.
45One-way ANOVA was used to test the relationship between 
the amount awarded and organizational size. With 1 (between groups) 
and 24 (within grous) degrees of freedom, F = 1.232; the significance 
level is .2781; and eta2 = .0488.
46Conversation with Ms. Laura Henderson, President of Pros­
pects, Inc., in early 1980.
47The relationships may be summarized as follows:
Relationship Between Technical 
Class And: N taur
Sig.
Level Conclusion
Small not-for-profit status 
(categories = small not- 
for-profit organizations 
and all other organiza­
tions) Note: For only
those RFP's in which not- 
for-profit organizations 
compete
Profit motivation as a small
organization
(categories = small not- 
for-profit organizations 
and small for-profit or­
ganizations) Note: For
only those RFP's in which 








Qualitative Assessment of the Research Effort 
There have been three primary official goals mandated by the
Congress which have been identified in this thesis: 1) to promote com­
petition in the procurement process, 2) to promote minority participa­
tion in the procurement process, and 3) to maximize efficiency in the 
procurement process. In order to achieve these goals, different pro­
curement methods have been developed. The procurement method which is 
adopted, in turn, may have a substantial impact upon the distribution of 
awards between organizational types and sub-types. This impact can be 
minimal (in the case of nonexclusionary competitive awards, in which 
behavioral and economic factors explain the difference in awards to 
organizational types and sub-types) or substantial, being the sole para­
meter upon which awards are distributed by organizational type (e.g., 
small business set-asides). It is this nexus between the official goal 
and the distribution of awards to the respective organizational types 
and sub-types which has directed this study toward the procurement 
method instead of the individual competitors.
The first research question posed at the beginning of this
*A11 notes are located at the end of the respective chapters.
Notes for Chapter V are located on page 206.
— 188—
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thesis was as follows : If the decision has indeed been made that more
of the work of Government is to be performed outside of the Government, 
then will for-profit or not-for-profit organizations benefit the most 
in an atmosphere of a reasonable degree of competition for HUD procure­
ment awards for external analysis and management services— and why? 
Reasonable competition was operationally defined as being a formal pro­
cess of selection in which more than one organization is considered, in 
which the criteria for selection are objective and known to all compet­
itors in advance (normally through the use of an RFP), and in which 
technical proficiency or cost efficiency, or both, are among the crite­
ria of selection.
There were four procurement methods utilized by HUD in FY 79 
and the first quarter of FY 80 which met the conditions of a reasonable 
degree of competition. However, one method— exclusionary competitive 
awards to not-for-profit organizations— is not legal, will not be uti­
lized in the future, and thus will have no further impact upon the dis­
tribution of procurement awards between for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations. In addition, two of the other methods— small business 
set-asides and 8(a) competitions— exclude not-for-profit organizations 
in being eligible to compete. Only one method, nonexclusionary compet­
itive awards, satisfies both the parameter of exhibiting reasonable 
competition and the parameter of allowing all organizational types to 
compete.
Not-for-profit organizations received only 3.1 per cent of the 
total amount awarded by HUD on a nonexclusionary competitive basis to 
procure external analysis and management services in FY 79 and the first
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quarter of FY 80, but received 15.4 per cent of the number of awards.
The reason for the disparity between the per cent of the total amount 
received and the per cent of the total number of contracts awarded is 
an unwillingness by not-for-profit organizations to compete for con­
tracts to provide data processing services, and these contracts are, on 
the average, awarded for larger amounts than other external analysis 
and management services.
For all categories of external analysis and management ser­
vices, it has been determined that willingness to compete is a factor 
in the relatively small amount of awards received by not-for-profit 
organizations through nonexclusionary competition, but the behavioral 
factor of awareness is also important. Fifteen (15) per cent of the 
nonexclusionary competitions did not include not-for-profit organiza­
tions on the source list, and a high association was found between 
whether not-for-profit organizations submitted proposals and whether 
they were invited to submit proposals.
More important than either willingness or awareness is the 
behavioral factor of an ability to compete. Not-for-profit organiza­
tions participated in 42 per cent of the nonexclusionary competitions, 
but only received 15 per cent of the awards. For data processing ser­
vices, two factors were found to be important in determining which 
organization received the award : 1) the best-and-final technical class,
and 2) the best-and-final cost class. But overall, only the technical 
score received in best-and-final competition (or if no best-and-final 
competition, the technical score received in initial competition) v̂ as 
important in determining which organiztion would receive the award.
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It was determined in the analysis that there was little differ­
ence between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations in their abil­
ity to be classified in the highest technical class (i.e., containing 
the first third of the organizations judged to be the most technically 
proficient), but not-for-profit organizations had a tendency to not be 
assigned the highest technical score in both the initial competition 
and the best-and-final competition. This was attributed to a reluctance 
by small not-for-profit organizations and universities to devote ade­
quate resources to proposal marketing and rehearsals for oral reviews 
conducted during best-and-final competition. It was hypothesized, based 
upon experience, that the large "nonprofit research institutes" did not 
suffer from this liability. This would explain why the overall statis­
tical relationship between the high score and organizational type was a 
weak one.
Overall, the assessment is that not-for-profit organizations 
will continue to suffer competitive disadvantages because of low levels 
of awareness, willingness, or ability. It is hypothesized that Orlan's 
observation regarding relative levels of staff insecurity in the large 
nonprofit research institutes and universities can be adapted to for- 
profit and not-for-profit organizations.^ That is, there is consider­
ably more staff insecurity in those small for-profit organizations (or 
divisions of larger for-profit organizations) engaged primarily in con­
tracting with the Government for external analysis and management ser­
vices. This insecurity increases both the willingness to seek out op­
portunities and to respond to them. But response causes significant 
organizational resources to be committed, and those employee-
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entrepreneurs who do not win contracts are likely to become unemployed. 
Small not-for-profit organizations and educational institutions are more 
likely to be direct service providers, have sources of funding other 
than Government contracts, and experience less staff insecurity. This 
results in less awareness, willingness, and ability to compete (partic­
ularly "at the margins" in best-and-final competition). But more 
research needs to be conducted before this hypothesis can be verified.
The second research question posed at the beginning of this 
thesis was whether a reasonable degree of competition still exists for 
HUD procurements of external analysis and management services. In FY 79 
and the first quarter of FY 80, nonexclusionary competitive awards ac­
counted for approximately 41 per cent of the total amount awarded by 
HUD to perform external analysis and management services. It was not 
possible to determine with confidence the procurement methods utilized 
for contracts included in the sample which were awarded prior to FY 79. 
It is hypothesized, however, that the percentage of the total amount 
awarded on a nonexclusionary competitive basis has declined.
The myth that competition automatically results in efficiency 
has prevented too much reliance being placed upon noncompetitive 
methods. But as the last chapter indicated, nonexclusionary competitive 
contracts are only more efficient for the small award amounts and are 
much less efficient than exclusionary competitive methods for larger 
award amounts. And this does not take into account the high average 
costs associated with all competitive procurement methods due to over­
regulation of the procurement process. Also, there was evidence that 
nonexclusionary competitive methods placed even less importance upon
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cost competition than small business set-asides. In fact, for those 
organizations receiving contracts awarded on a nonexclusionary competi­
tive basis, a negative association was discovered between technical pro­
ficiency and cost efficiency; i.e., the award most often was received by 
those organizations being among the most technically proficient and the 
most cost inefficient.
If a decline in the relative proportion of nonexclusionary com­
petitive awards has indeed occurred, it is due to the influence of ex­
clusionary procurement methods which have been designed to promote 
increased participation in the procurement process by small business 
concerns (both minority - owned and nonminority-owned). It has been 
hypothesized that small business concerns are more reluctant to compete 
against large organizations than against each other. Further, the num­
ber of nonexclusionary competitive contracts awarded by HUD in FY 79 
and the first quarter of FY 80 to minorities was minimal. Both of these 
factors— reluctance by small business concerns to compete in open com­
petition and the negligible proportion of awards received by minority- 
owned firms— have had the effect of placing pressure upon the bureau­
cracies to decrease the percentage of external analysis and management 
services procured through nonexclusionary competitions and to increase 
the percentage of services procured through exclusionary competition.
The most important procurement method (in terms of award 
amounts) devised to increase participation by small business concerns 
(both minority-owned and nonminority-owned) is small business set- 
asides. The research has indicated this procurement method is relative­
ly effective in promoting competition. Further, unlike nonexclusionary
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competitive competitions, a substantial amount (i.e., 33 per cent) 
awarded through small business set-asides by HUD are received by 
minority-owned firms. Thus, small business set-asides satisfy the 
official goals of the Congress to promote competition and to encourage 
participation in the procurement process by small business concerns and 
by minority-owned firms.
It has been indicated in this thesis that a certain degree of
competition also is present for noncompetitive awards. The Government
is not the only purchaser of external analysis and management services;
and the contractor is only one of many providers of external analysis
2and management services. Therefore, it is probably more useful to 
rephrase the first research question as follows: If the decision has
indeed been made that more of the work of Government is to be performed 
outside of Government, then will for-profit or not-for-profit organiza­
tions benefit the most in the competition for HUD contracts awarded on 
a nonexclusionary basis to perform external analysis and management 
services— and why? Similarly, the second research question posed at 
the beginning of this thesis— i.e., whether a reasonable degree of 
competition still exists— can be modified to determining whether non­
exclusionary competition still exists. The hypothesis is that the 
need to conform to official goals will cause bureaucracies to rely 
less upon all nonexclusionary procurement methods and more upon exclu­
sionary methods. It will be shown that this shift will have a signifi­
cant impact upon the distribution of procurement awards between for- 
profit and not-for-profit organizations.
In addition to nonexclusionary competitive awards, two other
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procurement methods which are not exclusionary by organizational type 
are modifications and nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards. Almost 
as much was awarded by HUD in FY 79 and the first quarter of FY 80 
through a combination of modifications and nonexclusionary noncompet­
itive awards to procure external analysis and management services as
3through nonexclusionary competitive methods. It has been hypothesized 
that the relative shares received by for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations of the amounts awarded through modifications will ap­
proximate the relative shares awarded through the basic contracts.
Thus, shifts in the relative shares received by the respective organi­
zational types will depend upon the changes in the relative shares 
awarded through basic awards.
Nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards result primarily from 
informal relationships established between program officials and repre­
sentatives of the organizations engaged in providing external analysis 
and management services for HUD. Not-for-profit organizations compete 
quite effectively for nonexclusionary noncompetitive contracts awarded 
by HUD.
Similar to nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards, exclusionary 
noncompetitive awards to 8(a) organizations result to some degree from 
informal relationships established between the contractor and program 
officials. However, the research implies that these relationships are 
not as close as those existing between program officials and recipients 
of nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards; further, competition for non­
competitive 8(a) contracts is probably intense. Establishment of in­
formal relationships is also a factor affecting the distribution of
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exclusionary competitive awards to 8(a) organizations. This is indi­
cated by the relatively few sources sought for these competitions and 
the relatively few offers received. However, technical pro­
ficiency is the most important factor in selection once offers are 
received.
The total amount awarded on an exclusionary basis to 8(a) 
organizations (both competitively and noncompetitively) is negotiated 
before the fiscal year by HUD and the SBA. The research has indicated 
that the amount targeted for 8(a) organizations is to increase. It is 
expected that there will be a shift from the total percentage of con­
tract amounts awarded on an nonexclusionary noncompetitive basis to 
exclusionary awards to 8(a) organizations. The reason is that nonex­
clusionary noncompetitive awards are not in compliance with either the 
official goal to promote competition or the official goal to promote 
participation by minorities in the procurement process. Both procure­
ment methods which limit eligibility to 8(a) organizations promote 
the official goal to promote participation by minorities in the pro­
curement process. Thus, it is expected that the relative percentage 
awarded on a nonexclusionary noncompetitive basis will decline as a 
direct result of more being targeted for 8(a) awards.
It is not clear from the research whether less reliance upon 
nonexclusionary noncompetitive awards will result in more amounts being 
awarded on an exclusionary basis either competitively or noncompeti­
tively. Exclusionary competitive awards to 8(a) organizations satisfy 
both primary goals to promote competition and minority participation, 
whereas exclusionary noncompetitive awards promote minority
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participation, but are in direct conflict with the goal to promote 
competition. However, the authority to issue 8(a) contracts competi­
tively is vague, and some contract officers refuse to utilize this 
procurement method.
The increased reliance by HUD upon small business concerns has 
been accompained by an increase in reliance upon minority-owned firms. 
The percentage of contracts awarded to minority-owned firms by HUD to 
perform external analysis and management services increased from 11.5 
per cent prior to FY 79 to 30.7 per cent in FY 79 and the first quarter 
of FY 80. The official goal to award a higher number of contracts to 
minority-owned organizations is complementary to the increasing ten­
dency to award contracts on an exclusionary basis to small business 
concerns, because most minority-owned firms competing for HUD procure­
ment awards are small organizations.
It is therefore expected that there will be a shift from all 
nonexclusionary procurement methods to exclusionary ones limited to 
small business concerns. As the discussion below indicates, this will 
accelerate the decline of not-for-profit organizations as participants 
in the competition to receive HUD contracts to perform external analy­
sis and management services. As Table 5-1 on the next page indicates, 
HUD has been relatively successful in ensuring that small business 
concerns receive a large share of procurement awards to provide exter­
nal analysis and management services. There is a general movement in 
the direction of awards from large organizations (both for-profit and 
not-for-profit) to small for-profit organizations.^ Also, since the 
13 awards made on an exclusionary basis to not-for-profit organizations
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are not indicative of what will occur in the future, it is more appro­
priate to reflect the adjusted distributional pattern reflected in 
Table 5-1. The adjusted percentages are more valid, because no exclu­
sionary competitive awards to not-for-profit organizations could be 
detected in the set erf contract awards made prior to FY 79. The 
adjusted percentages illustrate that the share of awards received by 
small not-for-profit organizations has also been declining.
Table 5-1: Percentages Of The Number Of HUD Awards Received To Perform
External Analysis And Management Services, By Organizational 
Type And Organizational Size
Period
Organizational Prior to 79 79—80 79-80
Type (unadjusted) (ad; usted)
N % N % N %
For-Profit
Small 39 28.3 46 48.4 46 56.1
Large 46 33.3 18 18.9 18 22.0
Not-For-Profit
Small 35 25.4 24 25.3 11 13.4
Large 18 13.0 7 7.4 7 8.5
All Organiza­ 138 100.0 95 100.0 82 100.0
tions
The general conclusion is that the combined influence of small 
business set-asides and other exclusionary procurement methods for 
small business concerns have reduced the degree of competition substan­
tially in the recent past between for-profit and not-for-profit organi­
zations and will do so even more in the future. HUD has indicated to 
the SBA that the number of awards to small business concerns (both 
minority and nonminority) is to increase significantly. Taken to its 
extreme. Table 5-1 implies that this policy will have the effect of
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reducing not-for-profit participation in the procurement process to 
negligible proportions. Thus, even though the relative amounts within 
categories of nonexclusionary procurement methods awarded to for-profit 
and not-for-profit organizations will continue to be a function of 
behavioral and economic factors, political decisions will establish the • 
parameters by which these behavioral and economic factors will affect 
the distribution of awards.
Implications for Future Research 
Throughout this thesis, the commonalities of the procurement 
policies of HUD and those of other federal agencies have been stressed. 
However, before discussing implications of this research effort for 
future research, it may be helpful to accentuate the differences.
It has been noted that the procurement process is much the same 
for all civilian agencies because these agencies must abide by the Code 
of Federal Procurement Regulations. The Department of Defense has its 
own procurement regulations. The two sets of procurement regulations 
are substantially the same, except that the military regulations are 
more voluminous and complex. Senator Chiles (D-Florida) has been 
attempting to have the two sets of procurement regulations consolidated 
into one. The probable effect is that more time-delays and administra­
tive effort will be required to execute competitive contracts.
Further, even the civilian agencies are allowed to establish 
their own implementing regulations, and these are published as separate 
sections in the Code of Federal Procurement Regulations. Particularly 
for internal clearances, the procedures can differ substantially from 
one agency to another.
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In addition to different administrative policies, the agencies 
differ in the degree of decentralization of procurement authority. For 
external analysis and management services, HUD retains such authority 
in Washington, B.C. Most of the federal agencies are thought to exhibit 
this tendency. But there are some agencies— i.e., the Department of 
Interior and the Department of Defense— in which procurement authority 
is much more decentralized.
Comparability studies need to be performed to assess the impact 
which the relative degree of centralization of procurement authority 
has in influencing the distribution of procurement awards between or­
ganizational types and sub-types and between geographical regions. It 
is suspected, for example, that if external analysis and management 
services were acquired through the regional offices instead of the 
central office in Washington, D.C., there would not be the geographical
imbalance in the distribution of these awards which now seems to
exist. Also, the participation in competition for colleges and uni­
versities would probably increase, while the participation of large 
research institutes might decline. But this might also result in a 
decrease in participation by minority-owned firms, particularly those 
which are owned by blacks. It is hypothesized that there is a much 
higher concentration of black-owned firms in the Washington, D.C., area 
than in any other part of the country because of the high concentra­
tion of blacks in Washington, D.C.
It should also be emphasized that HUD is a relatively small 
agency in comparison with other federal agencies. It is not known 
whether this in itself is a factor which influences the procurement
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process. It may be, for example, that the influence of program offi­
cials is diminished in the larger agencies, because power within the 
bureaucracy is more fragmented. This might have an impact upon the 
degree of abrogation of authority by the contract office.
Finally, the organizational behavior of HUD may be a factor in 
the analysis. That is, HUD may be attempting to conform to the offi­
cial goal of promoting either participation by minorities or by small 
not-for-profit organizations more than what is the norm for federal 
agencies. This might be associated with a relatively higher degree of 
"liberal" beliefs which are reputed to be held more by officials of HUD 
than many other federal agencies. This student observed no such ten­
dency while employed at HUD; furthermore, the pragmatic perspective 
seemed as pervasive at HUD as other federal agencies. And if this is 
true, the presence of liberal or conservative beliefs is irrelevant.
But this cannot be proven, given the scope of this thesis.
Throughout the following discussion, the limitations upon the 
scope of this thesis will be emphasized. There is a great need for 
further research regarding procurement policy and the impact of that 
policy upon service delivery systems. Thus, the following recommenda­
tions should be considered more as areas requiring research than 
suggestions for reform.
This research has indicated that exclusionary procurement 
policies at HUD are inexorably denying access to the procurement pro­
cess by not-for-profit organizations. Further research needs to be 
performed to compare the distributional pattern of awards for services 
other than external analysis and management services (e.g., construe-
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tion) and goods (e.g., furniture). It is suspected that the bureaucra­
cies are instituting exclusionary procurement methods primarily for ex­
ternal analysis and management services. This has the effect of under­
representing small business (both minority and nonminority) participa­
tion in some fields and overrepresenting them in external analysis and 
management services. Since it is only in the latter that not-for- 
profit organizations normally compete, there is a disproportionate im­
pact upon the distribution of awards to these organizations. Probably, 
measures of adherence to official goals need to be kept separately, by 
the General Accounting Office for three major categories of procure­
ment— external analysis and management services, other services, and 
goods.
This research has implied that when small organizations feel 
they are only to compete against other small organizations, they are 
more likely to compete. This needs to be verified by survey to deter­
mine whether this tendency is present not only for prospective 
offerors for awards by HUD, but for awards by other agencies as well.
If it is found that there is indeed a reluctance by small organiza­
tions to compete against larger organizations, the continued utiliza­
tion of small business set-asides is warranted in order to accomplish 
the official goal to increase the participation of small business con­
cerns. However, it should be noted that this analysis detected no in­
ability of small organizations to actually compete against large organ­
izations for HUD awards to perform external analysis and management 
services. Whether this is a tendency throughout the federal system is 
not known, but the hypothesis is that the tendencies discerned for HUD
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in this regard are common for most of the agencies, even though there 
may be some exceptions.
The argument here is that more comparative studies confirm 
the need to establish exclusionary preference on the basis of size, 
then status as a for-profit or not-for-profit organization should not 
deny eligibility to participate. But since not-for-profit organizations 
have offered little or no organized resistance to being so excluded, it 
is doubtful that the Congress will change the Small Business Act to 
allow participation by small not-for-profit organizations.. Without a 
Congressional mandate, the Small Business Administration can be expected 
to resist such a change.
Comparative research also needs to be performed to determine 
whether the ability of 8(a) firms to compete in small business set- 
asides is a general tendency throughout the federal system. If so, 
there would be no evidence of the need for even more exclusionary pro­
curement methods to encourage minority participation— i.e., 8(a) non­
competitive awards and 8(a) competitions. Also, it has been determined 
that women-owned firms and firms o\med by minorities other than blacks 
are particularly underrepresented in the distribution of HUD procure­
ment awards for external analysis and management services. It is not 
known if this is a tendency common to other federal agencies. But it 
may be that 8(a) awards should be only reserved for those organizations 
owned by members of disadvantaged groups who require preferential 
assistance to participate in the market for different categories of 
goods or services (i.e., external analysis and management services, 
goods, .and other services).
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It is suspected that small not-for-profit organizations employ 
a high percentage of both minorities and women. Any policies which 
exclude small not-for-profit organizations from the procurement process 
are likely to have an impact upon the employment of women and minori­
ties. If exclusionary policies are justified in terms of aiding 
members of disadvantaged groups, for-profit or not-for-profit status is 
not applicable, and eligibility should be targeted instead to the 
extent of participation within the respective organizations of disad­
vantaged groups (e.g., women). Further, different weights need to be 
devised (and assigned by the Congress) for different degrees of parti­
cipation at the policy-making, professional, and support levels within 
the organization. Research needs to be conducted to determine how 
such scales could be established and applied to the procurement system.
Finally, this research has implied that whatever the exclu­
sionary criteria, more efficiency needs to be reflected in the selec­
tion process to procure external analysis and management services.
Cost efficiency should be given equal weight with technical profi­
ciency. Less time needs to be spent in the awarding of contracts to 
allow more time to evaluate performance. And it might be that procure­
ment methods should be utilized in the range of awards in which they 
produce the most savings to the Government. Furthermore, additional 
research needs to be conducted to determine whether the tendencies 
associated with HUD procurement methods are common to all federal 
agencies and for the procurement of goods and other types of services.
If the hypotheses mentioned in this section are valid, the im­
plications for radical reform of the procurement system are immense.
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However, it was noted at the beginning of this thesis that expectations 
of radical reform are unrealistic. The inefficiencies and inequities 
inherent in the federal procurement process are little understood by 
Congress and its agents, and only the Congress can change that process. 
This research effort has indicated that the Federal Procurement Data 
System is not designed to provide the information required by Congres­
sional decision-makers to reform procurement policy. Further, a study 
of much broader scope than this thesis and one that is in nature more 
comparative than this thesis is required if tendencies discerned here 
can be verified as requiring Congressional (instead of agency) action. 
It is doubtful, though, whether any reviewer will have the time and re­
sources to conduct a statistically valid study for the entire federal 
government. And even if such a study were feasible, it is doubtful 
whether most federal agencies would allow a direct examination of con­
tract files because of a fear of violating Privacy Act requirments. 
Thus, the prospects for meaningful reform at what Sharkansky terms the 
"margins of government" are dim.^
NOTES FOR CHAPTER V
^Orlans, op. cit., p. 168.
2For a discussion of the competitive situation in which there 
is only one seller (i.e., a "monopolist") and/or only one buyer (i.e., 
a "monopsonist"), see: James Hibdon, Price And Welfare Theory (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969c), pp. 237-271.
3The total amounts awarded for the contracts drawn in the 
sample were as follows: modifications, $9.7 m.; nonexclusionary non­
competitive awards, $3.1 m.; and nonexclusionary competitive awards, 
$13.1 m.
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APPENDIX B; CODEBOOK 
The codebood is arranged by the order of precedence of the 
variables utilized in the computer file. The variables describe charac­
teristics of the organization actually receiving the award. The variable 
names as reflected in the computer file and the fields occupied on the 
data cards are as follows:
VARIABLE COLUMNS VARIABLE COLUMNS
ID 1- • 4 FUNDTYPE 36- 36
PROD 5- 5 RECPROC 37- 37
SP79CD 6— 6 RECSOLE 38- 38
SP80CD 7- 7 REQQTR 39- 40
PRIORACT 8— 9 REQAMT 41- 47
N079ACT 10- 11 BASICQTR 48- 49
N080ACT 12- 13 BASICFEE 50- 55
OTHERACT 14- 15 BASICAMT 56- 62
ORGTYPE 16— 16 BASCTIME 63- 65
ORGSIZE 17- 17 NCOMP 66- 68
EMP 18- 22 NAWARDS 69- 71
MINOWN 23- 23 MODAMT 72- 78
EIGHTA 24- 24 CONID 1- 4
MINTYPE 25- 25 MODFEE 5- 11
WOOWN 26- 26 MODTIME 12- 14
CONTYPE 27- 27 COMPTIME 15- 17
PROCCD 28- 29 PRCTTIME 18- 19
DESCODE 30- 33 INOFFER 20- 26






















Contract Number (ID) 
h u d's official four digit identification number (unique for each 
contract) was used. Prefixes (e.g., "H" or "HC") were deleted.
Action Code— Primary (PRCD)
"Action codes" were selected according to whether there was a 
contractual action, i.e., an original award or a modification which 
increased the amount of the contract. Decreases in the contractual amount 
were not considered as contractual actions, but rather as adjustments 
in the original amount (i.e., the basic amount) of the contract or 
the immediately preceding modification. The following primary 
action codes were used:
0 There were no FY 79 or FY 80 contractual actions.
1 There were no FY 79 or FY 80 basic awards; but there
were FY 79 and/or FY 80 modifications.
2 The basic was awarded in FY 79. There might or
might not have been modifications in FY 79 or FY 80.
3 The basic was awarded in FY 80. There might or
might not have been FY 80 modifications.
Action Codes— Supplemental (SP79CD and SP80CD)
These variables were not used in the analysis. Thus, these 
two fields were reserved for future use.
Contract Actions— Prior To 1979 (PRIORACT)
The number of contractual modifications executed prior to 
FY 79 was indicated in a two-element field.
Contract Actions— 1979 (N079ACT)
The number of contractual modifications executed in FY 79 
was indicated in a two-element field.
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Other Actions (OTHERACT)
The number of noncontractual actions— e.g., Small Business 
Administration "prime" contracts (I.e., clearances), "no money" 
modifications, task orders, and task specifications— executed in all 
fiscal years was recorded in a two-element field.
Organizational Type (ORGTYPE)
The following codes were used to differentiate between 
organizational types (as indicated by the organization itself on the 
Certifications and Representations portion of the file or by other 
sources):
1 . for-profit organizations
2 educational institutions
3 nonprofit research foundations and other not-for- 
profit organizations
Organizational Size (ORGSIZE)
At first, organizational size was coded according to whether 
the organization indicated on the Certifications and Representations 
portion of the file (or other sources) that it was "small" or "large." 
After preliminary runs on the computer, a more objective criterion 
was utilized. Codes used were:
1 "small" (the organization employing fewer than 200
employees)
2 "large" (the organization employing greater than
or equal to 200 employees)
Employment (BMP)
The number of employees of the organization receiving the 
award was entered into a five element field.
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Minority Ownership (MINOWN)
The codes used to indicate minority ownership (i.e., fifty-one 
percent of the stock held by minorities) were as follows:
1 minority owned
2 not minority owned
8(a) Status (EIGHTA)
The following codes were utilized to indicate whether an 
organization was eligible to participate in the Small Business Adminis­
tration’s 8(a) program:
1 organization has 8(a) status
2 organization does not have 8(a) status
Minority Type (MINTYPE)
The following codes were utilized to indicate the racial 
type of minority ownership as indicated in the Certifications and Represen­




3 American Indian/Alaskan Native
4 Asian/Pacific Islander
Woman Ownership (WOOWN)
The following codes were utilized to indicate whether the organi­





This information was collected only for those organizations 
which had primary action codes of 1, 2, or 3. Codes used were:
1 cost-reimbursement contract
2 fixed-price contract
3 indefinite quantity contract
9 not applicable (i.e., had a "0" primary action code)
Procurement Method (PROCCD)
Originally, sixteen codes were used to describe the pro­
curement method utilized for the basic award. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the number of codes was reduced to seven. These were:




14 Competitive, Exclusionary (to for-profit organizations
which had 8(a) status)
16 Competitive, Exclusionary (to not-for-profit
organizations)
24 Competitive, Nonexclusionary
31 Noncompetitive, Exclusionary (to 8(a) organizations)
34 Noncompetitive, Nonexclusionary
Description Code (DESCODE)
HUD's list of description codes for differentiating between the 
various types of services was utilized. The codes were renumbered to 
delete alphanumeric characters. This resulted in 20 primary description 
codes and 24 supplemental description codes. In the analysis, only 
four of the primary description codes and eight of the supplemental
—218-
codes were utilized. The other codes referred to services other 
than what is herein understood as external analysis and management
services o£ they were inapplicable to purchases by HUD. The codes
utilized were as follows:
Primary Description Codes Supplemental Description Codes








1113 Management and Professional 
Services
1114 Special Studies and Analyses
1140 Training Services none
2000 Research and Development 2020 Community Services and 
Development




The only difference between the codes utilized by HUD and by this 
student involved "ADP Systems Analyses" under code 1114 (Special Studies 
And Analyses). For the sake of clarity, all automatic data processing 
services (including ADP Systems Analyses) were coded 1112 (Automatic 
Data Processing Services).
Requesting Office (OFF)
Codes utilized to desinate the HUD program office initiating 
the request for the procurement were as follows:
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1 Office of the Secretary, Office of the General 
Counsel, Office of the Inspector General, or Office 
of Legislation and Intergovernmental Relations
2 Assistant Secretary^ for Community Planning and 
Development
3 New Community Development Corporation
4 Government National Mortgage Association
5 Assistant Secretary for Housing
6 Assistant Secretary for Neighborhoods, Voluntary 
Associations, and Consumer Protection
7 Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and 
Research
8 Assistant Secretary for Administration
9 Not applicable (i.e., had a "0" primary action code)
Fund Type (FUNDTYPE)
The following codes were used to denote whether the program 
office would lose the reserved amount of funds if those funds were not 




9 not applicable (i.e., had a "0” or "1" primary
action code)
Recommended Procurement Method (RECPROC)
The following codes were used to denote whether the procurement 
method actually used to award the contract by the contract office was 




9 not applicable (i.e., had a "0" or ”1" primary
action code)
Recommended Sole Source (RECSOLE)
The following codes were utilized to identify whether the 
organization receiving the contract (from the contract office) was 
recommended as a sole source by the program office:
0 not applicable. The program office requested a
competitive contract.
1 The sole source awarded the contract was the same
as that recommended by the program office.
2 The sole source awarded the contract was not the
same as that recommended by the program office.
3 The program office requested a sole source procurement,
but did not specify any particular organization.
9 not applicable (i.e., has a "0" or "1" primary
action code.
Request Quarter (REQQTR)
The following codes were utilized to denote the quarter in 
which the request for the basic procurement was made:
9 not applicable (i.e., had a "0" or "1" primary
action code)
11 first quarter, FY 1978
12 second quarter, FY 1978
13 third quarter, FY 1978
14 fourth quarter, FY 1978
21 first quarter, FY 1979
22 second quarter, FY 1979
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23 fourth quarter, FY 1979
24 fourth quarter, FY 1979
31 first quarter, FY 1980
32 second quarter, FY 1980
Request Amount (REQAMT)
A seven element field.was utilized to denote the amount reserved 
by the program office for that particular procurement. A ”9” denoted 
that REQAMT was not applicable, i.e., the award had a "0" or "1" 
primary action code.
Basic Quarter (BASICQTR)
The codes used to indicate the quarter in which the basic 
contract was awarded were the same as for the variable REQQTR (see 
above).
Basic Fee (BASICFEE)
A six element field was utilized to denote the amount of fee
awarded under that particular procurement. A ”9" denoted a not 
applicable award with an action code of "0" or "1" £r with CONTYPE 
equalling 2 or 3.
Basic Amount (BASICAMT)
A seven element field was utilized to denote the total amount 
of the basic award. A "9" denoted an award with an action code of "0"
or "1" (i.e., not applicable for this procurement).
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Basic Time (BASCTIME)
The difference between the request date and the award date— by 
number of days— was entered in a three element field. A "9" denoted 
a "0" or "1" award.
Number of Competitors (NCOMP)
If a competitive procurement, the number of competitors in the 
initial competition was used. If a noncompetitive award, NCOMP would 
equal 1. If the action code equalled "0" or "1", NCOMP was not applic­
able for this procurement and was denoted by a "9".
Number of Awards (NAWARDS)
If a competitive procurement, the number of contracts awarded 
as a result of the RFP (used as a basis for selecting the recipient(s) 
of the award) was used. If a noncompetitive award, NAWARDS would 
equal 1. If the primary action code was "0".or "1", NAWARDS was not 
applicable for this procurement and was denoted by a "9".
Total Amount of Current Modifications (MODAMT)
All FY 79 and FY 80 modifications were aggregated into a 
seven element field. If the action code were "0", MODAMT was not 
applicable for this procurement and was denoted as "9”.
Contract ID (CONID)
This was an identifing variable to denote the beginning of the 
second card of the case and is identical to ID.
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Total Amount of "Mod" Fees (MODFEE)
All FY 79 and FY 80 fees awarded as a result of modifications 
were aggregated Into a seven element field. If the action code were 
"0" or CONTYPE equaled 2 or 3, MODFEE was not applicable for this 
procurement and was denoted by "9".
Average Time for Modification (MODTIME)
The Individual differences between the request date for the 
modification and the modification award date were averaged (In days).
If MODFEE equaled 9, then MODTIME equaled 9.
Competitive Time (COMPTIME)
The difference (In days) between the date proposals were 
received In response to any given RFP and the date the final selection 
was made was entered Into a 3 element field. If this was a non­
competitive procurement, or If the primary action code was 0 or 1, 
then 9 was entered.
Note: If COMPTIME equaled 9, then all of the following
variables had to equal 9. Either the award had an action code of 0 
or 1, or the award was a noncompetitive procurement, and the variable 
was not applicable to that procurement. When 9 Indicates something 
In addition to the above. It will be specified. Otherwise to avoid 
repetition, no explanation will be forwarded.
Competitive Time as Percent of Total Time (PRCTTIME)
PRCTTIME was calculated by dividing COMPTIME by BASCTTIME and 
then multiplying by 100.
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Initial Offer (INOFFER)
The initial offer of the successful organization was shown 
in a seven element field. When CONTYPE equaled 3, INOFFER had to 
equal 9 (i.e., not applicable).
Technical Score (TECHSCOR)
The score received by the successful organization in the 
initial competition was indicated in a 2 element field.
Least Cost (LEASTCST)
The following codes were used to denote whether the organiza­
tion winning the award offered the least cost alternative:
1 yes
2 no
9 not applicable (i.e., a 0 or 1 action code, a
noncompetitive procurement, and/or CONTYPE 
equaled 3).
High Score (HISCOR)
The following codes were used to denote whether the organiza­





The following codes were used to denote which class the 
winning organization's initial offer belonged to:
1 third third (least expensive cost class)
2 second third
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first third (most expensive)
not applicable (i.e., a 0 or 1 award, a noncompetitive 
procurement, or CONTYPE equaled 3)
Cost Rank (COSTRANK)
The relative cost rank of the successful organization in the 
initial competition was indicated in a three element field. When 
CONTYPE equaled 3, COSTRANK equaled 9.
Technical Class (TECHCLAS)
The following codes were used to denote which class the winning 
organization's initial technical score belonged to:
1 first third (group of highest scores)
2 second third
3 third third (group of lowest scores)
Technical Rank (TECHRANK)
The relative technical rank of the successful organization 
in the initial competition was indicated in a three element field.
Note: The following variables corresponded with the variables
utilized to summarize the initial competitive process. These variables 
referred to the "best and final" competitive process. Codes used were 
identical in meaning to those used for initial competition. In those 
cases where there was initial competition, but no best and final com­
petition, a "9" was reflected in all of the best and final variables.
In addition, a "9" could have the meaning previously described for 
initial competition variables.






















Time Given to Submit Proposals (RFPTIME)
The time given to submit proposals was the difference (in days) 
between the date specified on the RFP as the issuance date and the 
date specified on the last modification to the RFP as the date after 
which proposals would not be accepted (if no modifications, the date 
so specified in the RFP was used).
Number of Sources (NSOURCES)
The number of organizations (i.e., "sources") sent the RFP 
was reflected in a four element field.
Number of Offers (NOFFERS)
The number of organizations responding to the RFP was 
reflected in a three element field.
Source Code (SOURCECD)
The following codes were utilized to reflect whether not- 
for-profit organizations were invited to submit proposals for this 
procurement:
0 The source list did not include not-for-profit
organizations.
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The source list did include not-for-profit 
organizations.
SOURCECD was not applicable to this procurement. 
Either the primary action code equaled 0 or 1, or 
this was a noncompetitive procurement.
Offer Code (OFFERCD)
The following codes were utilized to reflect whether not- 
for-profit organizations submitted proposals in response to the RFP;
0 No offers were received from not-for-profit 
organizations.
1 Offers were received from not-for-profit organizations 
in response to this RFP.
9 Not applicable (for the some reasons as for SOURCECD).
